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ABSTRACT  
 
 
To improve the resilience of complex, interdependent infrastructures, we need to 
better understand the institutions that manage infrastructures and the work that they do. 
This research demonstrates that a key aspect of infrastructure resilience is the adequate 
institutional management of infrastructures. This research analyzes the institutional 
dimension of infrastructure resilience using sociotechnical systems theory and, further, 
investigates the critical role of institutions for infrastructure resilience using a thorough 
analysis of water and energy systems in Arizona.  
 
Infrastructure is not static, but dynamic. Institutions play a significant role in 
designing, building, maintaining, and upgrading dynamic infrastructures. Institutions 
create the appearance of infrastructure stability while dynamically changing 
infrastructures over time, which is resilience work. The resilience work of different 
institutions and organizations sustains, recovers, adapts, reconfigures, and transforms the 
physical structure on short, medium, and long temporal scales. 
 
To better understand and analyze the dynamics of sociotechnical infrastructure 
resilience, this research examines several case studies. The first is the social and 
institutional arrangements for the allocation of resources from Hoover Dam. This 
research uses an institutional analysis framework and draws on the institutional landscape 
of water and energy systems in Arizona. In particular, this research illustrates how 
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institutions contribute to differing resilience work at temporal scales while fabricating 
three types of institutional threads: lateral, vertical, and longitudinal threads.  
 
This research also highlights the importance of institutional interdependence as a 
critical challenge for improving infrastructure resilience. Institutional changes in one 
system can disrupt other systems’ performance. The research examines this through case 
studies that explore how changes to water governance impact the energy system in 
Arizona. Groundwater regulations affect the operation of thermoelectric power plants 
which withdraw groundwater for cooling. Generation turbines, droughts, and water 
governance are all intertwined via institutions in Arizona.  
 
This research, finally, expands and applies the interdependence perspective to a 
case study of forest management in Arizona. In a nutshell, the perilous combination of 
chronic droughts and the engineering resilience perspective jeopardizes urban water and 
energy systems. Wildfires caused by dense forests have legitimized an institutional 
transition, from thickening forests to thinning trees in Arizona.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Statement and Theoretical Contributions 
The usual engineering approach to the resilience of infrastructure—understood as 
a physical, engineered, and technological systems—defines resilience in terms of the 
ability of an infrastructure to return (or be returned) to its original state after being 
exposed to a particular class of risks. A key shortcoming of this approach is that it 
assumes the original state of the infrastructure to be a static feature of the physical, 
engineered, and technological systems that make up the infrastructure. This assumption is 
always false. After any infrastructure is built, it changes dynamically over time. Some of 
these changes are physical: the infrastructure material degrades or the physical systems in 
which it is embedded alter, e.g., due to climatic or other environmental changes. Equally 
importantly, other changes result from human intervention. Operational and management 
decisions impact the state of an infrastructure at any given moment in time. Degraded 
systems are repaired, replaced, upgraded, or left in place. Parts of the infrastructure may 
be improved, adapted, transformed, or removed. And the human-built environment 
around the infrastructure evolves. All of these changes result from individual and 
institutional choices about how to manage the infrastructure and its surroundings. And all 
of these changes also have the potential to significantly impact how the infrastructure 
behaves during and after a disaster. Resilience cannot simply be understood as a problem 
of how infrastructures behave after a disaster; it must also be understood as a problem of 
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how people and institutions behave before a disaster. This dissertation examines one 
important facet of the latter aspect of resilience, which will be defined as the resilience 
work of institutions: the work that institutions do to design, build, operate, maintain, 
adapt, and transform infrastructures over time that impacts the performance of those 
infrastructures during a disaster. 
 
Consider a dam on a river. Although the infrastructure seems static, it isn’t. The 
amount of water held behind the dam at any moment of time is managed dynamically, in 
order to avoid flooding, with water being released from the dam periodically, or 
withdrawn from the reservoir, in order to create new capacity to absorb future water 
flows, as well as to provide water for the services that the dam provides, such as 
irrigation, flood control, or hydroelectric power. The infrastructure physically degrades 
over time and must therefore be carefully monitored, maintained, and repaired over time, 
in order to maintain its performance and prevent catastrophic failures. Moreover, the 
dam’s social and ecological environment changes over time, e.g., a town built below the 
dam might grow significantly or alter its policies for building within the river’s 
floodplain, changing the parameters under which water may be released from the 
reservoir, or the patterns of rainfall shift due to climate change, in either case 
necessitating adaptation of the infrastructure (e.g., the building of Roosevelt Dam on the 
Salt River higher in the 1980s, after devastating floods in Phoenix) or the construction of 
a new pipe, lower in the reservoir behind Hoover Dam, to feed water to Las Vegas from 
Lake Mead. Sometimes the whole value proposition for the infrastructure changes and 
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society decides, e.g., to remove the dam and to do something different entirely. 72 dams 
were removed, for example, in the US in 2016.  
 
To address these deficiencies in making decisions for infrastructural resilience 
management, this dissertation offers a new model of infrastructure resilience that has 
three key adjustments.  
 
a. This research defines infrastructures not as physical-engineered-technological 
systems but rather as sociotechnical systems, with a particular emphasis on the 
institutions that manage infrastructures. This idea can be applied to any infrastructure, 
and it encompasses a wide array of potential institutions. Take roads. Roads involve 
numerous institutions that support their construction and management, such as 
government budgets, markets for materials, construction companies, urban planning, 
legal regimes, such as eminent domain, the education, training, and licensing of 
workforces, gas stations, road signs, traffic signals, administrative traffic regulations, and 
so on. Without these institutions, roads cannot be designed, built, and provide spaces for 
traffic service in society (Chapter 2).    
 
b. This research redefines resilience not as bouncing back but rather as a complex 
combination of dynamics and achievements on multiple timescales, including: (1) the 
short-term achievement of stability, meaning that flooding on the river is significantly 
reduced through the proper operation and maintenance of the dam; (2) the medium-term 
achievement of adaptation to new conditions, e.g., altering the dams operational rules and 
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even physical characteristics in response to changes in streamflow patterns; and (3) the 
long-term achievement of transformation of infrastructures to meet new societal goals 
and objectives. Lack of resilience occurs when institutions are unable to achieve these 
outcomes in relation to the infrastructure. This definition makes clear that resilience is not 
homogeneous, but rather the multi-faceted outcome of institutions’ processes of 
reasoning about what kinds of risks to worry about and respond to, on what kinds of 
timescales. Towards this end, some scholars in systems engineering have argued for 
focusing on systems processes—sensing (monitoring), anticipating, adapting, and 
learning—as key elements in improving infrastructure resilience (Hollnagel 2011; Park et 
al. 2013). Each of these processes, however, must be institutionalized in infrastructure-
related organizations. Institutional analysis, thus, is indispensable to the analysis of 
resilience (Chapter 3).  
 
c. This research highlights and emphasizes the resilience work of institutions, 
including the work of developing and deploying knowledge about the infrastructure (e.g., 
dams and roads) and its performance vis-à-vis various anticipated risks, as well as the 
work of opening, maintaining, repairing, adapting, and transforming institutions, as it is 
critical to the performance of resilience. This work determines how systems perform 
under different kinds of shocks and the means through which the institution achieves 
resilience or not. The resilience features of infrastructures are the results of the ongoing 
institutionalization of epistemological conception, regulation, knowledge, and 
explicit/tacit protocols at any given time. Given human intentionality of institutions in 
society (Holling, 2001), infrastructures, in response to disturbances ranging from normal 
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stressors to uncertain challenges, must rely on decision making, behavioral adaptations, 
and organizational coordination for resilience expressed and coordinated through 
institutional dynamics (Chapter 4).  
 
1.2 Chapter Descriptions  
This dissertation begins with a set of theoretical explorations of the resilience of 
sociotechnical systems (Chapter 2, 3, and 4). The rest of the dissertation (Chapter 5, 6, 7, 
8, and 9) then applies the resulting insights to analyze different case studies of the water-
energy nexus in Arizona.   
 
Chapter 2 introduces the concepts of systems theory, sociotechnical systems, and 
institutions. This chapter illustrates the theoretical development of systems theory and 
sociotechnical systems theory through which the resilience of infrastructures will be 
articulated in the following chapters.  
 
Chapter 3 connects this sociotechnical concept to resilience. Chapter 3’s main 
contribution is that it argues for a new definition of resilience based on the sociotechnical 
approach to infrastructure dynamics. Particularly, Chapter 3 explains the key role of 
institutions with respect to this redefinition.  
 
Chapter 4 proposes a topological framework that explains the types of resilience 
work by institutions within scales. Resilience work at different temporal and spatial 
scales, with different organizations, goals, and uncertainties is the main focus of this 
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chapter. Chapter 4 also highlights the institutional interdependencies of infrastructures. 
By institutional interdependency, the dissertation means the linking of multiple 
infrastructures through social, economic, or institutional relationships. In 2011, for 
example, a major tsunami decimated manufacturing in Japan and caused extensive 
weakness in US markets. This vulnerability resulted not from physical or technological 
interdependencies but because of supply chain arrangements that linked the two 
economies (Nanto et al., 2011). Institutional interdependencies are frequently a property 
of infrastructures and significant contributors to infrastructure vulnerability or resilience. 
Therefore, the analysis of interdependencies should be incorporated into the analyses of 
infrastructure resilience.  
 
Chapter 5 applies the sociotechnical systems theory to a particular case study: the 
way that the allocation of water and hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam have been 
constituted, regulated, and operationalized by social and institutional arrangements. In 
particular, this chapter examines the institutional dynamics of resource allocation (e.g., 
reservoir water and hydroelectricity) through a lens of common pool resource 
management of Hoover Dam, describing how the utilities and purposes of a technical 
infrastructure are defined and sustainably adapted or transformed in social backgrounds 
and within institutional arrangements.  
 
To better understand and analyze institutional interdependence, Chapter 6 focuses 
on water availability issues and the management of Arizona’s water-energy nexus in 
response to water scarcity challenges. Chapter 6 describes the current landscape of water 
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and energy systems and organizations (e.g., the history of SRP) in Arizona and unbundles 
the complex structure of institutional threads (e.g., lateral, vertical, and longitudinal 
threads) of interdependencies in infrastructures. Chapter 6 illustrates how water and 
energy systems have integrated the physical and institutional infrastructures to supply 
water and electricity to the city of Phoenix. Institutions work to control water 
fluctuations, regulate groundwater consumption, and initiate federal level canal 
construction and water allocation which aims for the resilience of water and energy 
systems in Arizona.  
 
Chapter 7 investigates the interdependencies of water and energy systems. This 
chapter focuses on institutional interdependence and interactions between two different 
systems rather than engineering interdependencies. For instance, the impact of ‘shortage 
declaration’ in Colorado River allocation impacts both the management of water supply 
systems and the management of thermoelectric power plants which use diverse sources of 
water (e.g., Colorado River water, surface water, and underground stored water) for 
cooling in Arizona.  
 
Chapter 8 examines risk politics of water and energy systems detailed from the 
perspective of risk innovation by Andrew D. Maynard (Maynard, 2015). In this Chapter, 
the diverse threats (e.g., socio-eco-technical threats) to communities’ values and cultures 
will be examined in relation to the resilience of infrastructures. In this Chapter, 
infrastructure resilience is reinterpreted and explained from the point of view of the risk 
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politics of values and cultures embedded in different constituencies (Mary Douglas’s 
grid-grip analysis).  
 
Chapter 9 applies the analysis framework and other institutional analyses done in 
the previous chapters to ‘forest management’ in Arizona. Chapter 9 investigates the 
institutional transition from ‘thickening’ forests due to fire suppression to managed 
‘thinning’ of those forests to enhance their resilience to wildfire, and the implications of 
that for water and energy systems and functions in Arizona. In brief, the institutional 
analysis of infrastructure resilience extends to the socio-eco-technical contexts of 
Arizona.  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with a summary of this research, policy 
suggestions, and plans for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE AS SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 will first introduce systems theory in order to focus on the concept of 
the development and function of infrastructure as not only technological and material but 
also as outcomes of human institutional dynamics that change in response to social 
influences. The initial shape of technology was relatively simple; however, since the 
advent of the Industrial Revolution to the present, the rapid increase of human 
populations has been affecting the design of technological systems in society. As 
technological systems grow in scale and complexity, a new approach in operating and 
managing these complicated infrastructures is needed. Therefore, massive and highly 
interdependent technological systems should emphasize frequent and tight interactions 
between social and technical components. In this context, a new concept of the socio-
technological system has been accentuated (Werfs & Baxter, 2013). The socio-
technological system perspective is perceived of as essential in examining a complicated 
system by considering the tight interdependence and interactions between a society and a 
technological system. As such, infrastructures cannot be resilient without being properly 
operated, managed, and planned by human organizations and institutions. Operation, 
management and planning are usually based on particular norms and rules called 
institutions or social infrastructures (Anderies et al., 2004). In a sociotechnical system, 
maintaining a resilient system frequently means a proper operation, management and 
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planning of a system by several appropriate institutions. In other words, infrastructure is a 
sociotechnical complex system governed by human institutions and organizational 
decision making.  
 
2.2 Systems Theory  
This research analyzes infrastructures using a systems approach to show the 
characteristics of infrastructures as dynamic and open, sociotechnical systems. By 
definition, a system is “any entity, conceptual or physical, which consists of 
interdependent parts” (Ackoff, 1969, p.332). Thus, a systems approach is, here, defined 
as a holistic method for considering the interdependence of components to assess 
systems-level problems or phenomena. This follows Bertalanffy’s ideas, which focus on 
the complex interdependence of independent components and the feedbacks that occur 
among them. This contrasts with more static approaches that focus on organization as 
‘closed systems’ (Trist, 1978) and the engineering performance of individual 
infrastructures or components. Instead, Bertalanffy’s approaches to “feedbacks” and 
“open systems” examines what happens when dynamic components and their failures 
interact with other components. “Feedbacks, in man-made machines as well as in 
organisms, are based upon structural arrangements” (Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 28) in which 
the behavior of each part influences the behavior of other parts, thus rendering them 
interdependent and “a system.” Open systems are dependent on the exchange of 
components which enter and come out of them while “maintaining themselves in 
exchange of materials with environment, and in continuous building up and breaking 
down of their components” (Bertalnanffy, 1950).  
  11 
 
The theory of development and of life in general must be a ‘system theory’—that 
is no more to be doubted or disputed. The question only remains what relation 
there is between this ‘system theory’ and physics. (…) We have also seen that the 
chemical and physico-chemical theories, Goldschmidt’s theory, crystal analogy, 
Gestalt theory, cannot yield a complete explanation of development. There 
remains, therefore, for the present state of investigation at least, only one 
possibility: that of an ‘organismic’ theory, using specific biological concepts. 
(Bertalanffy, 1933 translated by Woodger, pp.180-181). 
 
In contrast to Descartes’ reductionism, Bertalanffy’s systems view emphasizes the 
Aristotelian viewpoint: “The whole is more than the sum of its parts” (Bertalanffy, 1972, 
p.407). Accordingly, modern technology, including infrastructure, should be conceived of 
as a system and necessitates a holistic analysis on the dynamic performance of a system 
rather than a reductionist analysis (Bertalnaffy, 1972, p.420). The Tavistock Institute in 
the UK expanded the systemic dynamics of Bertalanffy’s systems theory to include social 
and institutional components in the 1960s (Mumford, 2006), labeling the resulting system 
an open, sociotechnical system.   
 
Granted the importance of system analysis there remains the important question 
of whether an enterprise should be construed as a ‘closed’ or an ‘open system’, i.e. 
relatively ‘closed’ or ‘open’ with respect to its external environment (Emery & Trist, 
1960, p. 84). The technological component has been found to play a key mediating role 
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and hence it follows that the open system concept must be referred to the socio-technical 
system, not simply to the social system of an enterprise (Emery & Trist, 1960, p.86). 
Considering enterprises as ‘open socio-technical systems’ helps to provide a more 
realistic picture of how they are both influenced by and able to act back on their 
environment (Emery & Trist, 1960, p.94). Open systems “may spontaneously re-
organize towards states of greater heterogeneity and complexity, and that they achieve a 
‘steady state’ at a level where they can still do work (Trist, 1978, p.45). Organizations 
governing sociotechnical systems should remain open to society for transparency and 
accountability.  
 
The conception of sociotechnical systems was created and circulated for “the joint 
optimization of the social and technical systems” while studying the relationship between 
technological performance, economic production, and mining industries (Mumford, 2006, 
p.321; Bertalanffy, 1950; Emery & Trist, 1960). Building on Bertalanffy’s systems 
theory, Thomas Hughes also used a sociotechnical systems approach to analyze large 
infrastructure developments (Hughes, 1983, p. 5; Bertalanffy, 1933; 1950; 1968; 1972). 
“Technological systems contain messy, complex, problem-solving components. They are 
both socially constructed and society shaping” (Hughes, 1987, p. 51). Hughes argued that 
sociotechnical systems evolve following a pattern of phases—invention, development, 
innovation, technology transfer, growth, competition, consolidation, momentum—on 
their way to becoming ‘large technological systems’ (LTS). According to Hughes, the 
evolution of technologies such as large-scale infrastructures is not just an engineering 
problem-solving process, but a systematic and complex co-evolution of social and 
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technical arrangements and dynamics including diverse institutions (e.g., regulations) and 
participants (e.g., firms, utilities and investors). (Hughes, 1983; 1987; see also Pinch & 
Bijker, 1984). Viewed from this perspective, infrastructure can be understood in terms of 
the “complex interactions between humans, machines and the environmental aspects of 
the work system” (Baxter & Sommerville, 2011, p. 5).  
 
2.3 The Diversified Applications of Systems Theory and Sociotechnical Systems 
Systems theory has widely affected the conceptualization of sociotechnical 
systems. Social science and engineering field such as modern organization theory (Elinor 
Ostrom and others), Social Studies of Science and Technology (STS) (Bruno Latour and 
Langdon Winner), infrastructure as common pool resources (Frischmann, 2012 ), safety 
engineering (Erik Hollnagel and others), and sociotechnical infrastructure systems (Rolf 
W. Künneke), all of which congruently describe infrastructures as dynamic, open, 
sociotechnical systems. The next sections will evaluate how diverse scholarship has 
developed from the initial sociotechnical systems theory and evolved with other areas 
while contributing the conceptualization of sociotechnical systems as dynamic, open, and 
complex systems.    
 
2.3.1 Modern organizational theory and Hughes’ large technical systems  
Hughes’ sociotechnical systems approach is basically rooted in Bertalanffy’s 
general systems theory (Hughes, 1983, p.5; Bertalanffy, 1933). As Hughes (1983) stated, 
Bertalanffy’s work crucially affected his system conception and systems thinking for the 
development of the electricity system. Usually in this study, “system” refers to a 
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technical system, such as an electric transmission system. Sometimes the reference is, as 
noted, to a system with interacting components, some of which are not technical (Hughes, 
1983, p.6).   
 
Hughes’ notion of ‘open system’ is in accordance with the foundation of modern 
organizational theory, which is focused on the interactions between organizations 
and environments. Before the introduction of ‘open system,’ social scientists 
emphasized the conception of ‘closed system,’ and made efforts to define the 
characteristics of ‘organization itself’ (Emery & Trist, 1960, p.84).  
 
In practice the system theorists in social science (and these include such key 
anthropologists as Radcliffe-Brown) refused to recognise these implications but 
instead, by the same token, did “tend to focus on the statics of social structure and 
to neglect the study of structural change” (Emery & Trist, 1960, p.84) 
 
As Emery & Trist (1960) stated, before the conception of ‘open system’ was widely 
accepted, social scientists focused on how organizations are formalized and what 
determinants differentiate organizations from institutions rather than what makes 
organizations changes and how environments affect organizational structures and 
cultures. Thus, before the introduction of the ‘open system’ conception, old 
institutionalism focused on the ‘internal structure’ and ignored the ‘external environment’ 
(Trist, 1978, p.44).   
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Since the introduction of old institutionalism’s distinction between institutions 
and organizations, organizations are regarded as a loose and unstable structure with a 
limited technical competence, but as organizations go through the process of 
‘institutionalization,’ institutionalized organizations “take on a special character and to 
achieve a distinctive competence or, perhaps, a trained or built-in incapacity” (Selznick, 
1996, p.271). According to Selznick (1996), institutions have “orderly, stable, socially 
integrating patterns.” New institutionalists view institutions as ‘rules, norms, and 
equilibria’ which govern and intervene in human interactions and performances in 
organizations (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995).  
 
In particular, new institutionalists investigate how environments interact with 
organizations and how social institutions control human behaviors in organizations. 
Furthermore, ‘new institutionalists,’ who focus on the bounded rationality of individuals, 
argue that collective action cannot be reduced to individual behaviors (Selznick, 1996). 
This notion crucially affected the further development of sociotechnical systems and 
shared common ground with systems thinking theory. Their notion that “[the] properties 
of supraindividual units of analysis… cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct 
consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p.8) 
resonate with the idea of complex systems thinking and sociotechnical systems as 
dynamic and open systems. In contrast to Descartes’ engineering reductionism, the 
sociotechnical systems approach inheriting new institutionalism is congruent with 
Aristotelian systems thinking.  
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2.3.2 Bruno Latour’s hybridized network and the modernity paradox of 
infrastructures 
According to Latour (1991), the world is a system of networks. Modern society 
has struggled with a modernity dilemma of purification which creates two distinct 
ontological zones dissociating humans from nonhumans (p. 10). They have put the 
epistemological ‘Great Divide’ between human culture and nonhuman nature as seen in 
John Wesley Powell’s report, ‘1878 Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United 
States’.  
 
The central assumption of his plan—and it seems to have been Powell’s 
controlling idea through his entire Washington career—was that the wild rivers of 
the West had to be mastered. “All the waters of all the arid lands will eventually 
be taken from their natural channels,” (…) (Worster, 1985, p.134)  
 
However, the more the moderns reject hybrids, which is a mixture and networks of 
humans and nonhumans, the more they have, through translation, quasi-objects or 
‘interbreeding’ such as “one continuous chain the chemistry of the upper atmosphere, 
scientific and industrial strategies, the preoccupations of heads of state, the anxieties of 
ecologists” (Latour, 1991, p.10) (Fig. 1).  
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Figure 1. Purification of translation (Latour, 1991) 
 
This is a paradox of modernity. Modern society has no choice but to depend on 
technologies, and these technologies and social arrangements are more entangled in 
networks of modern society. Efforts to make a concrete division between human society 
and nature rely heavily on technologies, which entails more mediation and translation 
work between human organizations and technological apparatuses.  
 
What link is there between the work of translation or mediation and that of 
purification? This is the question on which I should like to shed light. My 
hypothesis – which remains too crude—is that the second has made the first 
possible: the more we forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the more possible 
their interbreeding becomes—such is the paradox of the moderns, which the 
exceptional situation in which we find ourselves today allows us finally to grasp 
(Latour, 1991, p.12). 
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Along these lines, infrastructure as quasi-objects symbolizes Latour’s modernity paradox. 
Moderns have endeavored to protect and sustain its society with both ontological and 
epistemological division from nature. Infrastructure for modern stability has coped with 
nature’s uncertainties and instability. The ‘Great Divide’ between society and nature is a 
result of the investment of financial and ‘purified’ natural resources into soft (culture, 
rules, standards, norms, protocols) and hard (dams, roads, railways, electricity grids etc.) 
infrastructures. More importantly, despite this robust dissociation (or purification), on the 
other hand, infrastructure should be interconnected for consistent performance as 
networks. In other words, the infrastructural accomplishment of societal stability is 
basically based on two characteristics of infrastructure: robust disconnection from nature 
and tight interconnectedness of networks. Modern infrastructural functionality can be 
sustained by the dissociation of built environments from nature as Latour (1991) stated. 
Dikes put boundaries around rivers and separate inhabitants from nature. Modern 
networks such as infrastructures epitomize the division work of modern science and 
technology (Latour, 1991; Edwards, 2003). The problem that, as Latour (1991) diagnosed 
and anticipated, modern society needs additional technologies in order to construct 
clearer boundaries around society. Engineered hybrids (e.g., dams, dikes, roads, rails, 
grids, aqueducts, and telecommunication towers) and hybridized management have been 
more and more intertwined and become more interdependent. We’ve used infrastructures 
to face nature and divorce ourselves from its risks, but this has been possible only by 
thoroughly fashioning interdependent society and technologies. “We have never been 
modern” with respect to hybridized, open, and complex infrastructure networks.  
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This paradoxical ‘Great Divide’ matches engineering scholars’ recent diagnoses 
of modern infrastructure jeopardized by complex networks. Additional proliferation of 
translation (network society) for interdependent infrastructure needs more back-up plans 
and redundant resources via complex networks, which exacerbate the vulnerabilities of 
infrastructure (Rinaldi et al., 2001). This is a well-known network dilemma. However, his 
analysis has a limitation as a useful tool for resolving the infrastructure dilemma. Despite 
the great insight on the networks of hybrids, Latour (1991) failed to suggest a realistic 
governance framework in response to the modern dilemma. Furthermore, Latour’s 
‘actant’ concept and its lack of discrimination on both human and nonhuman actants can 
be conceived of as a disdain for human dignity.      
 
2.3.3 STS, infrastructures, and design politics 
In Science and Technology Studies (STS), infrastructure has been interpreted as a 
heterogeneous, open, and dynamic assemblage of law, history, culture, politics, policy, 
technology, and science (Star, 1999; Jenssen et al., 2015). Infrastructure is not just a 
physical or material structure, but a ‘deliberate design’ as seen in Winner’s (1980) 
analysis. The design of infrastructures, (e.g., the height of the Long Island bridge) is a 
resultant negotiation of political and social tensions between heterogeneous communities 
(Winner, 1980). According to Winner (1980; 1993), infrastructure is essentially open to 
politics and society. Thus, the neutrality of social construction of technologies should be 
rejected, and instead society must reflect on technopolitics, social inequality, 
technological ethics, technology and labor unions, and environmental justice regarding 
infrastructures.  
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More broadly, to Winner, even the invention of technology is political. For 
instance, tomato harvesters invented by the University of California replaced handpicking 
with cost-efficient machines in the agricultural industry. In the 1970s, about 32,000 
farmworkers lost their jobs. Later, the creation of tomato harvesters developed into 
litigation between the University of California and California Rural Legal Assistance. 
The University of California was charged with the inappropriate consumption of 
governmental subsidy, which came from taxpayers, for private groups such as 
agricultural companies at the expense of detrimental impacts on rural communities. The 
innocuous invention of machines became inherently political in rural areas of California.  
 
The issues that divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the 
institutions and practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in 
tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts 
(Winner, 1980, p.128). 
 
Winner (1980; 1993) criticizes ‘social construction’ while focusing on social values 
around the process of production, infusion, consumption, and consolidation of 
technologies. Winner’s contribution to sociotechnical systems theory is to open a space 
for discussion on how to open, whether to open, who will open, and how to use 
technologies inside the ‘black boxes.’ Winner’s evaluation on the similarities between 
technologies and ‘legislative acts’ (Winner, 1980, p.128) is reminiscent of the 
conceptions of boundary object such as Star’s (1999) infrastructure and Busch’s (2011) 
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standards. Consolidated technologies as ‘boundary objects’ appear differently to different 
groups (Star and Ruhleder, 1996). “[An] infrastructure occurs when local practices are 
afforded by a larger-scale technology, which can then be used in a natural, ready-to-hand 
fashion” (Star & Ruhleder, 1996, p.6). To Winner, infrastructures (e.g., bridges), given 
their convoluted politics and technologies, are not closed, but open, dynamic, and 
complex systems in society.  
 
The problem with Winner’s assertion is that ‘what are technologies’ cannot be 
demarcated from ‘what is not’ anymore after technologies became consolidated in a 
particular fashion of society. Consolidated technologies are not ‘in the black box’ but 
already compose social contexts. In this sense, Latour’s (1991) networks of quasi-objects 
and the conceptualized ‘actant’ are more persuasive in that, for the democracy of 
technoscience, network analysis is necessary rather than technological assessments. 
 
2.3.4 Infrastructure as a Common Pool Resource (CPR) in society 
Intrinsically, infrastructures are open venues for allocating common pool 
resources (e.g., roads for open spaces, dams for water, grids for the transmission of 
electricity generation from fossil fuels, etc.) (Kunneke & Finger, 2009; Frischmann, 
2012). Therefore, social-ecological resilience research, which focuses on knowledge 
governance for sustainable social-ecological systems, intrinsically includes the 
management and operation of infrastructure. Common resources from social-ecological 
systems are allocated and delivered via open, dynamic, and sociotechnical infrastructures. 
In some sense, how to allocate and deliver common-pool resources is all about how to 
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sustainably share the capacity of infrastructure and allocate the sequential usage of 
facilities with the management of spatial and temporal divisions on infrastructural usages.  
 
However, despite the potential of the theoretical foundation for institutional 
analysis, a modern institutional framework shows a lack of consideration of technologies 
and infrastructures. The traditional social-ecological research on the governance of 
commons needs more discussion on how technologies (e.g., infrastructure) as common 
pool resources are socially constructed and distributed for social value (Frischmann, 
2012). Investigation on sociotechnical governance is tied to the studies on the governance 
of common pool resources and should receive more attention from the scholarship of 
social-ecological resilience. In this sense, the sustainable management of infrastructures 
sheds lights on Ostrom’s idea about common pool resource management.  
 
According to Ostrom, eight conditions for sustainable management of common 
pool resources can be suggested as follows. (1) Clearly-defined boundaries (effective 
exclusion of external parties), (2) Congruence between the resource environment and its 
governance structure or rules, (3) Collective-choice arrangements, (4) Effective 
monitoring for enforcement of rules, (5) Graduated sanctions for violations, (6) Low-cost 
and easy-to-access conflict resolution mechanisms, (7) Securing the right of the resource 
appropriation of self-governing, and (8) Multiple layers of nested enterprises for large 
common pool resources. Applying these criteria to a specific case, Chapter 5 will delve 
into a sociotechnical approach to the management of Hoover Dam.  
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2.3.5 Infrastructures as Sociotechnical Systems 
The operational performance of infrastructure systems during both routine and 
emergency contexts is always a product of the technological and physical components 
embedded in a procedural matrix of social and organizational management (e.g., 
operational decision-making, systems maintenance, budgeting, engineering design, and 
various social rules, politics) (Kunneke & Groenewegen, 2009; Bolton and Foxon, 2011; 
Larkin, 2013; Jensen & Morita, 2015). Recent scholarship in the field of science and 
technology studies has expanded on Hughes’s and Mumford’s early ideas, and this 
literature describes infrastructure as an assemblage of societal imaginaries, community 
values, cultural cognition, social practices, legislative rules, standards, and the labor of 
people (Star, 1999; Slota & Bowker, 2017; Shove, 2016; Miller, 2017). Understood as 
sociotechnical systems, infrastructures are shaped by social ideologies (who participates), 
processes (in what ways), and purposes (to what effect) (Miller, 2017; Linnenluecke et 
al., 2011). For instance, roads provide a stable service space for traffic, but this public 
service depends on the institutional co-production of ongoing technical adaptations, such 
as checking traffic volume, the adjustment of traffic light intervals, and even users’ 
compliance to myriad traffic signs and rules (e.g., lanes, green light, speed limit, HOV 
lane, etc.) (Latour, 1991; Miller & Wyborn, 2018).  
 
In particular, sociotechnical systems entail organizations (communities, social 
collectives, and informal associations) with institutions and governance rules. 
Sociotechnical systems are generally designed, built, and operated in multi-institutional 
contexts where diverse people and organizations generate outcomes and arrange 
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processes of the systems. According to Mumford (2006), an open sociotechnical system 
concept “considered technical structures and work roles as two systems that were both 
part of one inclusive system” and offered a foundational basis for understanding the 
importance of complex interactions between technical systems and social arrangements 
around it (Mumford, 2006, p.321).  
 
Indeed, systems theory developed into a more sophisticated theory to model the 
relationship between technical systems (e.g., infrastructures) and social arrangements, 
namely the concept of a sociotechnical system (Emery & Trist, 1960), and this 
sociotechnical systems approach helps us better understand the dynamics, openness, and 
complexity of infrastructures. A sociotechnical system integrates both social and 
technical elements, especially where the interactions and feedback relationships between 
these elements align system functioning (Hughes 1983; Finger et al. 2005; Baxter & 
Sommervile, 2011). Sociotechnical systems such as infrastructures (e.g., roads, dams, 
water pipelines, electricity grids, power plants, etc.) thus necessitate collaborative and 
complex communication pathways between social and technical components (Geels et 
al., 2007; Kroes et al., 2006; Werfs & Baxter, 2013), which has given rise in recent years 
to extensive integration of communication and technological infrastructures in 
cyberphysical systems (Peter M. Champion et al., 2018).  
 
2.4 Institutions and the management of infrastructure: boundary challenges 
Infrastructures are always under pressure because of many natural and social 
variables that occur outside of their clear boundaries. In other words, infrastructures are 
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open not only to social users (e.g., residents and firms) but also environmental 
characteristics while holding boundary lines static, which render large infrastructures 
innately vulnerable (Edwards, 2003).  
 
2.4.1 Sociotechnical management 
In terms of social changes, infrastructure as sociotechnical systems should 
provide stability, which is a sustainable “space of flow” that allows the production, 
circulation, and application of knowledge, services, and goods to modern society 
regardless of social fluctuations (Castells, 1996; Edwards, 2003). For instance, roads with 
institutional lines, signs, signals, and police officers’ tickets transition vacant spaces into 
transportation conduits, roads. These institutional settings and protocols, which should 
not be improvisational but persistently facilitate the transportation of people, goods, and 
knowledge. Roads should be flexible and adaptive to social emergencies and changes. 
For instance, roads should be flexible, regardless of the original meaning of actants 
(Latour, 1991), able to allow ambulances or fire trucks to exceed speed limits, ignore 
traffic signals, and go over road lines with knowledge flexibilities and transitions 
responding to social uncertainties. Road knowledge systems should have the capacity for 
managing adaptiveness for traffic fluctuations in the short-term, administrative planning 
and implementation for re-pavement and new road constructions due to population 
growth in the mid-term, and the social solidification of transformational transportation 
systems (e.g., autonomous vehicles) in the long-term.  
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Regarding environmental disturbances, for instance, open roads are vulnerable to 
environmental stressors and disturbances such as daily icing and thawing (in winter), 
monthly heavy rain (in summer), yearly snowstorms and hurricanes (in monsoon 
seasons), and sea level increase in decades due to climate change. However, in 
emergencies, intentionally inundating public parks can avoid the flooding of central, 
urban areas (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) and cutting electricity grids can prevent catastrophic 
wildfires (e.g., the California state wildfire case in 2018), and the ramping up of sub-
pumps and back-up substations instead of main facilities is needed to recover power lines 
and water supplies as soon as possible. Firemen even use the water from swimming pools 
to extinguish fires (Woods, 2011). These small cases of knowledge transitions to respond 
to uncertainties and abnormalities in social and environmental changes are examples of 
the boundary dilemmas that dynamic, open, sociotechnical infrastructures face.   
 
2.4.2 Institutions and sociotechnical resilience 
Institutions are, particularly, enablers which facilitate the transition across 
stability and adaptiveness of boundary dilemmas and infrastructural dynamics. To be 
resilient, infrastructure should be stable as well as flexible for resilience via institutions 
(Beunen, Patterson, & van Assche, 2017). Institutions, as embedded knowledge (Collins, 
1993), are accountable for the organizational stability and flexibility which govern 
infrastructure. Institutions, the expression of patterned human intentionality (e.g., norms, 
rules, and equilibria) (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995, p.582), govern managerial work of 
organizations (e.g., governmental departments, corporations, communities). Thus, 
infrastructure resilience hinges on the stability and flexibility of institutions. 
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Sociotechnical systems theory rarely accounts for these infrastructural and institutional 
dynamics.  
 
As such, institutions are crucial components in the resultant resilience of 
infrastructure. For example, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure, 
established by President Clinton in 1996 (Moteff et al. 2004), included the integral role of 
institutions in its definition of critical infrastructure: 
 
[Critical infrastructure is] the framework of interdependent networks and systems 
comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and 
procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products 
and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States 
… (President’s Commission On Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997, Appendix 
B B-2, emphasis added) 
 
2.4.2.1 The definition of institutions 
This research focuses on the set of stipulated rules such as protocols, statutes, 
policies, and court decisions governing a system as well as internalized incentives and 
controls, normative values, cultural symbols, and common beliefs. Accordingly, an 
institution is defined here as an assembly of formal or informal incentives or norms, rules 
(e.g. stipulated protocols, regulations, and constitution), and cultural, social, political, and 
economic alignments for governing a system or infrastructure (North 1990; Jentoft et al. 
1998; Scott 1995, 2014). In the context of critical infrastructure, we focus on 
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organizations of people and institutions which operate, manage, and reconfigure 
infrastructure systems. 
 
Thus, they investigate how the institutional rules, norms, and strategies of 
organizations play a role as a formal or informal structure that governs human 
interactions and performances in an organization (Coleman 1987; North 1990; Crawford 
and Ostrom 1995, p.583). They emphasize how “observed regularities in the patterns of 
human behavior” can “prescribe, permit, or advise actions or outcomes for actors” 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995, p.582-583). According to Ostrom (2011), working rules 
align and justify decision making through constraining, monitoring, and sanctioning 
human behaviors. Scott (2014), who focuses on sociological institutionalization, also 
extends the institutional spectrum to cultured cognition as well as norms such as 
identities, symbols, authority, and obedience, which are broader than Ostrom’s (1990) 
regulative institutions. 
 
2.4.2.2 Key features of institutions 
Various disciplines, such as political science, sociology, economics, social-
ecology, and robustness analysis have examined institutional governance in organizations 
and systems. For instance, in the book Leadership in Administration, Philip Selznick 
focused on the distinction between institutions and organizations. Whereas an 
organization can be characterized as an “expendable tool, a rational instrument 
engineered to do a job,” an institution is regarded as “a responsive, adaptive organism” 
(Selznick 1957, p.5). For Selznick, while institutions are adaptive and changing, they are 
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driven by a need to secure and stabilize both within and beyond as they confront internal 
and external pressures.  
 
Largely, two key implications regarding institutions from social science studies 
can be distilled: (1) institutions function as a set of rules for stabilizing societies, and (2) 
institutions function as a structured means for orderly adaptation to social and 
technological change. Both are relevant to the resilience of infrastructure that looks static 
but changes dynamically.  
 
First, institutions sustain stability, or “structurally induced equilibria” (Knight 
1992, p.37). New-institutionalists emphasize how “observed regularities in the patterns of 
human behavior” can “prescribe, permit, or advise actions or outcomes for actors” 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995, p.582-583). According to Ostrom (2011), working rules 
align and justify decision making through constraining, monitoring, and sanctioning 
human behaviors. Formal and informal structures for regulating behaviors pave the way 
for more stable societies than those without such institutions (North, 1990; Selznick, 
1996; Scott, 2014). 
 
Second, institutions can also enable the flexibility of an organization that manages 
infrastructural dynamics. According to Selznick, an institutional or organizational 
structure is “an adaptive product, responsive to environmental influences” (Selznick 
1996, p 274). For Selznick, while being adaptive, institutions nevertheless seek security 
and persistence as they confront internal and external pressures. Thus, institutions as 
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adaptive but persistent organisms, can be a critical governing structure for the sustainable 
adaptiveness of infrastructure systems.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the sociotechnical concept of infrastructures using 
systems theory. Systems theory views infrastructures as open, dynamic, and complex 
systems which are ‘jointly optimized’ with technical assessments, financing, social and 
institutional regulations, and constitutional politics. Thus, analyses on social and 
institutional components as well as the arrangements of infrastructures must be 
understood as crucial components of infrastructural dynamics including resilience.  
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the relationship between resilience and sociotechnical 
systems.  Critical questions posed in the next chapter include: What is the theoretical 
background for the emergence of resilience from the perspective of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS)? Regarding this question, what is the critical issue of the 
management of infrastructures? What is the contribution of institutions to solve this 
challenge? How do institutions manage the boundary dilemma of robustness and 
flexibility of infrastructures?  Finally, what are the limitations of sociotechnical systems 
theory in explaining resilience? These questions will be critically examined in the next 
chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RETHINKING RESILIENCE AND SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 introduced the idea that infrastructures are, when properly understood, 
sociotechnical systems. Technological infrastructures are created, maintained, operated, 
and continually reshaped by the ongoing “activities of human factors” (Geel 2004, p. 
900). This implies that the choices that people and organizations make determine how 
resilient an interdependent infrastructure system will be to a given risk at a given point in 
time (Rinaldi et al. 2001; Vespignani 2010).  
 
Yet, how to incorporate a plurality of resilience concepts into the framework of 
sociotechnical systems theory is still a key question in the management of infrastructures. 
Infrastructures are dynamic, but the management of infrastructure should be stable as 
well as flexible in society. Stable yet adaptive institutions manage robustness/ stability in 
the short-term, adaptation in the mid-term, and transformation in the long-term. This 
chapter develops a multi-faceted model of resilience as the short-term achievement of 
stability, the medium-term achievement of adaptation to new conditions, and the long-
term transformation of infrastructures to meet new societal goals and objectives. Chapter 
3 also investigates the limitations of sociotechnical systems theory in explaining this 
redefined resilience.  
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3.2 Infrastructural Dynamics and the Sociotechnical Systems Theory  
From the sociotechnical systems theory perspective, invisible components such as 
particular configurations of political constituencies, rules, norms, protocols, cultures, and 
sociotechnical imaginary constitute a complex network of interdependent infrastructure 
(Larkin, 2013; Jensen et al., 2015). According to Hughes (1983, p.2), “power systems are 
cultural artifacts.” Given that resilience is the capacity to sustain, adapt, and transform the 
structure and process of a system to withstand internal and external disturbances, 
infrastructure resilience should be understood from the question of how institutions 
(social and cultural aspects of systems) sustain, adapt, and transform the structure and 
processes of infrastructure.  
 
Sociotechnical systems theory (Emery & Trist, 1960; Hughes, 1983) cast doubt 
on the old ‘closed system’ theory and paved the new way for ‘open system’ perspectives. 
Different styles of electricity supply systems in three cities (e.g., Berlin, Chicago, and 
London) demonstrate differentiated variations in the matrix of social and technical 
intermingling. According to Hughes (1983), social and cultural aspects (e.g., 
geographical, cultural, managerial, engineering, and entrepreneurial characters) affected 
these three regions and the power systems differently developed in each city (p.17). 
“There was no one best way of supplying electricity” (Hughes, 1983, p.17). The notion of 
this ‘open system’ perspective has influenced organizational sociology, STS (e.g., 
Latour’s ANT), High Reliability Organization theory, and further the process approach of 
resilience engineering for infrastructure resilience.  
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Moreover, the conception of ‘reverse salient’ (Hughes, 1983), which was hinted at 
by military strategies and conceptualized as a designation of ‘critical problems’ in 
developing technical systems, provides a foundational idea to resolve the obduracy 
problem of infrastructure. Reverse salients play out as barriers in inventing, improving, 
and consolidating a new technology in society. The conception of ‘reverse salient’ based 
on systems theory (Bertlanffy, 1933) are not confined to technical issues but expanded 
into a wide array of problems in socializing technologies. “Reverse salients need not be 
technical; in fact, the most important reverse salients are often legal, political, social, or 
cultural” (Edwards et al., 2007). Thus, the institutional reverse salients can be represented 
with a wide spectrum in every community and can be different based on its culture, 
administration, and entrepreneurship while contributing to the obduracy of infrastructure 
(Hommels, 2005).     
 
Given that systems’ adaptation is integral to infrastructural management, the 
notion of institutional barriers can be a great point to be mediated for infrastructure 
resilience. Social institutions reify embedded human intentionality in both negative and 
positive ways that influence individual actions and organizational goals. Hence, 
understanding the role of institutions as catalytic matters as well as reverse salients is 
imperative to implementing resilience tasks (sustaining, adapting, and transforming) of 
infrastructure.  
 
Almost 40 years ago, Hughes (1983) had already pointed out that technological 
innovation and adaptation cannot be understood as a stand-alone influx, but as 
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systematized settings in a certain way that a society is particularly in favor. This 
awareness provides a foundational insight for the issues such as interdependence, trade-
offs, and obduracy problems associated with infrastructure resilience.  
 
A systems approach facilitates the use of the reverse salient-critical problems 
method because reverse salients are observably weak in relationship to other 
system components, and because, as Edison himself wrote, the improvement of 
one component in a system will reverberate throughout the system and cause 
the need for improvements in other components, thereby enabling the entire 
system to fulfill its goal more efficiently or economically (Hughes, 1983, p. 22-
23, emphasis added). 
 
The third contribution of sociotechnical systems theory for understanding infrastructural 
dynamics is a structural framework to comprehend the development of a system. For 
instance, Hughes’ framework helps to understand how the plural variations of systems 
emerge, develop, and consolidate in different societies. The nature of developmental 
phases comprises eight settlements. Hughes (1983) identified and ordered the phases for 
sociotechnical ‘pattern of evolution’ (e.g., invention, development, innovation, 
technology transfer, growth, competition, consolidation, and momentum) in the 
formation, evolution, and standardization of ‘large technological systems (LTS).’ 
According to Hughes (1983), the evolution of technologies is not just an outcome of 
engineering problem-solving, but a systematic, complex, and social process including 
diverse social institutions (e.g., regulations) and participators (e.g., firms, utilities, and 
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investors). In particular, the dynamics of developmental phases between infusion, growth, 
and consolidation illustrate that the infrastructural life-cycle could also be the iterative 
cycles of stability and adaptability. This reiterative evolution (e.g., developmental 
changes and consolidation states) of ‘large technological systems’ open a window to 
understanding infrastructural dynamics, which is helpful to understand infrastructure 
resilience. However, Hughes’ sociotechnical framework also has not fully explicated the 
dynamics between infrastructural stability and adaptations. To help understand the 
challenges of incorporating stability and flexibility into infrastructural management, the 
next section sheds light on the dichotomy issue and mediation discussions on risk and 
resilience.  
 
3.3 Risk and Resilience 
3.3.1 Quantitative vs. Qualitative 
The conventional risk assessment for physical infrastructure resilience (e.g., 
engineering resilience) is deemed as outdated and a resilience approach (e.g., resilience 
as a process) to infrastructure is conceived of as more applicable to modern risks given 
uncertainties. This chapter casts doubt on this dichotomy and seeks a mediation.  
 
Typically, the concept of ‘risk’ has been interpreted as “the possibility/ 
uncertainty/ chance that the activity will have some undesirable consequences, or the 
activity itself, that which is often also referred to as a risk source or a threat” (Aven, 
2012, p.36). The conventional concept of risk is defined as “a chance of harmful effects 
to human health or to ecological systems resulting from exposure to an environmental 
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stressor” (EPA). In particular, according to Aven (2012), the concept of ‘risk’ began to be 
formalized with “maritime insurance and was used to designate the perils that could 
compromise a voyage” (Aven, 2012, p.35). Along these lines, the British Medical 
Association confirms that the English word, ‘risk’ originates from the Greek word, 
‘rhiza,’ which means “hazards of sailing too near to the cliffs: contrary winds, turbulent 
downdraughts, swirling tides” (Aven, 2012, p.35). From this origin, the concept of ‘risk’ 
has been developed into a sophisticated quantified insurance framework.  
 
Since the 1970s, however, this quantification-based definition of risk [Risk = 
Probability of an accident  *  Consequence in lost money/deaths] has dramatically 
changed into more qualitative frameworks. Depending on the discipline in question, the 
definition of risk can vary (e.g., expected value (loss), probability of an (undesirable) 
event, objective uncertainty, etc.). Notably, the latest definitions of risk include a 
prominent characteristic, uncertainty, which means that the quantification of 
consequences from actions cannot be predicted or quantifiable. According to newer 
definitions, risk can be stated as “an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity 
(R=C)”. Or, risk can be regarded as “uncertainty about and severity of the consequences 
(or outcomes) of an activity (R=C&U)”. Also, risk can be “the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives (R=ISO).” These definitions are all qualitative and are characterized by the 
concept of uncertainty (Aven, 2012, p.37).  
 
3.3.2 Alternatives to the quantification of risks 
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Newer definitions of qualitative risks, which entail uncertainty and ambiguity, led 
to the emergence of risk governance (Asselt & Renn, 2011). “[M]any risks are not simple 
and cannot be calculated as a linear function of probability and effects” (Asselt & Renn, 
2011, p.436). Asselt & Renn (2011) argue that current ‘systemic risks’ are complex, 
uncertain, and ambiguous, and these traits of risks in modern society necessitate a 
governance framework rather than newer assessments. “Uncertainty, complexity, and 
ambiguity point to different reasons why many risks defy simple concepts causation” and 
shed profound light on risk governance (Asselt & Renn, 2011, p.438). Given that the 
results of risk assessments can be divergent depending on ‘scale,’ ‘interactivity,’ and 
‘contingency’ (Jasanoff, 1993, p.125), a paradigm shift such as risk governance is a must 
for risk societies. “One immediate consequence of contingency is that what people claim 
to know about risk is in fact constructed in different ways in different political and 
cultural settings” (Jasanoff, 1993, p.127). Political cultures significantly affect the 
evaluation of risks, which clearly illustrates the ambiguous nature of risks (Asselt & 
Renn, 2011).  
 
Urlich Beck (1986) also pointed out several issues in technoscience that involve 
self-manufactured risks as their attributes. It is paradoxical that, in the process of modern 
methods of controlling risks, risks have been mass-produced in tandem with the 
advancement of science and technology for resolving pre-modern problems (Beck, 1986). 
To Beck (1986), modern risks are already incalculable and unlimited. Enhancing social 
deterrence for technoscience, by recognizing the limitation of technologies (reflexive 
modernity), is the prerequisite for tackling modern risk problems (Beck, 1986).  
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Moreover, as Stirling (1999) stated, “the traditional treatment of risk as an 
objectively determinate quantity” should be “complemented with a sophisticated 
discussion of the essentially value-laden nature of the assumptions which necessarily 
frame and inform any analysis of risk” (p.120). Complex risks in society require a 
paradigm transition from conventional methodologies to an innovative framework such 
as risk innovation, which can scrutinize multi-layered risk landscapes (Beck, 1986; 
Maynard, 2015). Indeed, the essential governance elements for modern risks are 
“communication, inclusion, integration, and reflection.” (Asselt & Renn, 2011, p.439).  
 
With this in mind, the effect of efforts above, in trying to escape from the 
quantification trap of risks, is to foreground the co-production of risks in society. 
Anticipatory governance is aware of the characteristics of socially embedded risks and 
aims at the co-evolution of science and society. Anticipatory governance responding to 
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity in modern risks need “an array of feedback 
mechanisms,” collective imagination, and the engagement of diverse stakeholders 
(Barben, Fisher, Selin, & Guston, 2008). The features of modern risks such as 
complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, the lack of boundaries, incalculability, and the 
necessity of anticipatory governance have commonalities with the conceptualization of 
resilience. More broadly, a robust feedback loop between science and society (Stewart, 
2000) can be regarded as a more salient component for sound decision-making 
environments for both risk and resilience. 
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3.3.3 The emergence of resilience: plural resilience concepts 
Accordingly, in resilience scholarship, the complexity, uncertainty, and 
governance frameworks, instead of “command-and-control strategies” (Folke, 2006, 
p.255), have been focused on since Holling’s (1973) proposal on ecological resilience. 
Holling (1973) dismisses the single stable equilibrium notion of the traditional ecology 
and argued for multi-stable states of a complex adaptive system. The traditional ecology 
was based on Pimm’s (1986) mathematical resilience view. Pimm’s (1986) resilience was 
based on the singular equilibrium and bouncing back of a system, which emphasizes the 
return time to the original state as ‘resilience capacity’. Pimm’s resilience is quantifiable 
and measurable by the amount of time that was taken for a system to return to the 
previous static original state after a disruption.  
 
3.3.3.1 Engineering resilience 
Though the in-depth examinations of institutions as well as infrastructures are 
essential for the resilience of socio-technical systems, analysis of institutions is rarely 
carried out in the field of engineering resilience. From the perspective of engineering 
resilience, according to the US National Science and Technology Council, resilience is 
defined as a capacity of a specific infrastructure system (or facilities in infrastructure 
systems) at urban or regional levels to absorb the shocks of extreme events such as 
natural disasters (McDaniels, 2008)1. In other words, the two critical attributes, ability to 
withstand external shock robustly (robustness) and ability to bounce back rapidly 
(rapidity), were conceived as the main components of the resilience concept in the 
engineering resilience field (Chang & Shinozuka, 2004; Holling, 1996; McDaniels, 2008; 
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MCEER, 2005). Engineering resilience perspective focuses on how to retain or recover 
the functionality of physical infrastructures to the single equilibrium when exposed to a 
variety of stressors. Thus, in the engineering resilience approach, robustness and rapidity 
of infrastructure to the original state are scrutinized (Bruneau, 2003; MCEER, 2005; 
McDaniels, 2008; Pimm 1986; 1991; Wang and Blackmore, 2009).  
 
Engineering resilience emphasizes efficiency, constancy, and predictability rather 
than the multiple equilibria view of ecological resilience which underlines persistence, 
change, and unpredictability. However, in the ecological resilience field, the magnitude 
of disturbances that a system can absorb and the adaptive capacity toward new equilibria 
are critical in order to understand resilience capacity (Folke, 2006; Folke et al., 2004; 
Gunderson, 2000; Holling, 1996; Walker et al., 2004). We can observe lacuna in 
engineering resilience discourse; that is, even if a system moves to another desirable state 
in accomplishing alternative new equilibrium, the new stable states cannot be deemed as 
desirable or as the ultimate recovery state of a system. Put simply, engineering resilience 
perspective can evaluate new equilibrium as chronic instability—perennial deficit and 
less resilience (Fig. 2). This point clearly demonstrates why it is not appropriate to 
postulate a general or single equilibrium (Holling 1996; Scheffer et al., 2001) for the 
resilience of socio-technical complex network systems supported by human and social 
interactions. Hence, the engineering resilience concept, which highlights a static state, is 
not enough to reflect the tight interdependence and interactions between infrastructures 
and society.   
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Figure 2. Measuring resilience (modified from MCEER, 2005; Wang et al., 2009) 
 
3.3.3.2 Resilience engineering  
Recently, a new way of seeing resilience, or resilience engineering, has emerged 
in the field of engineering; that is, to view resilience as ‘a process’ rather than ‘a 
product’. This perspective refers to resilience as a quality rather than a quantity and 
points out not only what makes the system persistent and bounce back but also how the 
system maintains resilience (Hollnagel, 2011). In particular, Hollnagel (2011) defined 
resilience as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain the required operations under 
both expected and unexpected conditions” (Hollnagel, 2011, p.xxxvi).  In this context, 
the definition of the resilience of a system is stretched to day-to-day system operation and 
maintenance depending on the protocols of internal systems. Resilience engineering 
emphasizes system functionality rather than the ability to bounce back to the original 
state after some disturbances. In other words, how a system can retain its functionality to 
adapt to diverse exogenous and endogenous variables is more investigated. Put 
differently, we can say that a system is resilient if the system performs appropriately and 
is able to interact with its socio-technical environments (Rinaldi et al., 2001). If that is the 
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case, how can a socio-technical system function meet the requirement changes of various 
societal standards and fluctuations constantly adapting to biophysical conditions? How 
can a critical infrastructure absorb disturbances and retain its essential functionality to 
adapt to multiple stable states (Holling, 1973; Folke et al., 2003; 2004; Walker et al., 
2004)?   
   
In response to these questions, the people and the institution that operate, manage, 
and interact with the systems must be taken into account. From the resilience engineering 
perspective, it is not a bouncing back capacity but the appropriate functionality of a 
system is more underlined. Therefore, we can inquire into two points in terms of 
resilience which are worth examining (Hollnagel, 2011; Park et al., 2013). The first is 
how people in a particular organization are able to monitor the emerging risks and 
anticipate the possible results with the knowledge acquired by sensing. The second is 
how people respond to multiple situations with the knowledge system organized by 
monitoring, anticipating and learning to maintain the knowledge produced, validated and 
circulated by an iterative process (Clark et al., 2010).  
 
Infrastructure cannot be resilient without being properly operated, managed, and 
planned by organizations and governing institutions. In a sociotechnical system, retaining 
functionality means a proper operation, management, and planning of a system with 
diverse institutions. Graceful extension of the capacity of infrastructures entails 
institutional extension and adaptation of physical and material systems to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from the disturbances within or out of boundary competence 
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(Woods, 2011; McDaniel, 2013). Thus, examining the resilience of critical infrastructure 
demands an investigation into particular institutional coordination of critical 
infrastructures and society.   
 
3.3.3.3 Organizational risk theory and resilience engineering  
Organizational sociologists have worked to understand how organizations respond 
to unpredictability and complexity of risks embedded in organizational management 
(Perrow, 1984; Rochlin et al., 1987; Roberts, 1990; Reason, 1997; Grote et al., 2009). 
Human factors and organizational characteristics were the main research domains for 
Perrow’s normal accidents theory and High Reliability Organizational theorists. An 
important research question for both is about how organizations prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from disastrous events with high risks but low probabilities (i.e., longtail 
failures). Perrow’s approach is more pessimistic and suggests forgiving these high-risk 
technologies. For instance, Perrow (1984), an organizational sociologist, contends that 
accidents are inevitable in case of type II organizations (e.g., nuclear power plant, nuclear 
weapons) (Table 1). In this category, tightly coupled organizations and sub-organizations 
cannot escape from accidents due to frequent feedbacks/ interconnectedness and 
unstoppable processes. For these organizations, accidents are normal. Perrow (1984) 
further maintains that the only way to avoid this type of risks is to abandon the related 
technologies. However, according to Perrow (1984), accidents from the other types of 
risks (I, III, IV) can be prevented with technological and institutional improvements 
(p.97).  
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Table 1. System failure risks  
Interactions                                    Linear Complex 
Tight Group I  
(Marine transport, Dams,  
 Power grids,) 
Group II 
(Nuclear Plant/ Weapons) 
Coupling   
Loose Group III 
(Traffic Accident) 
Group IV 
(Mining, R&D firms) 
(source: Perrow, 1984, p. 97; p.349) 
 
Perrow’s (1984) normal accident theory highlights human errors and structural 
organization failures rather than technical mishaps in analyzing unpredictable accidents. 
 
However, High Risk Organization theory (Roberts, 1990; Rochlin et al., 1987) 
and Reason’s (1997) Swiss Cheese model also discuss organizational failures but propose 
a few sociotechnical design principles, in a positive way, such as redundancy, 
institutional feedback loops, managerial flexibility to prevent failures to overcome the 
embedded probability of system failures. Recently, in safety engineering field, with 
reflection on asymmetry in explaining engineering failures—Hollnagel (2011) developed 
a perspective that failures should be explained by the same framework with 
organizational successes— Hollnagel et al. (2011) emphasizes salient processes (sensing, 
learning, responding, and anticipating) which render sociotechnical management 
successful.  
 
Despite insightful implications of these sociotechnical systems perspectives 
above, Hollangel et al.’s (2011) framework, however, has no specific explanation on how 
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to combine technical rigorousness and societal flexibility. For instance, Hollnagel et al.’s 
(2011) process approach (sensing, learning, responding, and anticipating) includes a 
limitation of obscurity about sensing, learning, responding, and anticipating ‘of what’/ ‘to 
what’? Each sociotechnical process needs each objective to sense, learn from, respond to, 
and anticipate. The knowledge processes inevitably assess ontological conditions and 
include the result of technological assessments for the epistemic management of 
infrastructures. In other words, each of Hollnagel’s processes has deep liaison with the 
outcome of a previous process (e.g., anticipating ‘something’ based on the outcome of 
sensing). Sociotechnical theorists’ proposal of institutional governance provides an 
insight on how to make harmonious coordination between different sub-organizational 
work groups (e.g., engineers, managers, and operators), which have different epistemic 
cultures and imaginaries for work procedures and structures (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998, 
p.17). Sociotechnical theorists mention ‘humans,’ but humans and social groups are 
heterogeneous.         
 
3.3.3.4 Social-ecological resilience  
Scholars interested in the governance of natural resources proposed a social-
ecological perspective to connect social and ecological system (Berkes & Folke, 1998; 
Folke, 2006). They defined the resilience of a socio-ecological system as “a capacity of a 
system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing changes so as to still 
retain essentially the same function, structure, and feedbacks, and identity” (Folke et al., 
2010, p. 3). According to Holling (1973), if a system is continuously evolving and 
changing, rather than static, the pictures of renewal and re-organization of complex 
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adaptive systems are more accurate than a simple description of recovery (Folke, 2006). 
In complex adaptive systems such as ecosystems, “uncertainty and surprise are part of the 
game” (Folke, 2006, p.255). Their focus was on resilient governance to retain the 
persistent performance of social-ecological system while adapting to new environments. 
They pay attention to responsive interactions of social systems to natural resources from 
ecological systems. The operation, management, and planning of infrastructures for 
natural resources are usually based on particular norms and rules called institutions, that 
is, social and human-made soft infrastructures (Anderies et al., 2004; 2013; 2015). 
 
Social-ecologists perceive institutions as a vital component to retain the resilience 
of social-ecological system. Given the dynamics of natural and social environments, 
resilient systems should be both adaptive and persistent (Folke, 2006, p.259). Folke and 
his colleagues (2010) look into institutional adaptation and flexibility to contribute to the 
resilience quality of an ecological system. In their research, the traditional knowledge of 
local communities on ecological systems turned out to be sustainable community-based 
management of environmental resources. Scholars who work on social-ecological 
interactions also observe social-ecological institutions as social capital built in the 
governance of ecological systems (Folke et al., 1996; Folke and Berkes, 1995; Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom & Ahn, 2000).  
 
Specifically, Holling’s (1973) complex adaptive system provided a foundation for 
the emergence of social-ecological system resilience (Folke, 2006, p.257), which focuses 
on governance. All of the renewal activities for new opportunities are essentially related 
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to governance arrangements. Berkes & Folke’s (1998) social-ecological perspective 
investigates governance over interactions between natural resources and society. 
Moreover, the establishment of adaptive governance, in accordance with ‘risk society’ 
(Beck, 1986) ‘technological humility’ (Jasanoff, 1993) ‘risk at a turning point’ (Stirling, 
1999) ‘risk governance’ (Asselt & Renn, 2011) can be possible only through “the 
collaboration of a diverse set of stakeholders operating at different social and ecological 
scales in multi-level institutions and organizations” (Folke, 2006, p.262). 
 
The social-ecological resilience insight on governance also resonates with Stirling 
(1999). As Stirling (1999) stated, risk assessment should be a vector with divergent 
dimensions, the proposing of a numerical answer to ‘puzzles’ in society, and “fuzzy and 
controversial socio-political problems.” The goal of risk assessment should be “mapping 
the sensitivities of results to divergent assumptions” rather than the “single determinate 
quantity” (Stirling, 1999, p.123). All the incommensurable preferences in society cannot 
be merged through a simple risk assessment based on a narrow perspective, singular and 
solely rational process. Thus, if probability cannot be calculated and outcome cannot be 
measured, a policy should be made on the basis of the “ignorance” framework. The 
various dimensions of risk, such as severity, immediacy, duration, reversibility, 
familiarity, controllability, cannot be put into “a single objective ordering of social 
priorities” (Stirling, 1999). Every society (community) has its own perspective on the 
world, which is incarnated in incommensurable values, cultures, institutions, and modes 
of creation (Stirling, 1999; Jasanoff, 1993). A singular solution (formula) for social 
problems cannot be useful and, rather, be an illusion given the dynamics of the world. 
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Social and institutional governance is necessary for both risk and resilience.  
 
3.4 Sociotechnical Resilience Variations: Product vs. Process 
The definitions and standards of resilience are plural depending on different 
sectors and disciplines, and essentially linked to a question: is resilience a product or a 
process? (Pimm, 1986; Holling, 1996; Hollnagel, 2011b; Southwick et al., 2014; Mathias 
et al., 2018). Evolutionary resilience conception is more interested in the process of 
building resilience than a singular quantified equilibrium (Davoudi et al. 2013; Boschma, 
2014). Engineering scholarship has traditionally emphasized product resilience: the 
capacity of a specific physical system or technical components to rebound after exposure 
to extreme events (Pimm, 1991). Thus, product assessments which measure robustness 
and rapidity are seen as key guidelines of resilience: the ability to withstand external 
shock robustly and the ability to bounce back rapidly to a previous status quo (e.g., 
Chang & Shinozuka 2004; McDaniels et al. 2008; Bruneau et al. 2005, p. 19; Ouyang, 
2017). In engineering, this is often framed as optimizing whether physical infrastructure 
can robustly retain or restore its functionality to an original equilibrium point when 
exposed to a variety of stressors (Pimm, 1991; Wang & Blackmore, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the relatively new fields of safety engineering and resilience 
engineering emphasize organizational response and processes within a complex, often 
unpredictable sociotechnical system (Hollnagel & Nemeth, 2009). Hollnagel defines 
resilience as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain the required operations under 
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both expected and unexpected conditions” (2011a, p.xxxvi). Hollnagel (2011b) further 
emphasizes four human processes—sensing (monitoring), learning, responding, and 
anticipating—for infrastructure resilience, and casts doubt on the proposition of a static 
equilibrium outcome. Park et al. (2013) interprets safe-to-fail strategies as a process 
rather than a product while referring to resilience as a quality instead of a quantity. “From 
a non-equilibrium perspective,” fail-safe risk assessment based on static provisions for 
disturbances is paradoxically non-sustainable given nonlinear circumstances (Ahern, 
2011, p.341). The notion emphasizing safe-to-fail resilience is a result of contemplation 
on this paradox that critical infrastructure needs to be both resilient against disruption in 
the short term while capable of adaptation and transformation over the long term (Ahern, 
2011). As seen in the definition of resilience by UN/ISDR (2004), for instance, the 
process aspect of resilience is crucial:  
 
Resilience is a capacity of a system, community, or society potentially exposed to 
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing, in order to reach and maintain an 
acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to 
which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for 
learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk 
reduction measures. (UN/ISDR 2004, p.16, emphasis added by authors) 
 
However, infrastructure resilience should be understood from the perspective of 
institutions. Institutions are deeply involved in this dynamic interplay between resilience 
as a stable product and as a flexible process. Mathias et al. (2018) maintains the dynamic 
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aspects of resilience but fails to fully articulate the justification of this notion. Despite 
Mathias et al.’s (2018) work, this research argues that detailed efforts to understand the 
relationship between infrastructure resilience and complex institutional mediation are still 
required to better elaborate the coordination between process and product. Neither 
engineering statistics nor a qualitative process (e.g., resilience engineering) matches both 
infrastructural and institutional dynamics. This research holds that the summation of 
differential (short-term) assessments and institutional stability compose the long-term 
integral curves and institutional flexibility.   
 
3.5 Wildavsky’s (1988) Notion: Over the dichotomy  
However, the question, here, remains as to what kind of governance is need. For 
instance, in public administration associated with governing risks, there has been a long 
tradition of debates between outcome and process. In general, how the efficacy of public 
policy could be measured or how to evaluate the accomplishments of a governmental 
official has been a critical question to the implementation of public policies. In particular, 
with respect to risk governance, Wildavsky’s (1988) comparison between resilience, 
which “accommodates variability” and anticipation, which “seeks to preserve stability” 
(Wildavsky, 1988, p.78), epitomizes the debate between process vs. outcome. According 
to Wildavsky (1988), “under considerable uncertainty, resilience is the preferable 
strategy. Under substantial certainty, anticipation does make sense.” In detail, Wildavsky 
(1988) maintains that if resilience is more suitable for risks which derive from 
“unpredictable or low probability source.” Wildavsky’s (1988) great insight is imbued 
and harmonized with resilience engineering.  
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The uncertainty of risks as well as the emphasis on governance by resilience 
stresses an innovative perspective, called resilience engineering. This perspective focuses 
on process rather than product (outcome). For instance, engineering resilience and Safe-
to-fail strategies as a process for uncertain risks are preferred rather than a product and 
quantified resilience. Fail-safe risk assessment based on static provisions for disturbances 
is paradoxically non-sustainable given nonlinear circumstances (Park et al., 2013). 
However, safe-to-fail, process-based resilience can easily lack rigorous anticipation. As 
Wildavsky (1988) stated, “[A]ll resilience, no anticipation, or vice versa—would be 
destructive.”  Recognition of this dilemma asks infrastructure to be both stable and 
resilient against disruptions. Resilience engineering missed Wildavsky’s (1988) caveat on 
the difficulty in developing the optimal mixture of anticipation and resilience (p.85).     
 
This research maintains that process-based approaches well reflect the 
implications from the development of modern risks and resilience: uncertainty, 
ambiguity, complex society, and governance structure. According to Scott (1998), 
modern science perspectives—e.g., statistics, economics, etc.—which contribute to the 
foundation of modern states, contain errors in logic. Modern assessment methodologies 
inherently ignore the diversity of nature and society and reduce them into abstract 
numbers and formula (Porter, 1995). The process of mapping resources such as lands, 
people, and nature cannot avoid simplifying diversity. To avoid this fallacy, resilience 
engineering and other developments of risk discussions have improved governance and 
incremental process approaches. Thus, given the nonlinearity of climate change, adaptive 
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anticipations of risk governance, and resilience engineering for infrastructure flexibility 
fit in tasks of infrastructure resilience in response to climate challenges. Yet how to make 
an optimum of combination between anticipation and resilience is a fundamental inquiry 
to infrastructure resilience. As Wildavsky (1988) stated, a central problem with risk 
governance should be how to keep balancing between the rigorousness of methodologies 
and the harmonious processes that add social values and desires to paint rigorousness. 
 
3.6 From Risk vs. Resilience to Sociotechnical Resilience   
In order to answer the query on balancing (Wildavsky, 1988), in my opinion, the 
meaning of risk should be revisted and critically examined here.  
 
In general, the assessments and management of risks has been largely regarded as 
preparatory treatments to prevent harmful events from occurring or to constrain 
dangerous human activities in order to protect society. Conversely, (engineering) 
resilience is a new notion that focuses on recovery which basically aims at bouncing back 
and even further re-organization in the recognition of characteristics of modern risks: 
uncertainties and unavoidability.  
 
However, in this research, risk is viewed as inherently uncertain and unavoidable 
(see Renn, 2008; Renn, Klinke, and Asselt, 2011; Asselt and Renn, 2011 on ‘risk 
governance’). Resilience engineering scholars (Hollnagel, 2011; Park et al., 2013) 
demarcate identified hazards for risk assessments from unidentified causes for resilience. 
However, given the contextual complexity and expanded scales (e.g., temporal and 
  53 
geospatial) of realities wherein identified hazards (risk assessments) (Jasanoff, 1993) are 
always situated, there is an argument to be made for reconsidering the demarcation 
between risk and resilience. 
 
In particular, Jasanoff’s (1993) effort to bridge qualitative and quantitative risk 
conceptions already takes into consideration the limitation of dichotomy that Wildavsky 
(1988) pointed out with his notion of the mixture between anticipation and resilience. 
There is no risk which is not complex and has a clear boundary. Life is intrinsically 
uncertain. No risk can be isolated from society given the social co-production of risk 
knowledge. Ontological things and epistemological conceptions are always convoluted 
and rarely static in an era of uncertainties and complexity. In an era defined by the 
uncertainties of risks, then, scales not demarcation are crucial questions to defining 
resilience.  
 
Therefore, in terms of infrastructure resilience, this research asserts that resilience 
emphasis should move on to discussions on the human and social dimensions of 
resilience, and temporal and geospatial scales, not the demarcation framework (e.g., Park 
et al., 2013) between quantitative and qualitative risks: sociotechnical resilience. How to 
sustain infrastructure in the short-term, adapt in the mid-term, and transform in the long-
term with detailed institutional governance should be a more critical question to 
infrastructure resilience than the linear demarcation between risk assessment and 
resilience. For instance, engineering bouncing back in the short-term, multiple 
adaptations in the mid-term, and innovative transformation in the long-term can be a 
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potential strategy for infrastructure in response to nonlinearity and uncertainties of 
climate change.  
 
3.7 Overcoming the Weakness of Sociotechnical Systems Theory: Focusing on 
Institutional Dynamics   
However, with the goal of explaining infrastructure resilience in mind, to explain 
infrastructure resilience, however, more in-depth understanding of institutional dynamics 
incorporating quantified risks and qualitative resilience is needed. Infrastructure should 
sustain its equilibrium while being adaptive and even transformative in response to 
changing conditions (e.g., social and environmental changes). To be sustainable, as 
Bertalanffy (1933) and other system theorists stated, a system should be open to 
environments and sustain its homeostasis in the short term via sound feedback loops. 
Infrastructure should also be static as well as flexible to adapt to environments. Many 
scholars in the sociotechnical systems area overlooked the sustaining role of institutions 
and the importance of the persistent management of infrastructure. Not only adaptation 
but also sustaining is an essential component of resilience management. Sociotechnical 
systems theory is limited to explaining how the dynamic iteration of infrastructural 
stability and adaptations emerge and converge, which is critical to resilience.  
 
In particular, social institutions can settle a specific goal for the management of 
infrastructure per a fixed goal and a linear pathway in the short term. At a particular 
given moment, a derivative (a gradient) on an infrastructural curve can be well-defined, 
and organizational institutions easily quantify embedded conditions and determine the 
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trajectory—“the pattern of normal problem solving activity….on the ground of a 
technological paradigm (Dosi, 1982, p.152; Kunneke & Groenewegen, 2009, p.8)”—of 
infrastructure while aiming at a specific outcome. In case of uncertainties, institutions 
which govern infrastructure can aim for a process rather than a product. Chasing a non-
stationary target with a fixed trajectory is a useless effort because ‘we do not know where 
it goes.’ Different directions (or organizational goals) should be coordinated for a long-
term goal. In order to help to understand the dynamics of sociotechnical systems, Fig. 3 
has been created and refined throughout this research and will be explained in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
More specifically, institutions should support infrastructural stability and have a 
tendency for a stable equilibrium in the short term as seen on the point of ○A  (Fig. 3). 
Organizational goals and institutional settings should be clear and stable in the short term 
as are at the point of ○A . In the mid-term, institutions should interplay between stability 
and flexibility. A gradient (a derivative) on ○A , which is calculated by differentiation, 
illustrates a direction of incremental increase of a variable (e.g., traffic flow) associated 
with infrastructural management. However, it is also evident that the gradient, which 
implies the infrastructural pathway during the time period of t0 – t1 (from ○A  to ○B ), 
shows a positive slope. However, the gradient during t0 – t2 (from ○A  to ○C ) shows a 
negative slope. It is true that the infrastructural curve declines during the duration of t0—
t1 but goes up during the duration of t1—t2. This means infrastructural management and 
its goals should be adaptive in accordance with temporal changes in the mid-term.  
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Moreover, institutions should work for transformational changes in infrastructure 
systems in the long term. During the longer time duration of t0 – t3, uncertainties 
associated with infrastructural management can make it almost impossible for an 
organization to set an explicit quantitative goal for infrastructure. For instance, it is not a 
simple question to an organization of transportation management which point should be 
targeted between ○D  or ○E  as an organizational goal associated with traffic flows and 
transportation system planning in the long term. Organizational management and 
strategies for the pathway from ○A  to ○D  must be different from goals and strategies of the 
organizational pathway from ○A  to ○E . More specifically, in case of the duration t0—t3, it 
is uncertain that infrastructure will pass through ○D  or ○E . Under these uncertain 
circumstances, it is more strategic with respect to institutional management to make 
agreed-upon flexible processes by which an organization keeps moving forward towards 
an interim goal rather than to track a fixed trajectory and target a stationary goal. As such, 
institutions should work for the consolidation of infrastructure in the short term. 
However, institutions should be adaptive in the mid-term and transformative in the long 
term. It is questionable that sociotechnical systems theory has a detailed explanation on 
institutional dynamics as stated above.  
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Figure 3. Infrastructural stability and dynamics (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
3.8 Other Limitations of Sociotechnical Systems Theory in Explaining Resilience 
First, sociotechnical systems theory has not been developed to explain coupled 
systems (Mumford, 2006). Infrastructure and organizations are “moving away from 
hierarchies to networks (Castells, 1996) and from centralized to decentralized structures 
in which parts of a company are run as semi-autonomous units” (Mumford, 2006, p. 335). 
In the UK, the Tavistock Institute in the 1960s developed the sociotechnical approach 
more deeply and applied this to many work fields such as coal mining. However, the 
initial application and theoretical background have no consideration of coupled systems. 
Interdependent networks, robust yet fragile systems (Alderson & Doyle, 2010), put much 
emphasis on the coordination between systems (Rinaldi et al., 2001). However, since 
Thompson (1964) categorized three types of organizational interdependence (e.g., 
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal), research studies on sociotechnical systems theory 
raely have an explanation on how the two different systems are institutionally and 
organizationally interdependent and coordinate with each counterpart for infrastructure 
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resilience. As Hughes (1983) and Mumford (2006) pointed out, the deep understanding of 
interdependence issues is a prerequisite to analyzing infrastructure resilience.   
 
Second, sociotechnical systems theory cannot explain the process and contexts for 
the co-production of sociotechnical resilience. As Miller & Muñoz-Erickson (2018) 
stated, “knowledge doesn’t just appear in magic. (…) In turn, knowledge systems filter, 
manipulated, and represent the data and information that come out the other end” (p.3). 
Institutions, as embedded knowledge (Collins, 1993), are produced, validated, circulated, 
and consumed by social organizations. What is important with this process is institutions 
are also ‘filtered, chosen, and manipulated’ by particular organizations. Latour’s (1991) 
notion on scientific knowledge is also congruent with Miller & Muñoz-Erickson’s (2018) 
knowledge systems argument. 
 
The facts are produced and represented in the laboratory, in scientific writings: 
they are recognized and vouched for by the nascent community of witnesses. 
Scientists are scrupulous representatives of the facts (Latour, 1991, p.28). 
 
Sociotechnical systems theory postulates the neutrality of data, information, and 
knowledge, but institutions are essentially co-produced outcomes by the very particular 
arrangements between society and technoscience (knowledge systems) (Fig. 4).  
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Figure 4. The comparison between the knowledge systems and sociotechnical 
perspective (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
This shortcoming hampers the possibility of having a broader overview on the 
social production of infrastructure resilience. How infrastructural resilience can be 
socially constructed is also a critical question for society and should be reflected on in the 
process of the knowledge co-production (Miller, 2017; Miller & Muñoz-Erickson, 2018; 
Miller & Wyborn, 2018) of ‘resilience.’ Who participates, in what ways, and to what 
effect infrastructure resilience should be co-produced is a grave question for society.  
 
[D]esign is never just technical but always sociotechnical, raising important 
questions about who participates, in what ways, and to what effect. Equally 
important are questions of how design choices ultimately intersect with the 
arrangements and dynamics of social networks and relationships (Miller, 2017, 
p.910). 
  
In line with the second weakness of sociotechnical systems theory, the third weak point 
of sociotechnical systems theory is based on Latour’s (1991) critique on social 
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constructivism. According to Latour (1991, p.94), the social construction of science and 
technology is asymmetrical. Both nature and society should be symmetrically explained 
by identical principles (generalized symmetry) and thus infrastructure, quasi-objects, are 
already an assemblage of ‘sociomaterial practices’ (Orlinkowski, 2007). In other words, 
sociotechnical systems’ perspective on the social influence on technical components is an 
asymmetric diagnosis according to Latour (1991). As Hughes earlier wrote,  
 
Technological systems contain messy, complex, problem-solving components. 
They are both socially constructed and society shaping… (Hughes, 1983, p. 51).  
 
The world is full of quasi-objects and myriad of networks composed of ‘actants,’ and 
thus social institutions and technological apparatuses have been mutually shaped by each 
other to date. In this sense, the influence of technologies is also important to shaping 
society and should be evaluated as a symmetric contribution to the constitution of 
networks from the counterpart. Infrastructure, from Latour’s perspective, is an 
assemblage of social and technological networks and should not be regarded as different 
from a user or a utility, which is interpreted as an actant by Actor Network Theory 
(ANT). According to Latour (1991), when it comes to the resilience of infrastructure, 
how society can be impacted by technologies and be shaped towards resilience through 
the co-production of networks of quasi-objects should be an important question for 
society to consider. If sociotechnical systems theory only aims at the explanation of 
social influences on technologies, the resulting perspective is too myopic and can miss 
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the macro-level overview of the relationship between society and technoscience (Edward, 
2003).  
 
But taken alone, without attention to meso- and macro-scale analysis, 
constructivism creates a myopic view of relations among technology, society, and 
nature (Edwards, 2003, p.28). 
 
 
Figure 5. The principle of symmetry 
(source: Latour, 1991, p.94) 
 
Thus, it is asymmetrical not because it 
separates ideology and science, as 
epistemologists do, but because it brackets 
off Nature and makes the ‘Society’ pole 
carry the full weight of explanation 
(Latour, 1991, p.94). 
Lastly, sociotechnical frameworks fail to integrate users and institutions into 
sociotechnical systems to elucidate the resilience of infrastructures. The sociotechnical 
systems perspectives emerged to explain the managerial risks of systems and transitioned 
a narrow, technical perspective on systems into a more comprehensive frame, but fails to 
thoroughly investigate the dynamics of institutions, users, and organizations in response 
to the emergence of uncertainties. Furthermore, if we include ecological dimensions of 
infrastructures, the sociotechnical systems perspective is not suitable for examining the 
relationship between society, technologies, and ecological environments. A more holistic 
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framework (e.g., socio-tech-ecological framework) needs to be developed for analyses on 
the resilience concept embedded in socio-tech-environmental systems (Markolf et al., 
2019)    
 
3.9 Conclusion 
Resilience originates from the rejection of quantified risks, but risks are by 
definition both quantitative and qualitative given the complexity and uncertainties of 
risks (Jasanoff, 1993). The sociotechnical systems perspective does not fully explain how 
to incorporate both robust quantification and flexible qualitative approaches with respect 
to infrastructural dynamics. Wildavsky (1988) proposes an alternative mixture of 
anticipation and resilience for risk management. In other words, to manage physical and 
social challenges, namely risks to infrastructures, the management of infrastructure 
should deal with the boundary dilemma between stability and flexibility (or 
adaptiveness). Dietz et al. (2003) revealed that coupled institutions facilitating the 
exchange of information and enhancing the centralized decision-making system for the 
rapidity of system performance can, on the contrary, hamper the recovery and resilience 
of a system. A locally adaptive goal can also prompt a global maladaptation (Woods, 
2011). Besides, tangled layered network system can easily lead to the increase of 
embedded cost related to risk management (Weick et al., 2005). 
 
A solution to this dilemma can be found in institutional management. On this 
point, the sociotechnical consideration of infrastructure resilience has a critical 
implication. Institutions can be stable in the short-term, but also can be adaptive in the 
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long-term. In other words, sociotechnical infrastructure systems cannot be resilient 
without being properly operated, managed, and planned by people and institutions either 
on a small or large scale. In a socio-technological system, maintaining a resilient 
infrastructure frequently means a proper operation, management, and planning of 
infrastructures by quantified assessments, mediated regulations, and qualitative social 
agreements or political processes within which institutions play out. Thus, enhancing the 
resilience of infrastructures necessarily incorporates investigating particular institutional 
settings and organizational behaviors. The next chapter, in detail, will investigate this 
resilience work by institutions and institutional interdependencies of sociotechnical 
infrastructures.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INSTITUTIONAL THREADS, RESILIENCE WORK, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INTERDEPENDENCES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 shows how institutions sustain, adapt, and transform the structure and 
process of a system to withstand and absorb internal and external disturbances which is 
conceived of as resilience capacity. To this end, Chapter 4 illustrates how the complex 
work of different institutions are layered over infrastructures through vertical, lateral, and 
longitudinal threads. These overlapping and interacting institutions play a critical role in 
sustaining, adapting, and transforming sociotechnical systems in the face of the resilience 
challenge of balancing stability and flexibility. In other words, how the resilience work of 
institutions sustains stability, adapts rules, and transforms the governance of 
infrastructures with divergent goals, strategies, organizational levels, and distinct 
resilience frameworks at different temporal scales should be a question for infrastructure 
resilience. This work occurs across multiple levels of functionality, including operational, 
regulatory, and constitutional work, through which institutions seek to achieve 
infrastructure resilience via minute, adaptive, and transformational change, which, 
respectively, optimize, reconfigure, and redesign infrastructure. Social institutions also 
manage infrastructure for resilience at different temporal scales: in the short-term 
infrastructure is sustained to resist disruption; in the mid-term it must make infrastructure 
adaptable; and in the long-term it must be capable of fundamentally transforming the 
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sociotechnical infrastructure when necessary. Together, these multiple dimensions of 
overlapping and intersecting institutional work create interdependence.  
 
4.2 Institutional Approach to Sociotechnical Infrastructures  
An institutional approach to sociotechnical systems is not new. Kunneke, R. W., 
Knops, H. P. A. and Vries, L. J. de. (2007) proposed an institutional analysis framework 
that emphasizes co-evolution and coordination between institutions and infrastructure. In 
addtion, Kunneke & Gronewegen (2009) introduced an institutional layering model for 
the analysis of sociotechnical infrastructure. They defined infrastructure as “complex 
sociotechnical systems in which institutions and technology are strongly interwoven.” 
(Kunneke & Gronewegen, 2009, p. 5). They divided institutional governance for 
infrastructure into three types: institutional arrangements, formal, and informal 
institutions. First, “informal and embedded institutions” have a long-term period of 
updating (e.g., 100 or 1000 years) and are characterized by their independence from 
governmental intervention. Secondly, the formal institutional layer includes formal legal 
institutions such as ‘constitutions, laws and regulations’. Typically, these formal 
institutions are updated within a time scale of decades. They rule political power 
dynamics, economic activities (e.g., property rights) judiciary ordering, and governmental 
administration. Lastly, institutional arrangements include private contracts, and 
organizational, cooperative protocols which are revised within one year and a decade. 
Then, Kunneke (2010) applied this framework to understand bottom-up, user-driven, and 
self-organizing infrastructure, such as Wi-Fi networks. Their analysis sheds light on the 
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conception of coherent development of society and technology and helps to understand 
the sociotechnical dimensions of infrastructure.  
 
4.2.1. A critique of Kunneke and Gronewegen (2009) 
However, from my viewpoint, Kunneke & Gronewegen’s (2009) framework 
reveals a misunderstanding of institutional categorization. In particular, as formal 
institutions, each individual formal institution (e.g., constitutions, laws, regulations) has 
distinctive amendment cycles and functional roles in governing infrastructure. 
Infrastructural governance can be better understood with the full appreciation of the 
dynamics of institutional stability and adaptability at different temporal scales and 
layered levels. ii) Their institutional framework interprets contracts (institutional 
arrangements) as institutions, but contracts are different from generalized rules, 
institutions which have a broader application scope for other organizational members 
beyond contractors. iii) Furthermore, the separation and boundaries between formal and 
informal institutions is not binary and never static. For instance, informal social custom 
can be transitioned into customary law—legally binding institutions—with the 
acquisition of a social confirmation of law (opinion juris) (Dahlman, 2012). More 
importantly, yet, the sociotechnical frameworks, including Kunneke & Gronewegen 
(2009), do not fully understand the dynamics and inherent dilemmas that infrastructures 
face, which are critical to infrastructural management for resilience. The detailed 
dynamics of institutions can first be understood by analyzing the structure of institutional 
threads of sociotechnical systems. 
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The following sections will explain institutional threads, a new conception of the 
inherent boundary dilemma to infrastructure resilience, and institutional 
interdependencies.  
 
4.2.2 Institutional threads and types of institutions 
Table 2. Institutional threads and three types of institutions (source: author) 
Institutional 
threads and 
functions 
Definitions 
Vertical thread The hierarchical, institutional governance in a single 
organization or multiple organizations 
Lateral thread The horizontal structure of institutional governance in different 
levels of organizations 
Longitudinal thread The temporal dimension of institutional governance over 
organizational structure (e.g., temporal patterns of short-term, 
mid-term, and long-term management and historical 
accumulation of institutional development 
Institutional 
functions 
The respective functions of institutions for managing 
infrastructures (e.g., operational maintenance for daily and 
monthly routines, regulatory adaptation for correction, and 
reconstitution for transformation) 
 
The structure of infrastructure has three types of threads of institutions: vertical, 
lateral, and longitudinal threads. To analyze institutional structure, first, it is necessary to 
untangle institutional threads tangled in interdependence networks. Social systems (e.g., 
families, social groups, companies, local governments, and nation-states) and institutions 
for organizations of people have multi-dimensional threads of governance. Three forms 
of institutional threads support the structure of infrastructures: the vertical threads govern 
organizations at different hierarchical levels; the lateral threads exist among 
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organizations and institutions in different domains or systems at the same level; and the 
longitudinal threads of cultural/political heritage and temporal management over time. 
The functions of operational, regulatory, and constitutional institutions manage the 
functionality of infrastructures nested in three-dimensional arrangements; vertical, lateral, 
and longitudinal threads.  
 
The functions of institutions can be categorized into three types: operational, 
regulatory, and constitutional institutions. Operational institutions manage and operate 
physical infrastructures while sustaining a static matter, infrastructural stability with a 
specified goal. Regulatory institutions are a more adaptive governance tool, which is 
involved in updating institutions and reconfiguring physical infrastructures instead of 
supporting a static equilibrium. Constitutional institutions induce infrastructural 
transformation—which means a systemic change into a different state because preceding 
infrastructural settings cannot hold the same character and need significant alterations in 
institutional arrangements and physical configurations—in the long-term. The following 
sections unbundle these institutional threads.  
 
4.3 Unbundling Institutional Threads: Vertical, Lateral, and Longitudinal Threads 
This section unbundles different types of institutional threads (i.e., vertical, 
lateral, and longitudinal layers), which wrap infrastructures and arrange institutional 
settings for resilience work of institutions. These threads also become conduits for trade-
offs in infrastructural networks.  
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4.3.1 The vertical thread: hierarchy—organizations at different hierarchical levels—
directs and defines the relationship between higher/macro, middle/meso, and lower/micro 
level agents, organizations, and infrastructures. Hierarchical institutions, hierarchy, make 
an order in social organizations. A system “is composed of interrelated subsystems, each 
of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure (…)” (Simon, 1962, pp. 468-9). 
“Business firms, governments, universities all have a clearly visible parts-within-parts 
structure,” as do biological systems (p. 469). The institutional hierarchy in institutional 
orders span jurisdictional authorities (e.g., municipality/state/federal government), 
corporation ownership structure (e.g., proprietary and subsidiary companies), and 
regulatory oversight hierarchy (e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission and nuclear power 
plants).  
 
Figure 6. The structure of institutional threads wrapping infrastructures  
(source: Changdeok Gim, author)  
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The first fundamental difference between engineering systems and sociotechnical 
systems depicted in Fig. 6 is the consideration of institutional structures. The political 
governance in the United States has examples of hierarchical interventions from the 
ideology of ‘Federalists’ despite a mixture of vertical directions and devolution of 
political power. The adjudication of the state courts is subordinate to the judgment of the 
U.S. federal courts (the U.S. District Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals) in federal law 
related disputes. Also, the EPA provides a standard for air quality regulations (e.g., the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard, NAAQS) and requires states to submit a State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) to the EPA for approval (Konisky & Woods, 2016, p.376).  
 
“Under the Clean Air Act, for instance, each state must have an EPA-approved 
State Implementation Plan that governs how it is to attempt to achieve federal 
regulatory goals. If the EPA finds that some portion of a state’s SIP is inadequate, 
it can impose its own Federal Implementation Plan covering that portion.” 
(Konisky & Woods, 2016, p. 376) 
 
42 U.S.C.  
United States Code, 2013 Edition 
Title 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
CHAPTER 85 - AIR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL 
SUBCHAPTER I - PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES 
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Part A - Air Quality and Emission Limitations 
Sec. 7407 - Air quality control regions 
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov 
 
§7407. Air quality control regions 
(a) Responsibility of each State for air quality; submission of implementation plan 
Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the 
entire geographic area comprising such State by submitting an implementation plan for 
such State which will specify the manner in which national primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained within each air 
quality control region in such State. 
 
The vertical thread is a unique political feature and the reification of ideologies from both 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists in the US.  
 
These early “federalists” thus advocated little more than an expansion of 
congressional authority under the loose union of the Articles of Confederation. 
(…) More analytical essays pointed to defects in specific provisions, 
concentrating heavily on the small size and broad powers of the federal 
legislature. Anti-federalists also revived a dispute that figured heavily in the 
Federal Convention itself: that the Convention had exceeded its authority (Farber 
& Sherry, 1990, p.175; p. 178). 
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(about the debate on Federalists versus Anti-Federalists, see Farber & Sherry, 1990, A 
history of the American Constitution, pp.175-180).   
 
4.3.2 The lateral thread: Infrastructures have lateral threads to connect different 
domains or systems at distinctive organizational or geospatial scales. Lateral governance 
occurs as a result of the traditional siloing of organizations according to geographical, 
administrative, disciplinary, professional, system, or other boundaries. Within domains or 
systems, organizations develop specific forms of knowledge and social practices (Miller 
and Muñoz-Erickson, 2018) that tend to diverge from those operating in similar 
organizations in other nearby or even interdependent domains, across distinct, e.g., 
government departments, utilities, advocacy groups, or markets. These organizations may 
cooperate and exchange information, data, services, and resources, in order to facilitate 
coordination within or across individual infrastructure systems. Or, they may compete 
with one another for resources or power. Typically, the output from one organization 
becomes the input for the other organization and vice versa. Thompson (1967) called this 
‘reciprocal interdependence.’ In this type of interdependence, one counterpart can ‘pose 
contingency for the other’ (Thompson, 1967, p.55). Nonetheless, these coordination and 
competition mechanisms are rarely perfect and often tend to disguise or hide differences 
from one institution to another in ways that can exacerbate vulnerabilities and reduce 
resilience. In this case, one organization’s institutional changes in one system can affect 
the operation and management of system governance for the other organizations.  
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4.3.3 The longitudinal thread: Updating institutional arrangements for infrastructure 
resilience requires an understanding of the longitudinal heritage of institutions over time. 
The longitudinal accumulation of electoral voting, cultural beliefs, political contestation, 
and labor sabotage creates historical continuities as well as path dependencies in 
infrastructural contexts where decision making gets finalized and physically implemented 
in the form of real structures. Occasionally, infrastructural obduracy (Hommels, 2008) or 
path dependence (Bolton & Foxon, 2011; Unruh, 2000) hampers the adaptiveness of 
infrastructures to social changes and worsens vulnerabilities. Longitudinal threads are 
buried in invisible contexts rather than visible contents and become hard to detect. Thus, 
the amendment of historical and cultural paths requires sophisticated approaches. For 
instance, the monolithic historical remnants that Confucian cultures embedded in 
communication protocols blocked feedback between chief and assistant pilots and 
resulted in a fatal crash (223 deaths) of a Korean Airline passenger airplane in 1997 
(Malcom Gladwell, 2008, Outliers) in Guam. Moreover, longitudinal dimensions have 
more narrowed institutional arrangements that operate on different temporal dynamics. 
For example, in a related paper, I describe the short-term processes (minutes to months) 
through which management organizations operate infrastructures; medium-term 
processes (months to years) through which they adapt and upgrade them; and long-term 
processes (years to decades) through which they transform them via new construction 
(Gim, Miller & Hirt, 2019).  
 
4.4. The Function of Institutions and Resilience Work 
4.4.1 A problem statement on infrastructure resilience and knowledge transition:  
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boundary management 
 
 
Figure 7.  From a closed infrastructure model to a porous infrastructure model 
(knowledge adaptation and transition) (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
With respect to resilience, infrastructure has a boundary management problem. 
Infrastructures as open systems migrate across alternative phases when facing boundary 
dilemmas of institutions. Infrastructure is dynamic as well as open, and thus the 
institutional management of infrastructure should entail both stability and flexibility 
strategies. First, regarding environmental challenges, infrastructure should have the 
capability to sustain its functionality by dissociating its physical facilities from multiple 
natural interventions. Technical boundaries and physical visibility are quintessential 
qualities of urban infrastructures. Technological innovation in infrastructure engineering 
was mostly dedicated to rendering infrastructure boundaries discernible, defying nature’s 
interventions. Technological innovations in the design and materiality of engineered 
technological apparatuses (e.g., dams, roads, rails, grids, aqueducts, and 
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telecommunication towers), which indicate engineering resilience, all aim for lucid 
disconnection and consistent protection from ecological stressors and disruptions (e.g., 
frosting, erosion, flooding, destruction by water, air, fire, snow, hurricane, etc.). For 
instance, dikes confine surface water and protect the urban areas that urban residents 
inhabit.  
 
4.4.2 Stable yet adaptive: boundary challenges 
Multiple disciplines deal with the boundary management of open system 
dilemmas regarding stable yet adaptive boundaries. One of the conditions for the 
successful management of infrastructures as open systems has been focused on how to 
address boundary tensions between stability and flexibility with institutional capabilities. 
In the engineering field, a holistic system approach was proposed to maintain balance 
between engineering robustness and the adaptive flexibility of infrastructures to natural 
dynamics (Tempels & Hartmann, 2014). The social-ecological resilience field, in dealing 
with social dilemmas associated with the allocation of natural resources, tackle social-
ecological boundary dilemmas on how to reconcile ecological fluctuations and 
sustainable yields with the management of soft infrastructures (i.e., institutional 
governance) in operating hard infrastructures (e.g., dams, dikes, canals, and fishery 
apparatuses) (Anderies, 2006; Janssen & Anderies, 2007). The accomplishment of both 
societal stability and ecological sustainability in confronting ecological variations via 
governance is a fundamental question to social-ecologists. As Wildavsky (1988) points 
out, in the political science area one of the challenges that the management of risks faces 
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is the nuanced and balanced administration mixture between quantified anticipation for 
stability and resilience to uncertainties.  
 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) also offers a unique stance on boundary 
tensions. As Star and Ruhleder (2005) stated, “an infrastructure occurs when the tension 
between local and global is resolved,” which means “an infrastructure occurs when local 
practices are afforded by a larger-scale technology, which can then be used in a natural, 
ready-to-hand fashion” (2005, p.6). Put differently, the “interpretive flexibility” of 
infrastructure can allow ‘design flexibility’ and “different appearances to different 
groups” while avoiding the simplification of infrastructure as materialities (Star and 
Ruhleder, 2005; Trompette & Vinck, 2010). Abiding by local boundaries while scaling 
up to global systems is only possible with knowledge reconfiguration and transitions 
across different temporal and geospatial scales. It is imperative to infrastructure resilience 
to analyze and investigate knowledge (institutional) transition, given the transitioning 
role of knowledge for boundary dilemmas of infrastructure—as a type of knowledge 
(Collins, 1993), which is an institutional task to understand risk and resilience.  
 
4.5 Institutional Work and Resilience 
Despite the recognition that institutions are critical to the effective functioning of 
infrastructure, most research and investment in the field of infrastructure resilience has 
prioritized the technological and physical upgrades of infrastructural systems over their 
institutional dimensions. For instance, the growing emphasis in engineering research and 
resilience policy on the interdependence of multiple infrastructure systems—such as 
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water, energy, and transportation networks—tends to emphasize technological or 
physical interdependencies that create the possibility for failures to cascade across 
systems. A water shortage, for example, can impact the supply of water for cooling 
generators in thermoelectric power plants (Vliet et al. 2012). Electricity outages, in turn, 
can impede the delivery and treatment of water, halt the operation of rail and traffic 
signal systems, or prevent the supply of gasoline and natural gas required for myriad 
forms of transportation (Rinaldi et al. 2001; O’Rourke 2007).  
 
The development and function of infrastructure depends not only on engineering 
outcomes of technologies but also on dynamic social processes. Infrastructure is more 
than just technology; it is made up of organizational structures and processes that link 
technology to social, economic, and political dynamics (Emery & Trist, 1960; Kunneke 
& Groenewegen, 2009; Bolton & Foxon, 2011). The supply of water for cooling 
thermoelectric generators is not just a chemical matrix of H2O but a socially and 
technologically co-produced outcome: engineered water in society. At the macro scale, 
water for agricultural, urban, and industrial uses in Arizona has social value precisely 
because of the dams, canals, pipelines, treatment facilities, pumps and other infrastructure 
through which it is delivered, but also because of the institutional arrangements by which 
water infrastructure is built and maintained, water rights established and defended, and 
water quality standards adopted and enforced. Infrastructure, a ‘robust-yet-fragile’ system 
(Alderson and Doyle 2010) only successfully performs via complex institutional 
networks.   
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However, without engineering risk calibrations, the institutional arrangements 
cannot have standards. Without standards, institutional stability cannot be accomplished. 
For instance, water pump pressure should be optimized, and the quality of water needs to 
be standardized through engineering calculations. The stable trajectories of system 
resilience in the short-term comprise iterative engineering analyses for physical 
equilibrium, the optimization of components, and quantified recoveries (engineering 
resilience, Pimm, 1991). More importantly, these engineering calibrations are also 
dependent on knowledge matrices and institutional stabilities.  
 
Therefore, the complementary work between engineering rigor for short-term 
stability and evolutionary processes for long-term adaptation arise through the resilience 
work of institutions (Fig. 8). Each outcome standard and social process, such as 
monitoring robustness, identifying and repairing components, coordinating routines and 
flexibilities across multiple systems, and engaging stakeholders to redesign systems over 
time, should be institutionalized in infrastructure-related organizations.  
 
Figure 8. The adaptive curve comprises multiple short-term stabilities (source: 
Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
 
4.6 The Functional Dynamics of Institutions: Sustaining, Adapting, and 
Transforming 
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The relationship between stable routines of organizations and their ability to adapt 
to uncertainties has long been discussed by many scholars (Rochlin et al., 1987; Robert, 
1990). It is well-known that adaptive flexibility is the necessary complement to the 
stability of routinized procedures in supporting institutions and organizations (Craig et 
al., 2017; Beunen, Patterson, & van Assche, 2017; Denniz, 2016). Incessant subtle, 
adaptive, and innovative processes tempering uncertain social and environmental risks 
comprise multiple short-term rigorous engineering assessments for stability, products. 
How can an organizational reconciliation between stability and flexibility be achieved?  
 
Academic efforts were made to investigate how formal and informal (Kunneke & 
Groenewegen, 2009) or the macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level (Bolton & Foxton, 
2010) institutions can arrange, prompt, stymie, destabilize, co-evolve with certain 
technological developments, and also cause the obduracy of infrastructural lock-in 
(Hughes, 1983; Chester & Allenby, 2018). However, there has been little discussion on 
how both the stability and adaptiveness of institutions and infrastructure can be 
realistically orchestrated using different resilience concepts and time scales.  
 
Technical stability sustains a system’s function based on rigorous risk 
assessments and institutional strategies (e.g., preventive management, redundancy, and 
rehabilitation) aimed for short-term (day to year) outcomes. Institutional adjustments 
(adaptation) (e.g., the amendment of regulations) pursue appropriate responses towards 
alternative status quos with the mid-term (e.g., year to decade) replacement and 
reconfiguration of infrastructure. Social transformation as a form of long-term resilience 
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is occasionally necessary to overcome unprecedented uncertainties. ‘Black swans’ have 
no reliable precedent data to reference, and thus no routine adaptations (Taleb, 2007; 
Katz, 2010) are possible. Institutions enable social and political transformation of a long-
term duration (decade to decades) (IPCC 2014, p. 27). As institutions for sociotechnical 
material, infrastructure must be conceptualized with an epistemic recognition of temporal 
scales (Fig. 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. Resilience work spiral* (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
*The present status-quo #1 of infrastructure can move to a new constitutional, regulatory 
and operational status-quo #2 while adapting to environments for system resilience. This 
constitutional shift formalizes a different trajectory of regulatory circle (adaptive 
reconfiguration) and in turn new protocols (redundancy or preventive management) for 
physical sub-components.  
 
One more caveat with institutional dynamics is that solid stability also includes 
hourly or daily minute adaptive processes, and vice versa. A short-term stability state at 
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any divided moment should experience multiple subtle adaptions. Also, these adaptations 
and transformations should essentially end up with temporary, alternative stable states. 
The complementarity between stability and flexibility is not linear, but more compounded 
and concurrent via institutions. A technical stability at any given moment is not a static, 
but rather a socially agreed-upon “physical reality” induced from limited observed data 
(Sarewitz & Pielke, 2000). 
 
4.7 The Resilience Work of Operational, Regulatory, and Constitutional Institutions  
 
Figure 10. Types of functions of institutions (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
* Arrows depict the directions of institutional interactions between entities such as 
society and infrastructure. 
 
Fig. 11 describes how institutions at different temporalities work and coordinate with 
different dimensions. In the following sections, based on Fig. 11, detailed work of 
institutions for infrastructure resilience will be investigated. In addition, how institutions 
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sustain, update, and transform infrastructure will be analyzed based on institutional 
mapping of water and energy systems in Arizona.  
 
 
 
 
        
 
  
Figure 11. The topology of resilience work of institutions  
(source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
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Resilience work by different types of institutions is analyzed in accordance with 
the framework in Fig. 10. Social systems (e.g., families, social groups, companies, local 
governments, and nation-states) and institutions that govern organizations of people have 
multi-dimensional structures (Holling, 2001). Operational, regulatory, and 
constitutional institutions contribute to multi-dimensional resilience of infrastructure 
(Table 3). The next section explores the dynamic nature of resilience work by institutions 
for infrastructure. 
 
Table 3. Resilience work by different types of institutions (source: author) 
Dime
nsions 
Temporal 
and 
Spatial 
Scales 
Function
al 
Dimensi
on 
Govern
ance 
Goal 
Uncertainties Organiz
ational 
Levels 
Resilience 
Frameworks 
Types 
of  
Instit
utions 
Opera
tional  
Short-
term: 
minutes to 
months 
 
Scale of 
discrete 
infrastruct
ures 
Sustaini
ng 
systems 
operatio
ns 
Resilie
nce of 
enginee
red 
systems 
Technical 
uncertainties in 
current or 
future systems 
performance, 
within clear 
engineering 
boundaries 
Utilities 
and 
organiza
tions 
that 
manage 
discrete 
infrastru
ctures 
Engineering  
resilience 
(Pimm, 1984; 
Holling, 
1996), safe-
to-fail (Ahern, 
2011), green 
infrastructure 
(Sutton-Grier 
et al., 2015) 
 
Regul
atory 
Medium-
term: 
months to 
years 
 
Regulated 
entities 
and 
regulatory 
Adaptin
g 
systems 
through 
increme
ntal 
adjustm
ents 
Resilie
nce of 
socio-
eco-
technic
al 
systems 
Uncertainties 
in complex 
systems 
interactions 
during 
disturbance 
and recovery, 
within clear 
regulatory 
boundaries 
Govern
ment 
agencies 
and/or 
other 
regulato
ry 
entities 
Ecological       
resilience 
(Holling, 
1973), 
social-
ecological 
systems 
robustness  
analysis 
(Martin-Breen 
  84 
 
 
4.7.1 Operational  
Infrastructure-related institutions can be broadly divided into three types 
according to their functions: operational, regulative, and constitutional institutions. 
Operational institutions pursue the stability of systems in favor of engineering 
resilience. “Institutional structures and other factors combine to create at least short-term 
stability in the real world” (Niemi, 1983, p.269). Other factors here are largely 
recognized as institutional inertia, institutional interdependence, transaction costs, 
accountable outcomes, limited alternatives, and constraints on agenda (Niemi, 1983; 
Beunen, Patterson, & Assched, 2017; Lindner, 2003). 
 
Operational institutions are responsible for stabilizing sociotechnical 
infrastructure, including cooperating with other organizations that operate and maintain 
related subcomponents. An operational organization (e.g., energy utilities) typically 
jurisdictio
ns 
and Anderies, 
2011), 
resilience 
engineering 
(Hollnagel, 
2011 a; 
2011b) 
Consti
tu-
tional 
 
Long-
term: 
years  
to decades 
 
Constituti
onal 
jurisdictio
ns 
Transfor
ming 
systems 
into 
novel 
forms 
Resilie
nce of 
societie
s 
Uncertainties 
in social and 
political 
dynamics with 
unclear 
boundaries 
Society-
wide 
constitut
ional 
bodies 
(e.g., 
legislatu
res, 
supreme 
courts) 
General 
resilience 
(Walker & 
Salt, 2006) 
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operates and manages physical infrastructure adhering to internal and external confirmed 
protocols and manuals for stable outcomes. For instance, utilities maintain the 
consistency of physical performance of infrastructure according to fixed standards. 
Operational institutions posit a steady state and pursue “a single steady or cyclic state” 
(Peterson et al., 1998, p.10) of patterns of human behaviors. Operational institutions 
support rapid cyclic returns of a system to this single state. Sustaining (minute 
adaptation) for stability is the resilience work of operational institutions, which has an 
inclination towards stability strategies and single equilibrium. 
 
However, sustaining the resilience of infrastructure requires regular maintenance 
and periodic rehabilitation, both of which constitute a plethora of minimal adjustments. 
Short-term social and environmental changes (e.g., daily temperature changes, traffic 
flows, electricity demands, yearly updated reserve margin for summer season etc.) 
require infrastructural adjustment for adequate operation within a normal distribution 
curve. The stable performance (product) of infrastructure results from constant 
adjustments and daily optimizations pursuant to protocols established by engineering 
designers. In terms of the pre-shock status-quo in Fig. 12-(a), engineering resilience 
posits a normal state of infrastructure as flat as in Fig. 12-(a). However, Fig. 12-(b) 
reveals that the normal condition of infrastructure before shocks, which are represented 
as flat in Fig. 12-(a), is not static, but comprises dynamic activities with maintenance and 
rehabilitation works for infrastructure stability. In order to sustain the ‘flat’ mode of 
infrastructure while sustaining performance, infrastructure is in constant need of 
preventive maintenance, and light or heavy rehabilitation. The stable performance 
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(product) of infrastructure results from incessant institutional adjustments and daily 
optimizations pursuant to protocols and standards confirmed by utilities. “[The] 
‘maintenance’ of existing institutions often requires active and ongoing effort to uphold 
and defending existing institutions” (Beunen et al., 2017, p.12). 
 
  
 
Figure 12. (a) Engineering resilience curve and (b) sustaining pavement performance by 
engineering maintenance (Mcdaniel et al., 2013; France-Mensach et al., 2018, p.3) 
 
4.7.2 Regulatory  
Regulatory institutions allow the adaptation (or correction) of infrastructural 
paths through robustness strategies. Robustness adaptiveness via regulatory institutions is 
not stability, which focuses on a single equilibrium, and thus proposes multiple desirable 
status-quos despite a clearly defined system boundary (Martin-Breen & Andreies, 2011; 
Anderies et al., 2013; Capano & Woo, 2017).  
 
Infrastructure adapts to changing social needs via incremental regulatory 
adaptation. Adaptation, in other words, means path corrections. Systems need path 
corrections to sustain their performance capacity. Most regulatory policies use tools such 
as mandates, incentives, and sanctions to enhance the safety and resilience of 
infrastructure, or to correct market failures (e.g., monopolies, externalities, information 
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asymmetry, and insufficient provision of public goods), or to improve distributional 
justice (Ouchi, 1980; Baldwin & Cave, 1999). The judicial branch, in the US, interprets 
legislative intent, confirms regulatory authority, and resolves disputes. Engineering 
protocols for water and power infrastructure are shaped by and must conform to these 
regulative standards established by social contract. Robustness, which means adaptive 
capacity to external shocks, is “a property of the institutional arrangements through 
which a system can adapt or can regain stability after having encountered periods of 
uncertainty and/or transformation” (Capano & Woo, 2017; Martin-Breen & Andreies, 
2011). 
 
Adaptation is also “a process through which an actor is able to reflect upon and 
enact changes in those practices and underlying institutions… (Pelling, 2011, p.39),” or 
“the process of adjustment to actual expected climate and its effects (IPCC, 2014, 
p.118),” ‘Resilience engineering’ regards these adaptive processes of proactive learning 
as a strategy to escape from “getting stuck in outdated approaches” to system problems 
(Woods, 2016, p.3). Social negotiations are inevitable features of adaptive processes for 
adaptations. Organizations and stakeholders make knowledge claims and negotiations 
about standards and facility or performance requirements for knowledge co-production 
(Miller & Muñoz-Erickson, 2018; Münoz-Erickson et al., 2017). Thus, corrections for 
adaptation, in most cases, hinge as much on right procedures and procedural justice as 
they do on scientific rigorousness.  
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When there are infrastructural failures or excessive stressors, or unacceptable 
social outcomes regulatory organizations seek to replace outdated standards with a new 
sociotechnical equilibrium. To implement these regulations, regulatory organizations 
reconfigure incentives and sanctions to organizations that operate critical infrastructure 
through a wide array of strategies. 
 
4.7.3 Constitutional  
Constitutional institutions structure particular sociotechnical systems and 
provide ground rules for operational protocols and sociotechnical regulations. 
Transformational adaptation through constitutional institutions arises in larger scales 
and longer periods (Folke et al., 2010; Martin-Breen & Anderies, 2011) than adaptations. 
 
Constitutional institutions comprise political and legal consensuses, cultural 
beliefs, and sociotechnical imaginaries (“collectively imagined forms of social life and 
social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or 
technological projects,” per Jasanoff and Kim, 2009, p.120). Over time, society translates 
norms, beliefs, and civic epistemologies into a fixed type of ‘knowledge-order’ (Jasanoff, 
2005; Miller, 2007) such as constitutional law and Supreme Court decisions. This 
constitutional arrangement is the foundation by which regulatory institutions set specific 
standards, requirements, processes, goals, values, and authorities for decades.  
 
The transformation of constitutional institutions towards “a fundamentally new 
system” emerges “when ecological, social, economic, and political conditions make the 
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existing system untenable” (Walker and Salt, 2006, p.62). Constitutional transformation 
makes “a change in the fundamental attributes of natural and human systems” (IPCC, 
2014, p.128). Transformational changes in society should be implemented or emergent 
“at a much larger scale or intensity,” “[as] truly new to a particular region or resource 
system,” and “[to] transform places and shift locations” (Kates et al., 2012, p.7156). 
Contrary to adaptive robustness frameworks, which are characterized by a defined 
system, a relatively short time period, and fixed variables, transformation has different 
properties such as fundamental changes, uncertainties, a longer time period, and 
larger scales of system transformation (Walker & Salt, 2006; Martin-Breen & Andreies, 
2011).  
 
Transformation is a process-based approach that is deeply rooted in complexity 
and uncertainties about the interplay between science and society. Sociotechnical 
transformations better fit general resilience frameworks than infrastructure resilience 
frameworks in part because science is not effective at long-term predictions in systems 
with unstable variables (Walker & Salt 2006; Folke et al., 2010). Social complexity 
greatly complicates our ability to forecast future conditions, needs, and preferences 
(Sarewitz & Pielke, 2000). 
 
4.8 Sociotechnical Interdependencies 
Infrastructure networks, such as water, energy, transportation, and communication 
are interdependent (Alderson & Doyle, 2010). The growing emphasis in engineering 
research and resilience policy on the interdependence of multiple infrastructure 
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systems—such as water, energy, and transportation networks—tends to emphasize 
technological or physical interdependencies that create the possibility for failures to 
cascade across systems. A water shortage, for example, can impact the supply of water 
for cooling generators in thermoelectric power plants (Vliet et al. 2012). Electricity 
outages, in turn, can impede the delivery and treatment of water, halt the operation of rail 
and traffic signal systems, or prevent the supply of gasoline and natural gas for 
transportation (Rinaldi et al. 2001; O’Rourke 2007). Also, energy systems are dependent 
on transportation systems for the provision of fossil fuels and workforce. Communication 
facilities and services are the key elements for managing processes of work field in water 
and energy systems. These complex interdependencies are increasingly understood to 
give rise to emergent and unpredictable behaviors through their interactions (Holland and 
Miller 1991, p. 365) that exacerbate vulnerabilities to a greater degree than would occur 
within relatively more simple systems (Alderson and Doyle 2010). 
 
These kinds of physical interdependencies of infrastructure have been studied as a 
source of vulnerabilities and a challenge for efforts to make infrastructure more resilient 
to climate disruptions. The effects of climate extremes (e.g., droughts, storms, floods, and 
blizzards) on physical networks are projected to exacerbate the vulnerability of 
interdependent infrastructures (Hunt & Watkiss, 2011, p.26). Electricity outages can shut 
down water pumps, either causing shortages in water distribution systems or floods due 
to wastewater pump failures (e.g., the city of San Diego case). Disturbances and technical 
failures in water systems may propagate through physical linkages between the water and 
energy systems and in turn affect the function of power systems. For instance, high 
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temperatures have forced nuclear power plants to shut down temporally in Europe (2018) 
and in the state of Tennessee in the United States (U.S.) (2011) (Hersher, NPR, Jul. 27, 
2018; Linnerud, Mideksa & Eskeland, 2011). Environmental regulations ban nuclear 
reactors from adding heat to riverine or oceanic water with their discharged hot water. 
More significantly, the shortage of cooling water in crisis can cause devastating failures 
as seen in multiple cases, such as Three Mile Island and Fukushima nuclear accidents.  
 
To understand infrastructure vulnerabilities and resiliencies, the analyses and 
reconfiguration of the dynamics of institutional processes are necessary, which include 
monitoring the functioning of systems, coordinating routines and crisis responses across 
multiple systems, identifying and repairing systems components, and redesigning 
constitutions over time in response to a variety of changes to the system and its 
contextual environment.  
 
Therefore, this chapter proposes to expand on this understanding of infrastructure 
resilience by examining another form of interdependence that is not physical but rather 
enmeshed in institutional and social network linkages among and across infrastructures. 
A number of studies have begun to explore non-physical interdependencies and their 
impacts on resilience. For instance, a recent study argued that regulatory failures due to 
close ties between operators and regulators contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
(Kurokawa & Ninomiya, 2018). The unsound relationship between the Japanese 
government, the regulatory agency (NISA), and the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO) caused an institutional vulnerability, regulatory capture, and this regulatory 
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failure ultimately led to the Fukushima disaster in 2011: “the root causes were the 
organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and 
actions” (“The Fukushima,” 2012, p.16). Logical (Rinaldi et al., 2001) and invisible 
networks of social elements (Edwards, 2003; Anderies, 2013) often prove to be critical 
points for recovery and adaptation of systems after disruptive events in spreading 
networks. Well-informed decision making (McDaniels et al., 2008) and sophisticated 
organizational interdependence (Thompson, 1967) can better equip infrastructure to 
sustain, adapt, and transform arrangements and functionality.  
 
Building on this preliminary work, this chapter develops a more generalizable 
approach for defining, identifying, and analyzing institutional interdependencies in 
infrastructure systems. Section 4.9 of this chapter defines and describes different types of 
institutional interdependencies of infrastructure from the perspective of systems theory.  
 
4.9 Institutional Interdependence and Infrastructure Resilience 
Approaching infrastructures as systems, and especially as sociotechnical systems, 
which integrate social, economic, and institutional dynamics with engineered 
technologies, changes the analysis of infrastructure resilience. In open, sociotechnical 
systems, properties or functionalities of infrastructures, such as their dependability or 
resilience, are emergent phenomena that arise from complex interactions between social 
and technical aspects (Emery & Trist, 1960; Mumford, 2006; Baxter & Sommerville, 
2011). In physically interdependent infrastructures, vulnerabilities and failures are well 
known to emerge from complex and tightly coupled component failures (Perrow, 1984) 
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and propagate within and across systems due to physical interdependencies (see, e.g., 
Fig. 13). In sociotechnical systems, vulnerabilities also arise from social elements of the 
system and can travel from system to system along with social and institutional pathways 
(Silva et al., 2012; Chappin & Lei, 2014). When compared to the static engineering 
analysis of the water and energy nexus, institutional networks also experience more 
complicated and dynamic forms of interdependence. The resilience of infrastructure to 
climate change thus must be assessed in terms of complex, sociotechnical systems 
dynamics, including not just engineering but also ecosystems, economic, policial, health, 
and bureaucratic elements (Bertalanffy, 1972; Senge, 1990; Seager et al., 2013; 
Grabowski et al., 2017). 
 
This chapter is particularly concerned 
with the institutional arrangements and 
elements of sociotechnical systems that 
contribute to exacerbating the vulnerabilities 
of tightly coupled infrastructures (Alderson 
& Doyle, 2010; Rinaldi et al., 2001; 
O’Rourke, 2007). Recent studies have 
highlighted the importance of institutional 
anticipations and governance structure in 
response to endogenous and exogenous 
instabilities (de Bruijne and Herder, 2009; Bollinger, L. et al., 2014; Chappin & Lei, 
Fig. 13 From a single system to 
interconnected systems (Rinaldi et al., 
2011). 
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2014). These studies have not yet, however, focused in depth on institutional 
interdependence across systems.  
 
To analyze the contribution of institutions to infrastructure vulnerability and 
resilience requires extending sociotechnical systems theory from single systems (e.g., the 
electricity grid, see Hughes 1983, or coal mining, see the UK Tavistock Institute, Emery 
& Trist, 1960) to complex, interdependent systems. This is consistent with other recent 
trends in the study of organizations, which are “moving away from hierarchies to 
networks (Castells, 1996) and from centralized to decentralized structures in which parts 
of a company are run as semi-autonomous units” (Mumford, 2006, p. 335). It is also 
consistent with emerging approaches to the study of resilience in engineering and 
organizations that recognize that resilience is a dynamic property of socially and 
institutionally managed systems and that the enhancement of resilience requires careful 
attention to the dynamic practices and processes through which resilience is achieved 
through vigilant learning and feedback (e.g., via sensing, anticipating, adapting, and 
learning, see Hollnagel, 2011; Park et al., 2013; Linnenluecke et al., 2011; O’Rourke, 
2007).  
 
Institutional interdependence is defined as the reciprocal connections among 
different infrastructures which interact through institutional processes, practices, and 
rules such as operational protocols, regulatory policies, and laws. Interdependent 
networks rely on constant regulating, intervening, cooperating, and exchanging of 
resources in systems (Thompson, 1964). Such collaborations and interventions take place 
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and are governed by institutions. Institutions manage the collection, interpretation, and 
use of data to assess risks, such as climate change, and to identify and evaluate responses. 
They operate infrastructures, including regular management of technology (e.g., water 
levels behind storage dams on river systems), options designed to enhance resilience 
(such as the opening of flood gates to relieve high water levels, see ASCE 2007; Park et 
al., 2013 ), and the performance (or failure to perform) routine maintenance. Institutions 
are also regulated—and regulate one another—in tightly interdependent, multi-centric 
governance arrangements that include operational entities, regulatory bodies, and 
legislative and constitutional institutions. In worst case scenarios, these institutional 
configurations readily become pathways for vulnerabilities which propagate through 
various institutional links and nodes while threatening the reliability and dependability of 
these systems. 
 
Institutions also inevitably face decision making trade-offs (e.g., between 
infrastructure performance and ecosystem services) in their efforts to improve the 
resilience of both individual as well as interdependent infrastructures (Brown, Tompkins, 
& Adger, 2001; Janssen, 2007; George, 2014). Trade-offs that enhance the robustness of 
one system (e.g., the protection of groundwater) while constraining the performance of 
other systems (e.g., the expansion of thermoelectric electricity systems) (Janssen, 2007) 
also occur across a variety of forms of institutional interdependence, such as financing, 
eminent domain, social sabotage, labor negotiation, etc. Interdependent institutions are 
thus loci wherein losers and winners (Smith & Stirling, 2010) convene and negotiate for 
the right institutional design of trade-offs in sociotechnical contexts. Central questions for 
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infrastructure resilience analyses are therefore how, specifically, any given set of 
complex infrastructure systems are interconnected, institutionally and organizationally, 
via webs of institutional interdependencies, how these webs propagate vulnerabilities or 
failures or, by contrast, strengthen and support resilience, and how institutions choose to 
manage institutional interdependence. A recent study of community resilience to 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico similarly observes, for example, that 
vulnerabilities to climate change flow through diverse social and institutional pathways 
(Eakin, Muñoz-Erickson & Lemos, 2018). 
 
4.10 Institutional Conduits for Trade-offs and Two Types of Institutional 
Interdependencies 
4.10.1 Trade-offs and institutional threads 
One more important point of institutional analysis is related to trade-off threads 
on values and resources. Trade-offs on different values and resources run through all 
three elements of vertical, lateral, and longitudinal institutional venues (threads). Pooled 
resources shared by stakeholders condition trade-off dynamics, where infrastructural 
interdependencies reside and solidify. For example: 
i) The vertical structure of institutional connections brings trade-off decisions 
including the power dynamics of directive guidance, devolution, and feedback between 
central groups and administrative sub-groups. Vertical trade-offs occasionally entail 
unilateral, institutional decision making such as the destruction of sub-organizations so 
that the greater systems can thrive (Janssen, 2007). Global adaptations and sustainability 
frequently require local sacrifice in the vertical threads of organizations (Woods, 2011). 
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Therefore, vertical trade-offs are typically sequential rather than reciprocal across 
hierarchical levels, although this is rarely complete. For instance, the headquarters of 
corporations typically audit and allocate resources to sub-groups within the same group 
via institutional directions.  
ii) Trade-offs cross and flow through lateral institutional threads while facilitating 
the exchange of opportunities among infrastructures (Gunderson & Holling, 2002). The 
hierarchical direction from upper-level organizations can prompt the exchange of 
opportunities in lateral domains. Direct regulations on CO2 emissions by the EPA can 
impose a financial burden on fossil fuel power utilities, and this constraint indirectly 
creates a lateral swap of capital investment towards new industry sectors (renewable 
energy and electric car manufacturers). Constraints and opportunities cross over to 
myriad, interdependent combinations via vertical and lateral networks across 
infrastructures. By virtue of releasing resources from one system, the other system can 
reorganize its structure and conserve outcomes (Gunderson & Holling, 2002) and these 
circulations are materialized via lateral linkages. Specifically, in traffic systems, 
operators observe and continuously switch traffic signal intervals for managing capacity 
trade-offs between roads depending on daily traffic.  
iii) Trade-offs also arise alongside longitudinal continuities of institutions over 
time. Different stakeholders at different time periods are legally bound via the 
continuation of laws and regulations. Fossil fuel systems contributing to historical 
accumulations of CO2 emissions, supported by laws and regulations, face 
transformational system challenges and financial burdens for clean energy in a new era. 
Updating institutions need consideration on generation gaps in energy cultures and the 
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time discrepancies of CO2 emitters and greenhouse gas regulators to overcome the 
remnants of fossil fuel systems (Gardiner, S. M. & Hartzell-Nichols, L., 2012). 
Infrastructure aging is also a longitudinal, institutional trade-off challenge to both 
contemporary taxpayers and future beneficiaries, which is nurtured by the continuity of 
certain tax laws. Evenly spreading of benefits and burdens across longitudinally different 
taxpayers within the same infrastructure community is a fundamental question to the 
sustainability of infrastructure.  
 
4.10.2 Two types of interdependencies 
The implication of the analysis on institutional threads and trade-offs via 
institutions is that two-types of institutional interdependencies enfolding infrastructures 
can be found: direct or indirect interdependence. The infrastructure management of one 
system can directly or indirectly affect the operation and management of the other 
systems (Fig. 14). First, an institution of one system directly regulates the operation and 
management of the counterpart system via hierarchical threads. In this case, direct 
institutional interdependence postures tighter connections between two different 
infrastructures. For instance, institutional governance of water systems on using 
groundwater regulates electricity utilities in Arizona. A groundwater aquifer is a 
component of the water resource system and has been regulated by state-level water 
institutions in Arizona. If groundwater regulations change, then the operation and 
management for the usage of groundwater by power plants must by necessity change as 
well. In some cases, water security is privileged over electricity robustness in a way that 
sacrifices electricity expansion in exchange for the sustainability of Arizona’s whole 
  99 
social-ecological system. The direct intervention via a vertical thread from the water 
system represents a value emphasis on water at the expense of upgrading energy capacity.  
 
 
Figure 14. Direct interdependence (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
Second, with respect to indirect intervention, interdependence can occur via 
hierarchical and lateral threads between different infrastructures (Fig. 15). Indirect 
interdependence includes one system’s institutional changes vertically maneuvering the 
codes or standards of sub-organizations, and, via lateral linkages, these changes indirectly 
affect the counter system’s operation and management. For instance, the operational 
planning of water-related organizations can be modified in accordance with changes in 
higher-level organizational governance derived from environmental challenges, and then 
these institutional changes can affect, via institutional and social linkages, the provision 
of water resources to the electricity utilities that operate power plants. The operational 
changes in electricity utilities, which regulate the operation of power plants, are not 
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associated with any direct interventions of decision making from higher-level 
organizations in water systems.   
 
 
Figure 15. Indirect interdependence (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
Infrastructure resilience means stability in the short-term as well as 
transformability in the long-term. Thus, an institutional approach critical to infrastructure 
resilience emphasizes how a system sustains, adaptively adjusts, and innovatively 
transforms, when necessary, its structure and function via institutions in a strategic way. 
The essential element of infrastructure resilience should not be simply conceived of as 
equivalent to a fast bounce back to the original state after disturbances. Rather, an 
institutional balance between engineering stability and social transformability (Beunen, 
Patterson, & van Assche, 2017) at different temporal scales should be a crucial feature of 
infrastructure resilience.  
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Furthermore, infrastructures are not only physically, but also institutionally 
interdependent, and thus analyses of institutional interdependence are essential for 
systems resilience. External disruptions, not necessarily in the form of physical 
disruptions, flow through institutional networks. Climate change runs through institutions 
while influencing institutional contexts for water and energy systems in Arizona. The 
investigation on institutional interdependence clarifies institutional threats that water and 
energy systems will face and need to overcome in response to climate change. As such, 
climate stressors to infrastructure are also challenges to institutional interdependence of 
infrastructure. Society, technology, and environmental disruptions interact through 
institutional webs. Discussion on the strategic adaptation of interdependent infrastructure 
considering local institutional attributes is essential. Broad engineering quantification 
without looking at local institutional traits is parochial. Circumscribed abstraction of 
physical realities and the exclusion of institutional interdependence can lead to 
misdirected validation of knowledge and fallible policies (e.g., naïve resilience tactics 
and strategies).  
 
Chapter 5 examines the institutional management of Hoover Dam and its 
resources—water and electricity—to illustrate how society and institutions have shaped 
this critical infrastructure while focusing on the allocation of common pool resources. 
Hoover Dam was constructed by myriad technological acts and assessments, but the 
infrastructural utility and operational functionality for service were all arranged by 
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institutions, which is imperative to the sustainability and resilience of infrastructures 
(e.g., Hoover Dam) in society (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 1987).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A CASE STUDY OF INFRASTRUCTURE AS A SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEM:  
WATER AND ELECTRICITY FROM HOOVER DAM  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The first four chapters of the dissertation have laid out the theoretical argument 
that institutional work is an integral element in the resilience of critical infrastructure 
systems. This theoretical argument has developed around three key ideas. First, in 
Chapter 2, the dissertation introduced the idea of defining and describing infrastructure in 
terms of sociotechnical systems, i.e., that infrastructures have interlinked social and 
technical elements that interact dynamically with one another to form the infrastructure 
system. Second, Chapter 3 discusses the multiple definitions of resilience and argues for 
redefining resilience as a dynamic property of socio-technical systems, rather than a static 
property of engineered systems, in which institutional work provides the capacity to 
create both short-term stability and long-term flexibility. Finally, Chapter 4 delves deeper 
into the role of institutions in managing resilience, establishing a broad framework for 
mapping and classifying the resilience work of institutions and for analyzing the 
institutional interdependencies associated with complex infrastructure systems. 
 
Building on this theoretical work, Chapters 5-9 present empirical analyses of 
different aspects of the institutional dimensions and work of resilience. These analyses 
are grounded in multiple case studies of energy and water systems in Arizona. In each 
  104 
chapter, one or more case studies is used to demonstrate a key aspect of how resilience 
work plays out in practice in the work of one or more institutions. 
 
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to illustrate the core argument of Chapter 2: 
infrastructures are not just engineered systems but sociotechnical systems. Thus, the work 
of building and operating those infrastructures is not just engineering work but also 
social, political, legal, and institutional work. Chapter 5 is particularly concerned with 
one of the central infrastructures of the Arizona water and energy systems, Hoover Dam, 
a water storage dam with hydroelectric generating capacity built in the 1930s and 1940s 
as the lynchpin of efforts to develop the water and energy resources of the Southwest 
region. The chapter shows that, in order to make it possible to build the dam, as a 
technological object, the US government first had to establish a legal or constitutional 
basis for its existence. This included both settling major political conflicts about water 
ownership, e.g., via the 1922 Colorado River Compact, and creating a legal basis for 
federal ownership and operation of electricity generation and sales, e.g., via the 1929 
Boulder Canyon Project Act. Put theoretically, Hoover Dam was co-produced with its 
institutional and legal constitution.  
 
This system has not stayed static, however. Rather, institutional work has 
continued long after the construction of the dam in order to periodically update the 
regulatory arrangements for allocating water and electricity among diverse users. These 
adaptations have been necessary in order to adjust the operation of the dam in response to 
changes in both political values and social dynamics as well as the behavior of the 
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physical systems involved. Several constitutional changes have occurred over the years, 
including the integration of Arizona into the legal agreements for water and power 
allocation, the reconfiguration of rights to water and power around the Southwest Native 
American communities, and the persistent drought in the Colorado River watershed since 
the 1990s. Chapter 5 thus also illustrates the idea of constitutional resilience work, 
helping to maintain system functionality through transformational change in the supply of 
water and electricity over time in the Southwest. 
 
5.2 The First Electricity Transmission (from Hoover Dam to Los Angeles)  
On October 9th, 1936, the first transmission of electricity generated from the 
turbines of Hoover Dam began (Fig. 16). This transmission system spanned 266 miles 
across the area of mountains and deserts and arrived at the Civic Center of Los Angeles. 
With a flash, lightning started at 7:36 pm on Friday night. On Friday night, the parade 
started at 8:00 pm with “an illumination of 7,000,000,000 candlepower” and next day the 
Electrical Age Exposition was held in Pan-Pacific Auditorium. The parade with 
thousands of marchers illuminated by rainbow flash started at Washington Boulevard, 
moved to First Street, and went down the street before the Civic Center. At Sunset 
Boulevard, the parade ended (“City Waits New Power.” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 6th). 
 
The guideline for the allocation of hydroelectric power from Hoover Dam was 
legislated by the US Congress in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 before 
construction was completed in 1935. Complying with the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 
1928, the US Secretary of the Interior executed electricity allocation contracts on April 
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26th, 1930 and finished allocation for annual energy generated by Hoover Dam, about 4 
billion kWh, in 1931. In 1934, Congress signed a 50-year contract that spanned from 
1937 to 1987 that regulated the allocation of hydropower from Hoover Dam. The utilities 
purchasing that power and delivering it to their service territory, as defined in this act, 
were Southern California Edison and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.2 
The contract between the United States and the City of Los Angeles and its Department 
of Water and Power, and Southern California Edison Company, Ltd., “Contract for the 
Operation of Boulder Power Plant (No. I1r – 1333),” was made on May 29, 1941. Since 
this initial allocation of hydropower from Hoover Dam, there were two more 
developments with hydroelectricity allocation, in 1984 and in 2011 (The Bureau of 
Reclamation, 1980, p.57). 
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Figure 16. The first transmission*  
(source: Water and Power Associates website: 
https://waterandpower.org/museum/Construction_of_Hoover_Dam.html) 
 
* People were crowded on the route in Broadway on October 9th, 1936. A myriad of 
lights glowed with the electricity transmitted from Hoover Dam power generator. 
 
Given that Hoover Dam’s hydropower is derived from a federally-owned facility 
releasing water from a public reservoir, the hydropower can be seen as a sort of common 
pool resource. Thus, to study the history and dynamics of hydroelectricity allocation in 
light of common pool resources is deemed important and relevant.  
 
5.3 Governing Common Pool Resources from Hoover Dam 
5.3.1 The application of common pool resource criteria  
In Ostrom’s book, the common pool resource is defined by two attributes: 
excludability and subtractability. Therefore, to apply Ostrom’s theory to hydroelectricity 
from Hoover Dam, there have to be these two attributes. First, hydroelectricity can be 
generated only by the release of water from Lake Mead through Hoover Dam’s power 
turbines. The water resource of Lake Mead can be blocked from external entities without 
entitlement of access to this resource. The abuse of this resource will be excluded. 
Without water resources, there is no hydroelectricity. Thus, the hydroelectricity has 
excludability. Second, the water resource of Lake Mead is subtractable which means the 
diversion of water from Lake Mead leads to the depletion of water resource since the 
hydroelectricity cannot be generated without water release from Lake Mead. This results 
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in insufficient water resource for the generation of hydroelectricity. Thus, 
hydroelectricity also has another attribute, subtractability for common pool resource.  
 
5.3.2 The significance and details of the common pool resource criteria 
Ostrom’s idea is that the management of common pool resources leaning on the 
external authority sometimes results in inefficient or undesirable outcomes as observed in 
the empirical examples. Ostrom holds that self-governance as opposed to a command and 
control structure from outside the stakeholders and direct beneficiaries can be a more 
efficient and desirable management method. Thus, this system can be more sustainable 
than other systems. To understand Ostrom’s common pool resource management 
approach, the following sections first begin with Garrett Hardin’s “the tragedy of the 
commons.” In this chapter, how the management of resources from Hoover Dam has 
been sustained and adapted by institutions will be investigated.  
 
5.3.3 Garrett Hardin’s “the tragedy of the commons” 
Elinor Ostrom’s idea is so different from that of Hardin that she denies the simple 
resolution upon external authorities such as government or market system. It is worth 
noting that before Ostrom postulated her theory, Garrett Hardin’s pessimistic perspective 
concerning the improbability of successful self-governance for common pool resources 
had prevailed. As a microbiologist, Hardin had been interested in human overpopulation 
and sociobiology. Garrett Hardin’s seminal article, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” first 
focused on the problem of overpopulation for the sustainability on our planet (Hardin, 
1968). He asserted that to ask people to have fewer children through “an appeal to 
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conscience” would be a mistake. He further argued that this method would lead to the 
elimination of conscience from our society because those with a conscience would 
choose to limit their reproduction while those without a conscience would breed freely 
and become the majority. As a consequence, those whose behavior is based on 
conscience will become the minority. He extended this dilemma to explain the tragedy of 
the commons using the idea of a common pasture as an example. Assuming there is a 
pasture accessible to all herdsmen, we can expect all herdsmen try to breed as many cattle 
as possible on this common pasture. The following logic explains Hardin’s paradigm: 
When a cattleman puts an extra cow on the commons, he can get the whole benefit of the 
value of the cow when he sells it. However, the loss in the forage available on the 
common pasture is shared among all the cattlemen who use the commons. In other words, 
the cattleman gets all the benefit of the extra cow but suffers only a small portion of the 
cost. Thus, all the cattlemen, if they are rational, will try to add extra cows to increase 
their profits, and the common pasture will be overexploited and eventually degraded. The 
incentive for profits leads to an unlimited increase in the number of cows.  
 
Hardin suggests the National Parks as another example of the tragedy of the 
commons. As the number of people who visit the National Parks increases, the value of 
the natural landscape will diminish. For these tragedies, he proposes several options. 
First, he contends that we can divide our pasture or parks into several parts and make 
them private property, with the assumption that the owner of the pasture or park will 
regulate its use to avoid degradation. Alternatively, we can keep the pasture or park as 
public property, a common-pool resource, and allocate specific rights of use to specific 
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members of the community. The decision making for who should be the members are 
diverse. There may be a lottery, an auction, or it could be a first-come and first-serve 
basis. So, both governmental authority (mutual coercion upon mutual agreement) and 
private property regimes with market-based allocations offer solutions to the tragedy of 
the commons, according to Hardin. He suggested that the government allocation and 
management of common pool resources can be effective if mutual coercion is based on 
mutual agreement and recognition of necessity. In other words, the users of the commons 
agree on a system of regulations to avoid the overuse of the commons. In his 
controversial conclusion, Hardin returned to the issue of overpopulation and argued that 
paradoxically the best way to preserve the freedom of reproduction is to mutually agree 
to limits on an individual’s right to reproduce.  
 
5.3.4 Governing common pool resources (Elinor Ostrom) 
Elinor Ostrom asserted in her book, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action, that the common pool resource can be self-governed by 
a community. This assertion is contrary to the conventional analysis for common pool 
resources. The conventional analysis posited that it is inevitable that common pool 
resources will be depleted without government’s regulation or a privatized market system 
under total privatization. Ostrom used examples of self-governing resources in diverse 
situations and nations. Ostrom’s main idea was that public service such as operation and 
maintenance for common pool resources can be accomplished without government’s 
organization or market system under several special conditions (Ostrom, 1997; Ostrom, 
2011). Ostrom highlighted the limitation of external authorities as below:  
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“ …  I do not argue for either of these positions. Rather, I argue that both are too 
sweeping in their claims. … Institutions are rarely either private or public – “the 
market” or “the state.” Many successful CPR institutions are rich mixtures of 
“private – like” and “public – like” institutions defying classification in a sterile 
dichotomy. …” (Ostrom, 1997, p.14) 
 
The logic of this perspective aims at overcoming the result of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. 
This ‘collective action’ problem, which means that rational cooperation cannot be 
achieved among rational individuals seeking selfish advantages like Garrett Hardin’s 
(1968) idea. In the traditional framework for collective action, individuals are regarded as 
straightforward utility maximizers, and collective action readily leads to a social dilemma 
such as the under-provision of public goods. However, Ostrom’s contribution is to show 
the possibility that this bounded rationality can be overcome through building a ‘common 
pool governance’ structure.   
 
5.3.5 The characteristics of the allocation of the hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam 
There are two differences between Ostrom’s conceptiuon of a common pool 
resource and the hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam. First, the hydroelectricity from 
Hoover Dam needs the construction of Hoover Dam. This means for generation of 
hydroelectricity, there should be an investment of construction cost. Who will pay this 
cost is directly connected to the problem of who will benefit from the common 
infrastructure; that is, no dam, no hydroelectricity. Second, although Ostrom’s theory 
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mentions the self-governing of common pool resource, the theory could not sufficiently 
accommodate the case of Lake Mead and Hoover Dam since Lake Mead and Hoover 
Dam are both under government’s control. The government has the legal right of 
allocation of water and hydroelectricity. Even though hydroelectricity is a common pool 
resource, the allocation of hydroelectricity should be done by the government and the 
criteria for this allocation should consider the construction cost of Hoover Dam. Put 
simply, in the criteria for the allocation of hydroelectricity from a public dam, the 
common pool resource criteria and governmental allocation criteria can be put together 
simultaneously. Thus, deciding who will benefit from publicly owned infrastructure has 
two steps.  
 
The first step is to figure out who has the willingness to pay the cost of the 
construction and the operation of the common infrastructure. The second step is to decide 
who will be the beneficiaries if the people who want the resource outnumber the capacity 
of the common infrastructure. In the first step, we can just follow the simple and succinct 
principle, “The user-pay principle.”  However, in the second step, a different rule should 
be established. This is because the purpose of the public infrastructure is to advance the 
public interest, not necessarily to pursue profit. Given the aspect of common pool 
resource in the allocation of hydroelectricity, it is convincing that the allocation of 
hydroelectricity has to follow the criteria of common pool resource. Therefore, it is 
needed to review the problem of who should benefit from the Hoover Dam’s 
hydroelectricity in two different perspectives, namely willingness to pay and common 
pool resource criteria.   
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5.3.6 Ostrom’s eight conditions for the sustainable management of Hoover Dam 
Among the sustainable conditions in Chapter 2, in this essay, the conditions (2), 
(3), (6), and (7) will first be the focus of the discussion regarding the management of 
Hoover Dam. Condition (1) is clear with the boundary of Lake Mead and the 
transmission lines. Conditions (4), (5) are accomplished by the federal legal systems such 
as civil law and criminal law. Condition (8) is not reviewed in this research because this 
research does not deal with the allocation of hydroelectricity in the sub-jurisdictions 
under the states.  
 
With respect to the conditions (2), (3), and (7), the following sections will 
investigate what the guideline was used for the allocation. Also, these sections will 
examine how an agreement on the allocation of the Colorado River among the 
stakeholders (e.g., the states of California, Arizona, and Nevada) was made for the 
allocation of hydroelectricity. The hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam is bound with 
water from Lake Mead. Therefore, it is meaningful that by looking into the allocation of 
water, the collective-choice arrangement (rule-making)—according to Ostrom’s theory, 
collective-choice rule is connected to the policy making for the management of the 
common pool resources. How the common pool resources should be managed is directly 
related to this level of rule (Ostrom, 1990, p.52-53)—and the agents’ negotiation for 
mutual agreement about the allocation of hydroelectricity can be elaborated. In relation to 
the condition (6), the background, progress and resolution mechanism of the legal dispute 
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as a conflict-resolution mechanism between the states of Arizona and California will be 
studied. 
 
Second, for applying Ostrom’s theory, the hydroelectricity has to come from the 
publicly owned dam which is public infrastructure. For this point, the social and 
economic backgrounds of the construction of the “public” Hoover Dam with the federal 
budget will be studied.  With these focal points, we can review how the allocation of the 
hydroelectricity as a common pool resource was accomplished. The existence of public 
infrastructure, the collective-choice arrangement, the negotiation among the states for 
mutual agreement, and the dispute resolution mechanism will be discussed in this essay. 
This will make the discussion about common pool resources (infrastructures) deeper and 
applicable to society.  
 
5.4 Sociotechnical Transformation for ‘Public Hydroelectricity’ at the federal level 
5.4.1 A transformational support for the construction of Hoover Dam 
5.4.1.1 The formation of the Boulder Canyon Project Act at the federal level 
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Figure 17. The Boulder Canyon Project and adjacent territory  
(source: U.S. Department of the Interior, The Hoover Dam Power and Water Contracts, 
2) 
 
Major John Wesley Powell explored the Colorado River basin and documented 
his exploration in his report in 1878, “Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the 
United States” (Worster, 1985, p.133). He stated that the essential component for the 
future of this area would be the storage of water. He suggested that Congress prepare and 
conduct a survey of irrigation opportunities. The dominant idea in his mind was that 
water in the West should be rationally managed to maximize its efficient use in a region 
of water scarcity. “It is of the most immediate and pressing importance that a general 
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survey should be made for the purpose of determining the several areas which can thus be 
redeemed by irrigation” (Worster, 1985, p.134). 
 
However, the survey was not conducted because Congress thought it would be 
useless. In 1907, the President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, recommended 
that Congress pass a law to protect the Imperial Valley in the state of California from 
flooding. Congress was still reluctant to authorize funding to build extensive reclamation 
projects in the Colorado River basin. Within ten years, Congress became more amenable 
to federal investment in the Colorado River basin. A report by the All-American Canal 
Board established by an agreement of 1918 became a trigger to develop the Imperial 
Valley irrigation system. In this report, the All-American Canal Board argued that a large 
storage reservoir should be constructed in the Colorado River basin. With this report, the 
first and the second All-American Canal bill were submitted to Congress in 1919 and 
1920 consecutively. However, the bills were rejected on the ground that the data was not 
sufficient for validation. In 1920, the Kincaid Act required the Bureau of Reclamation to 
investigate the Imperial Valley area and the status of irrigation. On February 28, 1922, a 
report by Arthur Powell Davis, Reclamation’s Director and Chief Engineer, was 
submitted to Congress. In his “Report on problems of Imperial Valley and vicinity,” 
Arthur Powell Davis pointed out several significant investigation results for the 
development of the Boulder Canyon (Hiltzik, 2010, p.67; Linenberger, 2002, p.43). The 
most important point of them was that a storage reservoir should be constructed in the 
Boulder Canyon area and the construction cost funded by the federal budget and this cost 
be reimbursed by selling hydroelectricity.  
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Congressman Phil D. Swing from the state of California and Senator Hiram W. 
Johnson from the state of California drafted the ‘Swing-Johnson bill’ to execute this 
report. After several failed attempts, Congress finally passed the “Swing-Johnson bill” 
for the investigation of the economic and engineering aspects of the future storage 
reservoir at Boulder Canyon on May 28, 1928. After the investigation, a bill for the 
Boulder Canyon Project was passed in Congress and the Boulder Canyon Project Act 
became effective on June 25, 1929. The Boulder Canyon project, which was a multi-
purpose water storage, flood control, and irrigation project, was facilitated by the 1922 
Colorado River Compact that divided up the waters of the Colorado River among the 
seven river basin states. Arizona, which had not yet ratified the Colorado River Compact, 
protested that too much of the river’s water was allocated to California.  This dispute 
would not be settled for several more decades. One of the five purposes of the Boulder 
Canyon Project was the generation of electricity (Kleinsorge, 1941, p.75-80). 
 
5.4.1.2 Federal imaginaries: the “Public” Hoover Dam 
The federal government’s active intent to involve itself in the power market and 
the high potential of energy generation in the Colorado River Basin was a catalyst for a 
debate between the public and private power sectors. This debate is related to the 
question of whether the opportunity of making a profit should be reserved for the private 
power sector or not. The original 1922 report by Arthur Powell Davis recommended that 
the sale of hydroelectricity could easily reimburse government construction and operation 
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costs, so the project could be built without any investment from the private sector 
(Hundley, 1975, pp.113-114). 
 
After the Civil War, which lasted from 1861-1865, there was a debate in America 
about the nature and purpose of the national government. Some people preferred 
maximum liberty for economic profits and urged the government to promote industrial 
capitalism. Even though this political philosophy brought wealth and power to the United 
States, there remained many social problems from market system failures such as 
environmental pollution, labor exploitation, boom and bust economic cycles, and natural 
resources depletion. By the turn of the 20th century a reform movement called 
“progressivism” advocated a more activist role for government in advancing the public 
interest. Progressives felt capitalism should be regulated to make it more stable and 
socially responsible. As for electricity, the Progressives believed that the laissez-faire 
policy was not appropriate for the public welfare, preferring instead the utilitarian 
principle of “the greatest good to the greatest number.” Progressives believed that 
privately-owned electric utilities providing essential public services should be regulated 
by the state or the federal government commissions. It was reasonable that the private 
utility companies and the conservatives were opposed to this regulatory policy. 
Regarding the ownership of electricity utilities, there were overall four perspectives, that 
“(1) opposed any government intervention, (2) favored government regulation of 
privately owned utilities, (3) favored a wholly publicly owned electricity supply system, 
(4) preferred a hybrid system of private and public utilities.” Richard T. Ely, who was 
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known as Progressive economist, insisted the fourth model perceived best for 
“responsible economic and social development” (Hirt, 2012, pp. 105-108).  
The Hoover Dam provided a good opportunity for the debaters who wanted to 
talk about the private and public initiative in supplying electricity. The private industry 
was afraid of being compared with the quality and the price of public electricity supply. 
The specific concern related to governmental involvement was the market price of 
electricity. According to an article in the New York Times in 1933, opponents of public 
power argued that publicly-financed projects “…can take away existing markets for 
power from the companies because there are no immediate penalties incurred in selling 
electricity below cost. Rates can be introduced which would bankrupt private companies 
but which can be made up by taxation in the case of municipal, State or government 
projects. Eventually, however, the loss in revenues from taxes now is paid by utility 
companies, and the costs of operating at a loss, cannot fail to affect the welfare of 
consumers…” (“Utilities fight public ownership” 1933. Oct. 29th. New York Times). 
 
 Private power advocates charged that public power was inefficient but that was 
generally not true at least in 1920s (Hirt, 2012, pp. 205-213). The case of the Hoover 
Dam refuted this private power advocates’ assertion. The Hoover Dam, like all multiple-
purpose projects, could supply hydroelectricity at lower cost than the private industry and 
amortize the construction cost over a longer period at lower interest rates (Kleinsorge, 
1941, p.299). Though hydroelectricity already contributed 71% of the energy generated 
by Los Angeles in 1934 (Kleinsorge, 1941, p.292), after about 10 years, in 1945, 
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approximately 75% of the electricity consumed by the city of Los Angeles came from the 
Hoover Dam (Copp & Zanella, 1993, p.71) (Fig. 18).  
 
Figure 18. Percentage of total electricity for the city of Los Angeles provided by 
hydropower from all sources and from Hoover Dam (source: Copp & Zanella, 1993, 
p.71) 
 
5.4.2 Social and economic backgrounds: hydroelectricity and Hoover Dam 
5.4.2.1 Economic backgrounds: hydroelectricity market before Hoover Dam  
Before Hoover Dam was built, the electricity market was extensively controlled 
by the private power utilities as a result of the technological development related to 
electrical engineering in private power industries. From the 1910s to the 1920s, there was 
a rapid advance in technology and equipment of transmission system and substation 
automation system, the utilization of electricity spread widely. Especially in the industry 
department, with this technological development, the portion of electricity from private 
sector increased fast. The private power utilities became more interested in a lucrative 
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business model in the power market and according to the economy of scale, the small 
utilities began to merge into larger consolidated regional utilities. In 1912, the percentage 
of electricity from private power plants in the whole power market was 28%, and in the 
1920s it was over 50%. Only 18 private power companies held half of the 
hydroelectricity in the United States in 1916. This prevalence of private power utilities 
had been apparent for about 15 years from 1920. In 1932 three great utility holding 
companies took control over half of the electricity market in the U.S. However, there was 
a slightly different situation in the West. As of 1916, 56% of hydroelectricity in the West 
was tightly coupled with the publicly owned lands. In 1920, the legal background for 
prompting the publicly owned power utility was established. Protecting Federal 
participation in the power market and regulating the private utilities, Federal Water 
Power Act of 1920 boosted the public power market (Linenberger, 2002, pp. 38-40).  
 
5.4.2.2 Social and legal backgrounds: hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam 
The construction of Hoover Dam was completed in 1935 and the generators 
started power in 1936. The generation of electricity, one of Hoover Dam’s multiple 
purposes, was a way to finance the project. The directly benefited area with the protection 
from flood and irrigation system is limited and this area could not entirely bear the cost of 
the project. The government also did not have an intention to donate the federal income 
to this area. Thus, the sale of electricity was considered as the best solution to this 
conundrum. Moreover, generation of electricity played a significant role to initiate this 
huge project (Klenisorge, 1941, p.84) which was even labeled as the largest public 
project in the world at that time. The Los Angeles Bureau of Power and Light constructed 
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the Boulder-LA transmission lines and the lines comprised two rows of towers. The 
height of each tower was 109 feet and the distance between the two rows was 800 – 1,000 
feet.  Current Hoover Dam’s power annual generation is about 4.2billion kWh (Water 
and Power Associates, 2014). 
 
The Boulder Canyon Project Act gave the Secretary of the Interior the authority to 
execute the sale of hydroelectricity. According to the Act, transmission lines should be 
built by the applicants for making a contract. Because there were no large cities anywhere 
near Hoover Dam, long transmission lines were needed to get the hydroelectricity from 
Hoover Dam to markets, so the possible applicants could not make a contract with the 
Secretary of the Interior to buy Hoover power if they could not have built the 
transmission lines with their own money. However, the Act had an article to protect small 
contractors simultaneously, which empowered the Secretary of the Interior to ask a big 
contractor to share the transmission line with small contractors. This could prevent the 
duplicate investment for the transmission line and give an opportunity for smaller electric 
utilities to contract for Hover Dam hydropower (Kleinsorge, 1941, pp.97-98). Hoover 
Dam marked a transition in how the public and Congress thought about reclamation. 
Before the Boulder Canyon Project, the Bureau of Reclamation tried to recover project 
costs from the sale of publicly owned land and the sale of water from the reclamation 
projects to irrigators. However, land and water sales usually did not generate enough 
revenue to pay for project costs. To make matters worse, most irrigation districts were 
behind on their repayment obligations. Hydroelectricity became the answer to change 
those unpleasant situations. Revenues from electricity sales at large federal dams allowed 
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the government to quickly recoup project expenses and then use surplus revenues to 
subsidize the irrigation project costs. Hoover Dam was the proof of concept for this new 
approach to financing reclamation. With the success of the Hoover Dam, the Bureau of 
Reclamation could promote federal public hydropower projects with confidence 
(Linenberger, 2002, p.46). 
 
5.5 The Initial Allocation of Hydroelectricity at the Federal Level 
5.5.1 Tentative purchasers and collective-choice arrangement (rule-making) 
On September 10th, 1929, the Department of the Interior informed all prospective 
applicants for the Hoover Dam hydroelectricity.3 The tentative purchasers included the 
municipal-owned utilities and the states of Arizona, Nevada, and California (The United 
States Department of Interior, 1933, p.511). Due to the historically cheap price of 
hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam, the sum of the hydroelectricity purchase contracts 
requested by applicants exceeded three times the total generation capacity of Hoover 
Dam (Kleinsorge, 1941, p.287)4. 
 
Although the states of Arizona, Nevada, and California applied for the 
hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam, the reasons for applications were completely 
different. The state of California most strongly wanted to be a buyer of the 
hydroelectricity. Especially Los Angeles, which vigorously supported to add the 
hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam to the southern California power market. According to 
the application, the amount for which Los Angeles applied was 3.6 billion kWh per year, 
almost the whole hydroelectric capacity of Hoover Dam. The annual capacity to be 
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contracted was 4,240,000,000 kWh (The United States Department of the Interior, 1948, 
p.69). The lucid explanation came with the social and economical background of Los 
Angles. First, the consumption of electricity by Los Angeles had increased by 15% 
annually between 1915 and 1922. In 1930, the consumption of electricity became seven 
times more than that in 1915 (Pisani, 2002, p.229). Second, Los Angeles was 
economically boosted by the growth of Hollywood and the oil drilling on Rincon and 
Signal Hills in the 1920s. It became the largest city in the state of California that decade 
(Wiley & Gottlieb, 1985, p.108-109). In 1920, the population of Los Angeles was around 
0.6 million and the population increased to 1.5 million in 1940 (Fig. 19). The rapid 
growth of population was one of the greatest challenges to supply of energy which was 
needed not only for electricity provision but also water supply. The needs from the 
economic and social aspects of the state of California positively required a contract for 
electricity.  
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Figure 19. Population growth in the city of Los Angeles  
(source: Copp & Zanella, 1993, p.37) 
 
The states of Arizona and Nevada were not able to pay the lease or construction 
of transmission line. Based on Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, they had to build 
their own transmission line or lease it. However, they had not enough funds for 
hydroelectricity and transmission. They ostensibly had the ‘willingness to pay’ for the 
hydroelectricity, however the truth was that they wanted to buy the hydroelectricity at a 
low price and sell it to other areas at a higher price than they paid for it (Kleinsorge, 
1941, p.288). 
 
In spite of these conflicting backgrounds for applications, the Secretary of the 
Interior, Ray Lyman Wilbur, favored the policy to provide the states of Arizona and 
Nevada some of Hoover Dam’s inexpensive power. If the ability to afford the payment of 
hydroelectricity was only criteria, the states of Arizona and Nevada had no choice but to 
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be excluded from the process of the allocation. However, Secretary Wilbur’s idea for 
rule-making was different. This was because Wilbur focused on two criteria for the 
allocation of power. First, he wanted as many applicants as possible to participate in 
bidding for hydroelectricity. Second, he attempted to make the benefits from Hoover 
Dam spread over not only the areas near Hoover Dam but also as more areas as possible 
(Pisani, 2002, p.231). With this policy, the states of Arizona and Nevada had the 
opportunity to apply for the allocation of hydroelectricity. The rule for allocation can be 
seen as an appropriate collective-choice arrangement in that the stakeholders had an equal 
opportunity to participate in the allocation discussions. In other words, the expectations 
for the future from the states of Arizona and Nevada contributed to a controversy (Los 
Angeles Times, June 18, 1933, p.26; Los Angeles Times, April 10, 1938, p.9; Los Angeles 
Times, October 20, 1929, p.3). The state of Nevada required a third of total 
hydroelectricity (The New York Times, February 16, 1930), and the state of Arizona was 
not satisfied with the result of allocation. The state of Arizona asserted they deserved to 
have the right to directly tax the water and hydroelectricity rather than just to take 
revenue from sale of water and hydroelectricity according to their share portion 18% 
(Kleinsorge, 1941, p.154).  This controversy was kept until the final ratification of the 
Colorado River Compact by the state of Arizona in 1944.      
 
5.5.2 The condition for the fulfillment of willingness to pay: historically low price 
At first, President Hoover did not regard hydroelectricity as a revenue source. He 
saw hydroelectricity as a sort of spin-off from the need to prevent the Imperial Valley 
from flooding and provide water supply to Southern California, Arizona, and irrigation 
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farmers. Thus, the rate and the allocation of hydroelectricity were not the main issues for 
him. However, the intentions of Congress were different from President Hoover. 
Congress wanted the ownership of generating facilities, the hydroelectricity price, and the 
right of purchase decision before the completion of construction of the dam. This was 
because Congress wanted the federal government to have a dominant position in the 
electricity market. Even though the states of Arizona and Nevada at that time had less 
actual electricity demand than the amount of power they requested from the federal 
government from Hoover Dam, they continued to push for a generous allocation of power 
because of the value of that inexpensive hydroelectricity generated at Hoover Dam.  
 
Before the Hoover Dam, there was private power advocates’ assertion that the 
price of hydroelectricity could not be cheaper than conventional energy sources that 
prevailed for several reasons (Pisani, 2002, pp.228-229). They also opposed the 
construction of Hoover Dam for several reasons. First, the construction cost of the 
hydroelectricity power plant was two to four times more expensive than that of steam 
power plants with petroleum. Second, with the huge amount of construction cost and the 
long time required for construction, the price of hydroelectricity would also fluctuate 
with the change of monetary interest. Third, the generation of hydroelectricity was 
contingent on precipitation and water intake. Fourth, relatively long transmission of 
hydroelectricity from the remote dam to the consumers was an obstacle to make the price 
of the hydroelectricity lower (Pisani, 2002, p.231). Fifth, in the Southwest, there was no 
sufficient consumption market for the hydroelectricity from the Hoover Dam. For the 4.3 
billion kWh of power generation from the Hoover Dam, the market should be enlarged 
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by two times. Lastly, the cost of generation of electricity from steam power plant would 
keep going down incrementally in the Southwest area (Kleinsorge, 1941, p.285-286). 
This opposition from private power sector had an impact on the government’s decision 
for the price of hydroelectricity. The construction of Hoover Dam proved the private 
power advocates’ logic wrong. The wholesale price of hydroelectricity from the Hoover 
Dam was decided at 0.163cents/kWh5 (Los Angeles Times, December 23, 1931; The 
United States Department of the Interior, 1933, p.109). It was less than half that of steam 
power plant electricity. In 1930, the City of Los Angeles and the Metropolitan Water 
District bought electricity from the oil-fired plant at the price of around 0.4cents/kWh 
(Copp & Zanella, 1993, p.63). There should be no consumer who could refuse to make a 
contract with a reasonable price like that. That total amount of all applicants was over 
three times the total generation of Hoover Dam (Kleinsorge, 1941, p.287). The condition 
of willingness was unquestionably fulfilled with the historically cheap price of the 
hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam. 
 
After construction of Hoover Dam, the portion of hydroelectricity in total 
electricity generated in the city of Los Angeles get to around 95% in 1940 (Fig. 4). It 
revealed that the private power advocates’ concern about consumption market was 
unnecessary. 
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Figure 20. Electrical energy from hydroelectricity and steam power in Los Angeles  
(source: Copp and Zanella, 1993, p.130) 
 
5.5.3 Agents’ negotiation and dispute resolution for making an agreement: from the 
allocations of water to that of hydroelectricity  
5.5.3.1 The Colorado River Compact 
The initial allocation share of hydroelectricity for the state of Arizona was 
connected with the allocation of water for the state through the Colorado River Compact 
in 1922. In the 1910s, the consumption of the Colorado River by the state of California 
was increasing rapidly and this made the states near the Colorado River Basin concerned 
that California might intend to have too much control over Colorado River water. 
Western water law allocates superior rights to those who make beneficial use of water 
first: “first in time, first in right.” As a result, the League of the Southwest for negotiation 
of the allocation of the Colorado River was organized in 1919. Simultaneously, the 
investigation on the feasibility of developing the Colorado River Basin funded by the 
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Kinkaid act was initiated by Congress in 1920. In 1922, there was a historic agreement 
among seven states, the states of California, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Wyoming, 
Utah, and Colorado, at Bishop’s Lodge, near Santa Fe in New Mexico (The U.S. 
Department of Interior, 1933, p.5).6 With the U.S. Geological Survey’s investigation, the 
average flow of 17.5 million annual acre-feet was divided into two parts, the Upper Basin 
and the Lower Basin that were divided by the geographical point, Lees Ferry (The U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1980, p.4).7 Each basin was allocated 7.5 million acre-feet. 
However, the Upper Basin States could not make an agreement about the specific share 
of allocation in 1922. On October 11, 1948, the Upper Basin States finally confirmed the 
allocation of water subject to the Colorado River Compact of 1922 with the Upper 
Colorado River Compact of 1948. According to this agreement, the 7.5 million acre-feet 
of water should be allocated to the Upper Basin states based on this scheme: Wyoming 
(14%), Colorado (51.75%), Utah (23.00%), New Mexico (11.25%), and Arizona (0.7%) 
(The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1980, p.11). On the contrary, the Lower Basin States 
of California, Arizona, and Nevada made an agreement on the allocation of water in 
1922. The allocation for the Lower Basin stipulated in the Notes of the Colorado River 
Compact of 1922 was like this: 58.7% for the state of California, 37.3% for the stated of 
Arizona, and 4% for the state of Nevada.  
 
5.5.3.2 The electricity share for the state of Arizona: 18%  
The state of Arizona’s share of hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam is almost the 
same as its share of the 15 million acre-feet of water divided among the basin states in 
1922. This result was an outcome of the state of Arizona’s struggle and litigation for 
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water with its other competitive neighbor, the state of California. The history of this 
dispute about water and hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam between neighbor states is 
explored as follows.   
 
A huge public project is likely to trigger a debate between its proponents and 
opponents and the Boulder Canyon Project, the construction of Hoover Dam, was no 
exception. The state of Arizona’s opposition for the construction was strong. In spite of 
the agreement on the Colorado River Compact, the state of Arizona changed its mind and 
hesitated to ratify the compact. The major reasons that the state of Arizona was opposed 
to this unprecedented project were due to the engineering and economic problems. First, 
the state of Arizona maintained that the Hoover Dam project was not safe from the 
engineering point of view. Second, Hoover Dam was unnecessary because there was no 
need to prevent flood or supply water to the agricultural irrigation system (Kleinsorge, 
1941, p.105). In spite of these absurd grounds that the state of Arizona backed, there was 
a crucial and political reason behind it which was disclosed in the lawsuit case, State of 
Arizona v. State of California. The state of Arizona wanted to own Hoover Dam or at 
least take compensation for providing lands for Hoover Dam. It was interested in the 
revenue from the sale of water or hydroelectricity. In spite of political negotiation and 
appeals, the state of Arizona finally filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court against the states 
of California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming, and the Secretary of 
the Interior, Ray Lyman Wilbur in 1930. In this lawsuit, the state of Arizona maintained 
that the Colorado River Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act were 
unconstitutional on the grounds that (a) the act invaded the sovereign jurisdiction over the 
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territory of the state of Arizona  (b) it deprived Arizona of the right of water usage in her 
jurisdictional territory and give the Secretary of Interior a authority to sell the stored 
water; (c) it did not give the same privilege for the Colorado River to the state of Arizona 
as that of the state of California; and (d) the Secretary of the Interior should not have the 
power to sell water and generated hydroelectricity from Lake Mead and Hoover Dam 
dynamos because the water and power comes from the territory of the state of Arizona, 
and the Secretary did not offer proper compensation to the state (Kleinsorge, 1941, 
pp.132-133).   
 
Regarding the fourth question that the state of Arizona raised, the Supreme Court 
denied the state of Arizona’s argument as follows. The government of the United States 
could do public works without complying with the state of Arizona’s law on the United 
States territory for the fact that the authorization from Congress for the construction of 
the Hoover Dam would legally suffice (Kleinsorge, 1941, pp.132-133). The federal 
government had owned most area of the Colorado River Basin except the private lands 
since the United States acquired that territory from Mexico under the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848. Moreover, based on the Constitution of the 
United States, Congress has the authority to make and eliminate regulations in relation to 
the territory of the United States (Kleinsorge, 1941, p.128). The Supreme Court also 
contended that the public works based on the Boulder Canyon Project Act would be 
perpetually owned by the United States and under tax exemption from the state of 
Arizona’s taxation (Kleinsorge, 1941, pp.132-133). Thus, there was no financial loss to 
the state of Arizona and the United States had no obligation to give appropriate 
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compensation to the state of Arizona for selling water and hydroelectricity. Seeing that its 
legal challenges were not going to succeed, in 1944 the state of Arizona finally ratified 
the Colorado River Compact. The initial allocation of hydroelectricity for the state of 
Arizona was 18% and this portion is approximately equal to the state’s share of the whole 
water from the Colorado River. The amount of water allocated to the seven basin states 
from the annual flow of the Colorado River was 15 million acre-feet, and the share of the 
state of Arizona was 2.8 million acre-feet, around 18% in 1922—according to Section 
8(b) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the benefits from the Colorado River and 
Hoover Dam should be divided based on the Colorado River Compact. 
 
5.5.3.3 The interim allocation of hydroelectricity (Oct. 21st, 1929) 
Regarding the first allocation of electricity, the state of California contractors took 
100% of hydropower at first. On October 21st, 1929, the Secretary of the Interior decided 
the allocation of Hoover Dam hydroelectricity. Before the final close, there was a formal 
hearing process prepared by the Secretary of the Interior on November 12th. The decision 
was as follows. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California acquired 50% of 
hydroelectricity of Hoover Dam, 25% of hydroelectricity was allocated to the City of Los 
Angeles, and 25% to the Southern California Edison and associated companies (The U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 1933, p.517). Put simply, 100% of hydroelectricity was 
allocated to the state of California (The U.S. Department of the Interior, 1933, p.526).8  
 
This allocation was tentative and for the states of Arizona and Nevada, 36% was 
reserved with privilege for 50 years. So, the state of California has to be subject to the 
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request of the states of Arizona and Nevada if these states require their share, 36% at any 
time. Later, Arizona and Nevada demanded their purchase of the 36% of Hoover’s 
electricity allocated to Arizona and Nevada. The contractors of the state of California 
relinquished the allotment of 36% proportionally. In 1941, 18% of the total 
hydroelectricity was allocated to the Nevada and the remaining 18% to Arizona in 1945. 
In 1945, the Arizona Power Authority, a public entity of the state of Arizona, made a 
contract with the Bureau of Reclamation for the purchase of Arizona’s portion of the 
Hoover Dam’s hydroelectricity. The first delivery was accomplished in 1951 (Arizona 
Power Authority, n.d.). 
 
5.5.3.4 The confirmation of initial allocation  
According to the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Secretary confirmed the initial 
allocation of hydropower by May 1941. The allocation percentage is as follows.  
 
Table 4. The initial allocation of hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam (source: The Bureau 
of Reclamation, 1980, p.57) 
Contract no. Contractor Firm energy 
Allocation % 
Date of 
Execution 
Date of 
Termination 
I1r-1334 Dept. of Water 
& Power 
17.5554 May 29, 1941 May 31, 1987 
I1r-1336 Metropolitan 
Water Dist. 
35.2517 May 29, 1941 May 31, 1987 
I1r-1455 State of Arizona 17.6259 May 29, 1941 May 31, 1987 
I1r-1338 State of Nevada 17.6259 May 29, 1941 May 31, 1987 
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I1r-1335 So. Calif. Edison 
Co. 
7.0503 May 29, 1941 May 31, 1987 
I1r-1340 City of Glendale 1.8475 May 29, 1941 May 31, 1987 
I1r-1337 City of Pasadena 1.5847 May 29, 1941 May 31, 1987 
I1r-1341 Calif. Electric 
Power Co. 
.8813 May 29, 1941  
I1r-1339 City of Burbank .5773 May 29, 1941  
 
The revenue from selling the electricity has been used for amortization of the 
investment cost of Boulder Canyon Project for 50 years. The total cost for the project was 
$145,181,882 as of 1969. The revenue has been also put into the Colorado River Dam 
Fund for annual operation and maintenance of the Colorado River and its tributaries by 
Congress. The dam and power plant facilities are owned by the federal government of the 
United States and the federal government is responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of the dam and facilities as well. The Federal Government owns the 
facilities for generating, transforming, and switching hydroelectricity at the dam itself, 
but does not own or maintain the high-voltage transmission lines taking power from the 
dam to utilities and customers in the three states. The operation and maintenance of the 
transmission facilities serving California were delegated to the Department of Water and 
Power of the City of Los Angeles and the Southern California Edison Company, Ltd.  
This delegation contract had been effective from 1937 to 1987 The Bureau of 
Reclamation, 1980, p. 11).  
 
In 1977, the Bureau of Reclamation started preparing the re-allocation of 
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hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam since the 50-year contracts were due to expire in 
1987. On Oct. 1st, 1977, the administrative jurisdiction for the transmission of 
hydroelectricity and contracts for the purchase of federal hydroelectricity were taken over 
by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) from the Bureau of Reclamation, 
through the Bureau of Reclamation is still in charge of operation and maintenance of the 
dam and its power plant.  
 
5.6 Institutional Adaptations in the Allocation of Hydroelectricity  
5.6.1 The second phase of the allocation of hydroelectricity: The Hoover Power 
Plant Act of 1984 
In preparing for the termination of the criteria established by the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act in 1987, the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 regulated the allocation of 
hydroelectricity of the Hoover Dam. The Hoover Power Plant Act allocated 
hydroelectricity of the Hoover Dam to the contractors such as states, municipalities, and 
utilities according to three schedules (Schedule A, B, C). The Act entailed the Hoover 
Uprating Program and set the amount to fulfill the Lower Colorado River Basin 
Development Fund. This fund was to support the Central Arizona Project (CAP) 
financially. The Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 imposed .0045 cents/kWh on purchases 
of hydroelectricity to fund CAP.9  Though this subsidy was a few cents per person per 
day, 2 million users could generate several million dollars per year. In addition, the U.S. 
Department of the Interior entitled CAP to have the right to buy the hydroelectricity of 
Hoover Dam at a cheap price and resell that at the higher market price (Reisner, 1993, 
p.304). The Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 is effective from 1987 to 2017.    
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The Hoover Uprating Program updated generation units at Hoover Dam and 
finished it in 1993. Ten 82,500kw power units were changed into 130,000kw units. Two 
82,000kw power units were upgraded to 127,000kw units.  The remaining 82,500kw 
power units were replaced to 130,000kw and the 40,000-kW unit replaced to 61,500-kW 
and the 50,000-kW unit replaced to 68,500-kW (The Bureau of Reclamation, 1995, p.49).  
 
The Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 updated the initial allocation of hydropower 
entitlements reflecting the change of situations of Hoover Dam hydroelectricity. Schedule 
A refers to the initial allocation frame for the contractors of Hoover hydroelectricity 
according to the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928. The contractors are Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California, the city of Los Angeles, the city of Glendale, the 
city of Pasadena, the city of Burbank, Southern California Edison Company, Arizona 
Power Authority, Colorado River Commission of Nevada, and the city of Boulder City. 
Second, the Act also determined that the increased long-term generation capacity of 
Hoover Dam achieved by the Uprating Program would be distributed according to 
Schedule B which allocates the additional power to both traditional and new customers 
that helped fund the Hoover Uprating Program. According to the Hoover Power Plant Act 
of 1984, the States of California, Arizona, and Nevada could get more hydroelectricity. 
Complying with the Hoover Power plant act of 1984, the hydroelectricity allocation 
portions for each state are 23.4% for Nevada, 19% for Arizona, and 57.6 % California 
(“Hoover Power Allocation Act, Senate Report 112-58).10 Schedule C guides the 
allocation of any “excess” hydroelectricity. The allocation depends on the negotiation 
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between the states of Arizona, Nevada, and California and the federal government 
(Western Area Power Administration, DOE, n.d.).11 
 
5.6.2 The third phase of the allocation of hydroelectricity: The Hoover Power 
Allocation Act of 2011  
In 2011, the US Congress passed a new bill amending the 1984 act, the Hoover 
Power Allocation Act of 2011 (HPAA) in anticipation of the 2017 expiration of the 
Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984. President Obama signed this bill into law on Dec. 20th, 
2011. This bill has a new allocation criterion, called Schedule D. This criterion is 
designed to create opportunities for adding new customers to get access to inexpensive 
Hoover power. According to Schedule D, traditional Schedule A and B contractors must 
deduct 5% of their allocation of hydroelectricity for new contractors. This deducted 
hydroelectricity will be allocated to federally recognized Indian Tribes and other eligible 
contractors that currently are not included in the purchaser group.  
 
Schedule D allocation of power of “re-distribution” of the common pool resource 
can be justified for a couple of reasons regarding the benefits from common pool 
infrastructures associated with Hoover Dam. First, Schedule D allocation of deducting 
some power (5%) from the Schedule A and Schedule B contractors and allocating this to 
other “new” contractors can be best understood in historical context. Regarding the 
Colorado River Compact, the divergent Indian Tribes were not asked to participate in the 
discussions of the allocation of the Colorado River. Though they had depended on the 
Colorado River basin longer than the farmers and the residents, they were not included 
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among the allottees of water and hydroelectricity from Lake Mead and Hoover Dam 
(Worster, 1985, p.211). The Schedule D re-distribution of hydropower allocations partly 
addressed this injustice toward Indian Tribes. Second, this “re-distribution” definitely fits 
into Secretary Wilbur’s initial idea for allocation of hydroelectricity, enhancing the 
opportunity for participation and spreading widely the benefit of the electricity commons. 
Therefore, the deduction of some people’s vested interests to benefit those who had 
previously been excluded from this CPR can be understood as a successful adaptation of 
the institutional arrangements governing this sociotechnical infrastructure.  
 
The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) allocated one-third of 
Schedule D power to the Arizona Power Authority for the state of Arizona, the Colorado 
River Commission of Nevada for the state of Nevada, and WAPA for the state of 
California. The remaining two-thirds (approximately 66.7%) of the Schedule D power 
was allocated to WAPA for the federally recognized Indian tribes, the Arizona Power 
Authority for the state of Arizona, and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada for the 
state of Nevada (Lisa Lien-Mager, n.d.).12 However, the act does not explain the specific 
procedure for allocating of hydroelectricity of Schedule D within the states (Arizona 
Power Authority, n.d.).13   
 
A dispute on priorities among the users for the allocation of power has been 
provoked by the Schedule D allocation. The states of Arizona and Nevada did not agree 
with the allocation of Schedule D in 2011. According to Schedule D scheme, 
approximately 66.7% of hydroelectricity of Schedule D should be first allocated to 
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federally recognized Indian tribes and then to new allottees in Arizona and Nevada. The 
states of Arizona and Nevada asserted that they could not accept the higher priority of 
Indian tribes over the current allottees. They maintained that there was no legal evidence 
for establishing different allocation priorities. In addition, the states of Arizona and 
Nevada contended that because Hoover Dam is situated on the border of Arizona and 
Nevada, they deserve higher priority access to Hoover hydroelectricity and the revenue 
from selling the hydropower. From the initial legislative establishment of power 
allocations, a relatively larger portion was allocated to the state of California because the 
state of California was expected to need more power due to the projected rapid growth of 
industry and population. In allocation criteria, Congress and the Department of the 
Interior gave weight to the fact that the Boulder Canyon Project (Hoover Dam) was 
provoked from the necessity of water and electricity supply in California’s irrigation 
system and prevention of Colorado River floods (Arizona Power Authority, n.d.).14  In 
spite of the objections of the states of Arizona and Nevada, the Indian tribes were 
provided first priority for the Schedule D power conclusively (WAPA, n.d.).15 
 
Recently, the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) has finished the 
process of receiving the applications for Schedule D allocation. WAPA received 107 
applications by March 31, 2014 and allocated the Schedule D hydroelectricity, 80,680 
kW to appropriate applicants considering their priorities and general eligibility. WAPA 
closed the comments period for this allocation on September 19th, 2014. In the allocation 
process, the Native American tribes were taken in first consideration and then the 
remaining hydroelectricity was distributed to the eligible applicants (WAPA, n.d.)16.  
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5.7 Conclusion   
This chapter investigated the federal level arrangements for the construction of 
Hoover Dam and the allocation of its resources (water and electricity). Hoover Dam is a 
sociotechnical infrastructure. Constitutional level institutions, such as the 1929 Boulder 
Canyon Project Act and the 1922 Colorado River Compact, have supported the 
transformational change in the water and electricity systems in 1930s. Regarding the 
hydroelectricity and water resources from Hoover Dam as a common pool resource, 
layered social and institutional arrangements at the federal level have supported and set 
up imaginaries, epistemologies, and rules for the sustainable allocation of resources.  
 
Institutional arrangements, which have been the condition sine quo non in 
development of water and energy systems, have worked properly for the maximized 
utility of Hoover Dam based on agreements among lower basin states. With institutional 
management, the sociotechnical systems of Hoover Dam have been sustainable, and 
seven basin states and other industries have benefited from the sociotechnical resources, 
water and electricity from Hoover Dam for 80 years. Without institutional management, 
resources inevitably become depleted or overused by a limited number of users with 
privilege. Also, the updated rules on the allocation of electricity in response to social, 
economic, and political changes reflect the flexible management of institutions.  
 
In particular, on the basis of the eight conditions that Ostrom suggested for 
sustainable management of common pool resources, in the case of Hoover Dam the 
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collective-choice arrangement for determining hydropower allocations appear to provide 
somewhat equitable opportunities to the stakeholders (the states of Arizona, Nevada, and 
California, and later the regional tribes) to influence allocations and subsequent re-
allocations. The Colorado River Compact and the effectiveness of the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act, first, provided the foundation for the allocation of water resources and 
hydropower entitlements. Moreover, the evolving hydropower allocation process shows 
that the institutional arrangements exemplify “resilience” because the allocations of water 
and hydropower were both stable in the short-term and adaptable in the longer term 
(adapted in 1984, 2007, and 2011) which entail long-lasting debates as well as 
political/legal dispute resolution processes.  
 
The next chapter illustrates how current institutions have supported the operation, 
regulation, and transformation of water and energy systems within the state of Arizona. 
Also, the resilience work of different types of institutions will be articulated.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
WATER AND ENERGY SYSTEMS IN ARIZONA: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
IN SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS RESILIENCE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 builds on the work of Chapters 3 and 4, which argued for the need to 
thoroughly understand the institutional work of resilience and the institutional landscapes 
of critical infrastructure systems. Resilience is a capacity to sustain, adapt, and transform 
systems responding to disturbances to systems. Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the 
characteristics of institutions—stable yet flexible— and proposed a redefinition of 
resilience around this idea. Moreover, Chapters 3 and 4 revealed the importance of 
resilience work for sociotechnical systems: sustaining, adapting, and transforming then 
over time to create stability and flexibility. The degree to which institutions can sustain, 
adapt, and transform infrastructures determines the dynamic resilience of infrastructures.  
 
Chapter 6 applies the frameworks of institutional analysis and resilience defined 
in Chapters 3 and 4 to the resilience work of institutions that govern water and electricity 
supply in Arizona. Chapter 6 first describes Arizona’s three primary water resources: the 
Colorado River, the Salt River, and underground aquifers. Each water resource uses 
respective water infrastructures: Central Arizona Project (CAP) canals, Salt River Project 
(SRP) dams and reservoirs, and natural aquifers as well as underground water storage 
facilities. These water infrastructures currently face pressing technical and social 
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challenges: the fluctuations of mountain snowpack and precipitation, long-term droughts, 
the higher probability of ‘a shortage declaration’ of Colorado River, population growth, 
groundwater depletion, and the political pressures of water entitlement negotiations in the 
Colorado River basin areas. More importantly, the successful management of the 
complex water systems is tightly linked to the operational practices of and water 
regulations that govern electricity utilities (e.g., Arizona Public Service, Salt River 
Project, and Tucson Electric Power) which consume cooling water and supply electricity 
to municipalities such as the city of Phoenix and Tucson in Arizona. 
 
Chapter 6 investigates three types of infrastructure institutions: i) infrastructure-
level practices that control the inflow/outflow of Colorado River water and Salt River 
water within normal operational ranges; ii) state-level regulations adapt the utility 
practices of groundwater pumping for the resilience of socio-eco-technical systems in 
Arizona; and iii) federal-level water rights decisions, the reallocation of Colorado River 
water, and social forces that impinge on groundwater management. All three play a 
significant role for the resilience of Arizona and the Southwest. 
 
In brief, the contribution of Chapter 6 is three-fold: i) understanding and mapping 
the institutional landscape of water and energy systems; ii) unbundling the lateral, 
vertical, and longitudinal threads of institutions governing this landscape; and iii) finally, 
describing the dynamic management of resilience work done by operational, regulatory, 
and constitutional institutions. Understanding this landscape of resilience work done by 
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operational, regulatory, and constitutional institutions is essential to improve the 
resilience of sociotechnical infrastructures. 
 
6.2 Water-Energy Nexus in Arizona: water availability issues 
Water availability issues have been one of the most critical challenges to the 
management of water and energy infrastructures in the US and Arizona. Recently, several 
socio-technical phenomena and preceding researches in the U.S. have drawn significant 
attention to the tightly bound water and energy systems from the perspective of 
vulnerability and resilience. First, climate change increases the frequency and intensity of 
extreme heat temperatures and droughts in the Southwest (Garfin et al., 2013). As a 
consequence, the availability of water supply in all sectors—water and electricity 
utilities, agricultural irrigation, municipalities, and states—is expected to decrease (Miller 
et al., 2008). Second, the thermoelectric power plants took 41% of fresh water and this 
share is more than any other sectors, such as irrigation, drinking water, and the industry 
in the U.S. (Kenny et al., 2009). At the same time, extensive electricity is used to produce 
and move water. Third, in 2010, the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant in Athens, 
Alabama, showed the correlation between the impact of climate change and the 
curtailment of electricity generation. From July 24th to August 23rd, the three reactors of 
the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant reduced their power output to 60% due to the hot 
surface water (NRC, 2010). Arizona has a large nuclear power plant (Palo Verde) that 
can be similarly affected by rising temperatures.  
 
  146 
These water-energy nexus challenges also arise in the context of water and energy 
systems in the Phoenix Metropolitan Area (PMA). Those systems both consume great 
energy to move water and use diverse sources of water for electricity generation. 
Arizona’s energy systems heavily depend on Colorado River water for cooling 
thermoelectric generators. Currently, 90% of utility-scale net electricity generation comes 
from thermal generators as of January 2019 in Arizona (EIA website). Water supply is 
essential for the cooling system in thermoelectric power plants. Wet-cooled combined 
cycle plants of APS use approximately 295 gallons/ MWh (APS, 2017, p.184). The 
electricity generation in Arizona that is largely reliant on thermal power plants may see a 
decrease of as much as 10% due to water shortages during drought cycles (Bartos & 
Chester, 2015; 2016). The following sections will first describe the landscape of water 
and energy systems in Arizona within which resilience work occurs and then how 
resilience work of institutions at different scales—such as recurrent practices, 
anticipatory regulations, and transformative constitutions—has contributed to the 
functionality of water and energy systems in Arizona.  
 
Many studies investigated the impact of climate change on the relations between 
infrastructure and institutions regarding water and energy systems. For instance, the 
curtailment of some power plants’ generation due to extreme climate events has drawn 
our attention to resilience and vulnerability of water and energy systems (DOE, 2014). 
This recent socio-technological phenomenon stresses the findings of the latest research 
underscoring the institutional coordination in managing water and energy systems 
coupled infrastructures (Benson, 2009; Conrad, 2010; Gold & Bass, 2010; NETL, 2010; 
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Scott et al., 2010, 2011; Sovacool, 2009). Yet these studies did not adequately examine 
the fundamental role of the institutions, which govern highly coupled water and energy 
systems. Importantly, we need to delve into the contribution of institutions to critical 
infrastructure from the perspective of resilience. A more astute question should be how 
critical infrastructure retains their functionality and what role the institutions play to 
contribute to or subtract the functionality or capacity; that is, the resilience of critical 
infrastructure to climate change.  
 
6.3 The Development of Water and Energy Systems in Arizona 
6.3.1 The initial development of centralized water and energy systems  
Before the 1911 completion of Roosevelt Dam as the first large centralized socio-
technical water control structure in Arizona, localized and simple water and energy 
systems dominated. One of the original water supply systems was in Tempe, composed 
of three twelve-inches-diameter wells and 30 horsepower (HP) generators to pump up 
groundwater into the Tempe Butte reservoir in downtown Tempe. In December 1902, the 
first tap water was delivered to the consumers in Tempe using gravity (Tempe Public 
Works Department, 2012). After the Newlands Reclamation Act was passed by the US 
Congress under the Theodore Roosevelt administration on June 17th, 1902, the U.S. 
Reclamation Service was created. The establishment of the U.S. Reclamation Service 
institutionally facilitated issuing bonds for public irrigation infrastructure projects.  
 
In Arizona, the first publicly funded irrigation project, the Salt River Project, was 
initiated by the Reclamation Service in cooperation with local landowners who formed 
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the Salt River Valley Water Users Association. For financing, the Salt River Valley 
Water Users Association (which later became SRP) mortgaged lands owned by project 
members to fund ten million dollars of the construction cost for Salt River Dam #1 
(Roosevelt Dam, constructed from 1906 to 1911).  However, a more fundamental issue 
had to be clarified before the construction. Disputes concerning water rights occasionally 
occurred among the landowners in the Salt River Valley Water Users Association. They 
needed rules to govern ownership and allocation of water resources, including the stored 
water that would become available after the construction of Roosevelt Dam and reservoir. 
In 1904, the distinction between groundwater and surface water was confirmed by the 
Arizona Territorial Supreme Court in the Howard v. Perrin case. The landowner owned 
the groundwater, which was not subject to the appropriation right of surface water. In 
1910, a well-defined institution to govern water resources in Arizona was affirmed by the 
judiciary again. Judge Edward Kent confirmed appurtenance rule for groundwater – 
groundwater was subject to the ownership of overlying land - and prior appropriation rule 
for surface water in Hurley vs. Abbott case. His decision developed into the basis of the 
Public Water Code of 1919, which became the founding rules for water governance in the 
Valley later.  
 
The stable supply of hydroelectricity and water from Roosevelt Dam (name 
changed in 1959) has been rooted in the sociotechnical arrangements of the state of 
Arizona. Water and hydroelectricity from Roosevelt Dam and the related facilities 
belonged to the U.S. government. The first people served by the hydroelectricity from 
Roosevelt Dam comprised only 13 customers. In 1912, the water association made a 
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contract with the Miami Copper Mine, which was a prominent industry, to supply it with 
hydroelectricity for mine operations. In 1917, the Secretary of Interior and the Salt River 
Valley Water Users Association signed a supplemental contract to turn over operation 
and management of the federal dam and irrigation structures and facilities, including 
power generators and transmission lines to the water association. In 1937, the water users 
association convinced the Arizona legislature to create a new public entity titled the Salt 
River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District to assume the management of 
the dams and hydropower system, which by then included Roosevelt (1911), Mormon 
Flat (1925), Horse Mesa (1927), and Stewart Mountain (1930) Dams. This new public 
utility company soon became commonly known as SRP (ADWR, n.d.; Century One, 
1969; SRP, n.d.; SRP, 2003; Salt River Project, 1980).  
 
6.3.2 The current complex landscape of water and energy systems in Phoenix 
metropolitan area      
Since then, the state of Arizona has further extended an artificial and increasingly 
complex sociotechnical water and energy infrastructure to serve the central valleys of the 
state where most of the population and agriculture exist. Water and energy systems are 
complex and tightly coupled in Arizona. With regard to the state’s water supply portfolio, 
the multi-state Colorado river makes up 40.2%, in-state rivers (Salt River, Verde River, 
Gila River and others) make up 17%, groundwater 39.5%, and reclaimed water 3.3% 
(ADWR, 2015). Central Arizona Project (CAP) infrastructures deliver Colorado River 
from Lake Havasu to the three counties, Maricopa, Pinal, and Pima counties in Arizona. 
CAP delivers Colorado river through the 336-mile long canal system, which was 
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completed in 1992 with approximately 5 billion dollars supported by the Colorado River 
Basin Project Act of 1968. The canal system elevates Colorado river water up to 2,400 
feet using 14 pumping facilities (Hanemann, 2002; USBR, 2008). In addition, the 
pumping and delivery of the Colorado River by CAP aqueducts and treatment of this 
water need an enormous amount of electricity. For instance, the main water resource for 
the city of Tucson in the south of Arizona is the Colorado River water from Lake Havasu. 
The water conveyance from Lake Havasu to Tucson Metropolitan area consumes 3,140 
kWh/AF electricity. This is four times more than that of groundwater pumping in the 
Tucson area (Hoover, 2009). The total electricity consumption for the 1.6 million AF 
CAP water delivery is about 2900 GWh annually (CAP, 2011).  
 
As stated above, behind the physical landscape of CAP delivery, there are the 
complicated and coordinated regulatory rules among stakeholders for governance of 
common resources such as Colorado River water through Colorado River Compact 
(1922) and Arizona’s ratification (1944), Supreme Court decision (1963) and other 
formal rules.  Looking at the specific water supply portfolio in the city of Phoenix area, 
the water supply system shows a distinctive landscape which is different from that of 
Arizona. CAP delivery infrastructures supply 44% of water resources to the city of 
Phoenix with Colorado River water, and SRP, a water utility 50% of consumptive water 
to the service area within the city of Phoenix boundary. SRP’s water infrastructures are 
composed of seven reservoirs, 1,300 miles long canal systems and approximately 270 
wells. The capacity of 270 pumping wells is about 340,000 AF per year and the total 
storage of seven reservoirs is 2,328,201 AF. Groundwater takes 3% and reclaimed water 
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3% for the remains (City of Phoenix, 2011). The electricity needed for the water system 
in the Phoenix Metropolitan Area comes from two sources: SRP and a large investor-
owned utility company, Arizona Public Service (APS). The two utilities divide the 
greater Phoenix metro electric market into two roughly equal halves. As a for-profit 
utility, APS is regulated by the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC). As a non-profit 
utility, SRP is governed by an elected board of directors.  
 
 
 
Figure 21. The institutional and infrastructural mapping of water-energy nexus in the 
PMA (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
* (Abbreviations) United States Interior Department (USID); United States Bureau of 
Reclamation (USBR); Department of Energy (DOE); Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC); Department of Energy (DOE); Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Central 
Arizona Groundwater Replenishment District (CAGRD); Arizona Department of Water 
Resources (ADWR); Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ); Water 
Infrastructure Finance Authority of Arizona (WIFA); National Forest Fund (NFF); 
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA); Arizona Power Association (APA); 
Arizona Public Service (APS); Maricopa County Environmental Services Department 
(MCESD); Roosevelt Water Conservation District (RWCD) 
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When it comes to electricity system, the purpose of the related regulatory 
institutions is distinct from water allocation regulatory and constitutional institutions, in 
that the reliability of electricity supply, not allocation, has been emphasized as a focal 
point. Myriad issues like electricity outages, rates, and low service quality were caused 
by fragmented institutions and infrastructures. Responding to these issues, the new 
organization, Department of Energy instead of Bureau of Reclamation or Department of 
Interior was established as a responsible organization and a variety of centralized and 
regulatory sub-organizations for the reliable supply of electricity have emerged. At the 
federal level, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (the Federal Power 
Commission established in 1920), NERC (North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation), WECC (Western Electricity Coordinating Council) regulate the 
transmission and distribution standards/quality of electricity. At the state level, Arizona 
Corporation Commission (ACC) has been responsible for the revenue requirement, 
resource acquisition, securities issuance, affiliated interests, service standards and 
quality17 (RAP, 2016). Climate change as a new manufactured risk (Beck, 1992) 
prompted Environment Protection Agency’s (EPA) involvement and effect on the 
decision of electricity utilities with CO2 emission regulations issue to add up regulatory 
complexity such as Clean Power Plan. 
 
An in-depth view into the relationship between water and energy systems in 
Arizona unveils a more complex narrative. For instance, APS that supplies electricity for 
much of the water system in Phoenix Metropolitan area uses a diverse spectrum of water 
resources –effluent (61%), surface water (21%), and groundwater (18%)—for cooling the 
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electricity generators (Arizona Public Service, 2014). Institutions for extraction, 
contracts, allocation and treatment for these natural and artificial water resources for 
cooling water used in the ten power generation stations of APS have evolved from a 
single organization and institution—Bureau of Reclamation and governance of Colorado 
river’s water and power –to more complex network system since the era of reclamation in 
1930s. In particular, regarding the allocation of Colorado River water, the institutions 
have grown into more complex through negotiations and litigations among the 
stakeholders. For example, entitlements for consumption of Colorado River water in 
Arizona was acquired by the legal contract with the Bureau of Reclamation. This water 
consumption includes all diversions such as wells drawing out water from the Colorado 
River aquifer pursuant to the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, Section 5 and 
Consolidated Decree by U.S. Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 
150 (2006). (Jason Robison et al., 2012; USBR, 2010).  
 
Besides, in 1996 an innovative institutional arrangement to augment water 
availability in Arizona, which contributes to climate resilience of water system in 
Arizona, was facilitated. Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA) for water that is not 
utilized by Arizona was established. Before AWBA, Arizona cannot use the full 2.8 MAF 
of allocated CAP water. With intrastate and interstate water banking system, Arizona was 
able to store the excess Colorado River water as well as water that Nevada does not 
utilize fully. Currently, the AWBA has accrued about 4 MAF of long-term storage credits 
(LTSC) which is composed of about 3.4 MAF for Arizona and 0.6 MAF for Nevada 
according to Lower Basin Water Banking Regulations of 1999. Moreover, in February 
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2014, under the agreement between the Arizona Municipal Water Users Association 
(AMWUA) and the Southern Arizona Water Users Association (SAWUA), an Inter-
AMA water storage contract between the Phoenix AMA and Tucson was established. On 
the basis of this legal agreement, a CAP Municipal and Industrial (M&I) subcontractor in 
the Phoenix AMA is able to store the water, which is not utilized, in the Tucson 
underground storage facilities. In the case of a ‘shortage’ declaration, the CAP M&I 
subcontractors in the Phoenix AMA can consume some of the CAP water that would go 
to Tucson and in exchange, Tucson would recover that amount of lost water by pumping 
Phoenix’s LTSC water stored within the Tucson AMA. With this fascinating institutional 
coordination, the Tucson CAP M&I subcontractors can use the stored water instead of 
depending on the delivery of Colorado River water (AWBA, 2014; Colby & Jacobs, 
2007; Megdal, S. et al., 2014; USBR, 2014).  
 
The legal mechanism that determines how much Colorado River is allocated to 
CAP and a contract structure between CAP and Bureau of Reclamation are also much 
complicated. First, the water allocation decision for CAP is highly dependent on the 
Annual Operating Plan for Colorado River Reservoirs. According to the federal level 
legal framework, the Secretary makes the Annual Operating Plan for Colorado River 
Reservoirs (AOP). The AOP is a single, integrated document for the water operation and 
the Bureau of Reclamation’s practical institutional governance for Colorado River 
Reservoirs. In AOP of Colorado River, hydrologic conditions and water releases from the 
storage system during the last year and projects water operations for the current or next 
year are explicated. The allocations and releases of the Colorado River reservoirs are 
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varied on the basis of the AOP. If it is confirmed that there will be no ‘shortage’ on 
Colorado river reservoirs based on AOP, the year-based contract for the excess water can 
be allocated to CAP (AWBA, 2014; U.S. Department of the Interior, 2007b; 2010a; 
2010b). Second, during a ‘shortage’ or extended drought season, the availability of the 
contingent ‘excess water’ from CAP depends on the allocation priority for Colorado 
River water. Each user of Colorado River water holds a different priority level from the 
first (or the highest) to the sixth (or the lowest). For instance, the Central Arizona Water 
Conservation District (CAWCD) is entitled to 1.49 MAF per year with fourth priorities. 
In addition, CAP water system also depends on a more specified priority institution for 
CAP water allocation. Thermoelectric power plants in Arizona which use CAP water 
with lower priorities for cooling generators should find alternative water resources 
through institutional coordination such as water right exchanges in case of ‘Shortage’ 
declaration by the Secretary of Interior (personal communication, August 17, 2015). This 
is because in ‘Shortage’ declaration case, a user who is dependent on lower priority 
water, for instance ‘excess’ water, cannot be provided with Colordo River water. Third, 
the institutional framework for Colorado River water in Southwest was extended into a 
more sophisticated structure with the 2007 Interim Guidelines to cope with drought. This 
institutional change enhanced resilience capacity of water and energy systems in 
Southwest to retain functionality responding to an exogenous stressor, drought.   
 
6.3.3. Salt River Project (SRP) 
In the map of water and energy systems in Arizona, USBR, ACC, SRP, ADWR, 
and MCAQD are viewed as common governance nodes making compounding impacts on 
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energy-water linkages. Among these, SRP, a quasi-political entity, is operating and 
managing both water and energy supply. 
 
SRP is comprised of two organizations. The first is a private water corporation 
known as the Salt River Valley Water User’s Association (the Association) which was 
founded in 1903 to supply sufficient water for the agricultural stakeholders in the Salt 
River Valley. The second one is the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and 
Power District (the District) established in 1937 as a public utility and political 
subdivision of the State of Arizona (Phillips et al., 2009). The Association and the 
District work as governing institutions for the water and electricity within the boundary 
of the Salt River Reservoir District.  
 
The Salt River Reservoir District is divided into ten geographical voting districts 
(or divisions). The Association and the District of the Salt River Project are governed by 
the elective officials from ten districts (divisions), plus four at-large directors. 
Landowners elect the ten members of the Association within the Association boundary 
and each of the ten districts elects one director and three council members. Ten directors, 
plus a president and vice-president, and thirty council members are the total elective 
officials for the Association. Fourteen district directors, plus the same president and vice-
president, and the same thirty council members are elected by the landowners within the 
District boundary. The president and the vice president as well as the four at-large 
directors are elected from all the voting divisions. Electors must be the owner of qualified 
land within the 1937 reservoir District boundary. An individual who has been appointed 
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by the trustee(s) of the qualified land has also the right of voting. The voting system for 
the 10 district and association directors is based on an acreage-based system. The owner 
of 1acre land has 1 vote; 5 acre owner has 5 vote; half acre owner, 0.5 vote. The election 
of the officials is on the first Tuesday in April of even-numbered years (the Association 
2015; the District 2015).  
SRP delivers in average 950,000 acre-feet of water from three water resources—
seven reservoirs, groundwater, and the Colorado River by CAP (Central Arizona Project) 
to a 375 square-mile area. The water amount of annual supply by SRP is 736,041 acre 
feet/year (SRP, 2014). While nearly all of the water service territory was originally 
farmland, 90% of it is now urban. SRP’s seven reservoirs’ total storage capacity is 
2,300,000 acre-feet. SRP operates around 250 groundwater wells. The annual maximum 
pumping capacity from theses wells is 325,000 acre-feet. SRP acquires some Colorado 
River water through the CAP canal, but mostly serves to transport that water to other 
purchasers. SRP makes an agreement with the CAP and receives the available Colorado 
River water (Phillips et al., 2009).  
 
SRP provides electricity to a 2,900 square-mile service area and about 984,000 
customers. The entire service area is in the Greater Phoenix metro area, although the 
rapidly expanding cities of the metro area often have only portions of their incorporated 
territory served by SRP water, which must remain in the 1937 irrigation district and not 
used outside those boundaries. The SRP electrical service area is not restricted to the 
irrigation district and is therefore much larger in size, encompassing over a million 
customer accounts in 2018. The total amount of electricity sold by SRP was 33,567 GWh 
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(2014). Twelve Generation Stations, eight dams and renewable energy sources contribute 
to SRP’s power sources. In addition, SRP receives hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam, 
Glen Canyon Dam and Parker Dam from WAPA (Western Area Power Administration) 
through power purchase contracts. SRP owns or co-owns fourteen thermal generation 
stations that use about 69 billion gallons of water annually (Diehl and Harris, 2014). The 
sewage effluent which is the cooling water resource for Palo Verde Nuclear Power plant 
is purchased from the 91st Avenue Wastewater Treatment Plant in Phoenix. The 
Wastewater Treatment provides annually around 26 billion gallons of treated effluent to 
Palo Verde Nuclear Power plant that is the only nuclear power plant using treated 
effluent. The effluent comes from the cities of Glendale, Mesa, Phoenix, Scottsdale and 
Tempe (Heiser, 2010; Wong & Johnston, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 22. Water-Energy nexus in SRP (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
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6.4 Unbundling Threads 
Section 6.4 briefly introduces the institutional threads (e.g., vertical, lateral, and 
longitudinal) of Arizona’s water and energy systems. 
 
 
Figure 23.  Three types of institutional threads (vertical, lateral, and longitudinal) of 
water and energy systems in Arizona that complicates infrastructure resilience  
(source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
* This diagram is based on Alylott’s (2014) water and energy systems in the UK. Author 
(Changdeok Gim) added the lateral, longitudinal, vertical, and functional threads of 
institutions.  
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Figure 24. The hierarchical and highly complex system of WEN governance in the UK 
(source: Alylott, 2014) 
 
6.4.1 Vertical threads 
Despite the federalism of the United States, the examples of hierarchical order in 
water and energy infrastructures abound. The Bureau of Reclamation has the 
responsibility to decide whether to declare a ‘shortage’ on the allocation of Colorado 
River water for the next year. This ruling vertically affects the subsequent decision 
making of lower organizations and units, which are lower basin states, municipalities, 
and utilities through vertical threads. The decision and anticipation of water availability 
of Lake Mead from the Bureau of Reclamation vertically put pressure on the operational 
planning of municipalities for the next year’s water in Arizona.  
 
With respect to energy systems, a multitude of federal regulations are related to 
electricity demands, reliable supplies, reasonable rates, CO2 emission reduction, outage 
anticipation, enhancing human performances, and preparation for climate extremes (DOE 
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2009; 2015a; 2015b). Regulatory institutions are mediating social needs and utilities’ 
social and economic purposes. For instance, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC), and the Western 
Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) vertically set the transmission, distribution 
standards/quality. At the state level, the responsibility to implement these rules 
established by FERC, NERC, and WECC falls on the Arizona Corporation Commission 
(ACC). The ACC also deals with revenue requirements, resource acquisition, securities 
issuance, affiliated interests, service standards (e.g. standards for voltage, frequency, and 
other technical requirements, distribution service) and quality for the operation of energy 
infrastructures (Lazar, 2016).  
  
In addition, the Salt River Project (SRP) in Arizona vertically governs both water 
and energy subsystems. The SRP board members, whom landowners elect, govern the 
water and electricity supply in the Salt River Reservoir District. The Salt River Valley 
Water User’s Association (the Association), as a private water corporation, and the Salt 
River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (the District), as a public 
utility, are institutionally interdependent while serving the same service area, the Salt 
River Reservoir District. The administrative departments for each service are different 
but cooperate as well as coordinate within a mutual organization, SRP. Also, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates not only the quality of different 
resources (e.g., air and water) with diversified institutions, but the regulatory sub-
departments on air, water, and land as a higher organization (see Fig. 25).  
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Figure 25. One organization and sub-groups (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
6.4.2 Lateral threads 
The delivery of Colorado River water to the Phoenix area needs the cooperation 
of diverse water-related organizations such as the Supreme Court, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the EPA, CAWCD, ADEQ, ADWR, Maricopa County, the City of 
Phoenix, and a water and electric utility, SRP (Salt River Project). Each organization has 
an expertise and knowledge system to deal with water delivery. Regarding water 
allocation, the Supreme Court makes decisions about water rights and the Bureau of 
Reclamation establishes the allocation scheme for Colorado River water. CAP canals 
should be successfully operated and maintained to deliver Colorado River water from 
Lake Havasu down to Tucson. Municipalities’ and SRP’s operation and maintenance for 
each component of the water system in the Phoenix area are also imperative to water 
delivery. The expertise of the EPA, ADEQ, and ACC (Arizona Corporation Commission) 
on water quality standards and price determine the quality of water delivery service. The 
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lateral cooperation of these diverse human activities contributes to the resilience of the 
water system.  
 
Furthermore, the water and energy nexus in Arizona unveils a more complex 
lateral coupled infrastructure and, in turn, institutions. APS, which supplies electricity for 
the Phoenix Metropolitan area uses a lateral spectrum of water resources for cooling—
effluent, surface water, and groundwater—for cooling the electricity generators of APS’s 
ten power generating stations (APS, 2015). Thus, the ‘Shortage’ declaration by the 
Bureau of Reclamation can affect the electricity generation of a thermoelectric power 
plant dependent on lower priority Colorado River water for cooling. Similarly, other 
users of Colorado River water can be more or less affected by the ‘Shortage’ declaration 
depending on their priority level, ranging from first (or the highest) to sixth (or the 
lowest). In 2012, an APS thermoelectric power plant, which uses CAP water with lower 
priorities (the fifth or the sixth) for cooling generators, had to secure alternative water 
resources through institutional coordination such as a new contract for water right 
exchanges (personal communication, August 17, 2015). This complex, lateral, and 
institutional layering in water and energy systems provides a space wherein each system 
indirectly intervenes the counterpart. 
 
Specifically, the water system’s groundwater regulations from the Arizona 
Department of Water Resources (ADWR) can directly govern the operational level 
institutions of power plants in Arizona, which use groundwater as their cooling water 
resource. The water department affects energy systems. If the ADWR’s groundwater 
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regulations reduce the amount of water that power plants pump out due to groundwater 
depletion, power plants in the energy system should find an alternative water resource in 
the water system, which does not include wells (direct intervention, Fig. 26). In a 
different case, water utilities and regulatory entities can increase the price of cooling 
water, and this will have a socially indirect impact on the operation of power plants. The 
increased water price indirectly affects not only the economy of electricity utilities but 
also general consumers’ yearly budget.  
 
6.4.3 Longitudinal threads 
The delivery of Colorado River water requires political negotiations on allocation 
between stakeholders that constantly adapt to water users’ needs (e.g., the Colorado River 
compact in 1922 and the update of this compact, namely the 2007 Interim Guidelines for 
drought seasons between California, Arizona, Nevada, and Mexico, and between 
stakeholders in Arizona). Since the Colorado River Compact in 1922, Arizona has held 
the entitlements for 2.8 MAF of Colorado River water based on the Law of the River 
(MacDonnell et al., 1995). However, the definition of Colorado River water consumption 
has longitudinally changed in terms of whether and how the ‘consumption’ includes all 
diversions of Colorado River water. Pursuant to the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 
Section 5 and Consolidated Decree by U.S. Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. 
California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006), the consumption of Colorado River water includes 
diverse uses of Colorado River water, such as the withdrawal of groundwater from the 
Colorado River aquifer ‘Subflow Zone’ (Robison et al. 2012; USBR 2010).  
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Another illustration of longitudinal changes in institutions is the 2007 Interim 
Guidelines to cope with drought. In 2007, California, Arizona, Nevada, and Mexico 
extended water allocation governance to establish a sophisticated scheme to share the 
shortage of Colorado River water in response to droughts in the Lower Basin to enhance 
the resilience of water and energy systems in the Southwest. According to the 2007 
Interim Guidelines, the state of Arizona will take reductions of 320,000 AF when the 
projected elevation of Lake Mead on January 1st is below 1,075 feet elevation (CAP 
2014, Grant 2008 pp.971-972). Given these longitudinal backdrops, a consent-based 
reduction strategy for Colorado River water allocation instead of a top-down program, 
once the lake level drops under 1,025 feet, should be prioritized in preparation for climate 
extremes. 
 
The 1922 Colorado River Compact was set up based on data from the wettest 
period in history (Reisner, 1986, p.130).  
 
Between 1907 and 1917, however, the wettest period on record, the river had 
discharged nearly enough water to fill the reservoir during several years (…) 
(Reisner, 1986, p.130). 
 
The gathered data and sociotechnical fashion of overallocation in 1920s resulted in 
‘structural deficit’ in relation to the allocation of Colorado River water since the 
ratification of the 1922 Colorado River Compact (Hirt et al., 2017). Longitudinal trade-
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offs between different generations have contributed to ‘structural deficit’ at the expense 
of the sustainability of the Colorado River. 
 
6.5 Resilience Work of Institutions: Droughts and Energy-Water Infrastructures in 
AZ 
The following sections will describe how resilience work of institutions, 
explained in Chapter 5, has sustained, adapted, and transformed infrastructure in Arizona. 
 
6.5.1 Droughts and energy-water nexus in Arizona 
The scope of case studies is limited to droughts and their impacts on energy-water 
nexus in Arizona for two reasons. First, for over a hundred years, Arizona has undertaken 
a chronic disaster, droughts since the formulation of water and energy systems in the 
1900s. Among other disasters including earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, and 
snowstorms, the sustainable management and expansion of infrastructures in Arizona 
have critically hinged on how to institutionally deal with droughts, which are “the most 
costly weather-related events” (NOAA, 2012). The secular risks of droughts on energy-
water infrastructures have been termed by technical and social factors: controlling water 
fluctuations, regulating water consumption, and increasing water demands as the 
population grows.  
 
Secondly, given lacking water resources, in Arizona, not only water systems but 
also energy systems have crucially relied on water governance for the availability of 
cooling resources: water. Thus, energy-water resiliencies in Arizona is more tightly 
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intertwined than any other states in the US. A wide array of water scarcity issues have 
simultaneously challenged both water and energy infrastructures over time. Flattening 
intermittent water inflows, adapting regulations for water sustainability, and transforming 
the landscapes of water systems have been tightly connected to the resilience of energy 
systems. In particular, operating daily and monthly water inflows to fill dams and to 
generate hydroelectricity, regulating water consumption of electricity utilities, and 
constituting new water-energy landscapes and burdens of future water shortage between 
states anticipating Colorado River water shortages have all challenged both systems’ 
resiliencies. Therefore, discussion on infrastructure resilience to droughts necessarily 
leads to the investigation on the coupled energy-water nexus in Arizona. According to the 
Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR), Arizona currently undergoes one of 
the most draconian drought seasons since the 1900s (City of Phoenix, 2011, p.45, Fig. 4-
2).  
 
6.5.2 An institutional tree of energy-water nexus in the Phoenix Metro Area (PMA) 
To conduct institutional analysis on resilience work, first, this research mapped 
out a current institutional tree of water and energy systems (Fig. 21) with qualitative data 
from semi-structured interviews with over 30 experts at water and energy systems as well 
as literature reviews based on our framework in Section. The following sections briefly 
sketch how institutions and organizations stably operate, adaptively regulate, and 
innovatively transform water and energy systems in the PMA. The operation of Salt 
River Project (SRP) and other utility level organizations work on operational stability and 
routinized work, whereas regulatory entities such as Arizona Corporation Commission 
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(ACC), Arizona Power Plant and Transmission Line Siting Committee (TLSC), and 
ADWR focus on the regulatory adaptiveness (correction) role. Federal level 
organizations, such as the Supreme Court, United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Energy (DOE) guide long-
term political constitution rather than specific operational practices or regulatory 
adaptation.  
 
 
 
Figure 26. The organizational and institutional network trees of water and energy 
systems in the PMA (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
The following sections discuss how operational, regulatory, and constitutional 
institutions have served on the resilience—following the resilience definition in this 
chapter—of water and energy infrastructures responding to water shortage. In Arizona, 
water and energy systems are institutionally interdependent in three ways: vertically, 
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laterally, and longitudinally. Moreover, continuous, occurring trade-offs are mediated 
through these interdependencies. 
 
6.5.3 Operational, regulatory, and constitutional work of institutions for the 
resilience of energy-water nexus in the PMA 
Table 5 summarizes the dynamic resilience work of institutions of water and 
energy systems in response to water availability issues in the PMA at different levels and 
scales based on the analysis of institutional tree in Fig. 21.  This section investigates how 
operational, regulatory, and constitutional institutions work on different functions, 
governance goals, uncertainties, and organizations for infrastructure resilience at different 
temporal scales.  
 
Table 5. Resilience work by different types of institutions in the PMA 
Dimensi
ons 
 
Tempor
al 
Cycles 
Functions Governance 
Goal 
Uncertainties Related 
Organizational 
Levels 
Types 
of  
Instituti
ons 
Opera- 
tional  
Minutes 
to 
months 
Sustaining  
(e.g., 
SRP’s prop 
program/ 
Annual 
Operational 
Plan for 
Hoover 
Dam)  
Resilience of 
engineered 
infrastructure 
facilities 
(e.g., water 
supply) 
Technical: daily 
or monthly water 
inflow, 
precipitation, 
temperature, 
daily electricity 
demands etc. 
Water and 
energy utilities 
(e.g., Power 
Plants, Dams, 
Canals, and 
Transmission 
lines of SRP, 
APS, and City 
of Mesa) 
 
Regula- 
tory 
Months 
to years 
Adapting Resilience of 
infrastructure 
- Regulatory 
uncertainties 
Municipalities, 
states, and 
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6.5.3.1 Operational work 
Water utilities (e.g., SRP) regularly assess the accomplishment of a fixed goal, the 
stability of water outflow while controlling daily and monthly water fluctuations 
responding to intermittent water inflow. A water and energy utility, SRP adjusts, every 
six months or at least one and a half years, their PROP program (Project Reservoir 
Operation Plan), a computational modeling. SRP ’s PROP operates seven dams and 
approximately 250 wells, for the optimization of water release and hydropower 
generation (Phillips et al., 2009). Using the PROP system and other sensing facilities, 
SRP inputs many quantified numbers (e.g., precipitation, water demands, electricity 
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demands, water inflow, and temperatures) to optimize water release and hydropower 
generation. The optimization of these technically identified numbers targets specific 
operational goals for six months. Hourly and daily fluctuations of water inflows and other 
variables calculated by modeling are statistically within the normal distribution curve of 
operation and a steady cycle of SRP’s operational practices. Conventional engineering 
assessment approaches are employed in sustaining daily and monthly routinized 
practices, the PROP system and modeling for SRP’s infrastructures (e.g., dams and 
grids).  
 
Another case shows the operational resilience goal for stability at the expense of 
groundwater sustainability that state-level regulatory organizations pursue. In 2003, 
SRP’s seven reservoirs including Roosevelt Dam and lakes could not water demands due 
to severe droughts (City of Phoenix, 2011, p.14). SRP’s water supply mix is typically 
composed of approximately 900,000 acre-feet of surface water and 50,000 to 75,000 
acre-feet of groundwater pumping (Phillips et al., 2009). However, in 2003, SRP changed 
the mixture of water resources and extracted approximately 200,000 acre-feet of 
groundwater which is twice more than typical pumping powered from SRP’s 250 wells 
until August in 2003 (McKinnon, 2003). SRP’s operational practices privileged a utility 
governance goal, water supply to customers over a broader socio-eco-technical resilience 
goal, groundwater sustainability, given no permission regulations on drilling by power 
plants outside AMA areas. In broader contexts, these operational practices render energy-
water nexus less resilient.  
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6.5.3.2 Regulatory work 
Municipalities, states, and federal regulatory organizations (e.g., City of Phoenix, 
Tucson, ACC, and ADWR) reconfigure and regulate socio-eco-technical infrastructures 
in the mid-term at the state or federal-level resilience context while reordering energy-
water nexus. In February 2014, the city of Phoenix and Tucson made a water storage 
contract preparing for water shortage. With this agreement, the city of Phoenix became 
able to store their surplus CAP water in underground storage facilities owned by the city 
of Tucson. In severe droughts, the city of Phoenix can directly consume the CAP water 
allocated to the city of Tucson, without pumping out the stored water in Tucson’s storage 
facilities. In turn, CAP water users in the city of Tucson will use the stored water in their 
facilities accrued from the surplus CAP water owned by the city of Phoenix (Megdal, S. 
et al., 2014). This institutional exchange illustrates an adaptive ‘bounce forward’ towards 
more energy efficient contingency nexus, a new status quo, to cope with droughts for 
years instead of holding an engineering fixed role of water canals and storage facilities.  
 
Another example of regulatory work of institutions is the establishment of the 
1980 Groundwater Management Act to regulate water consumption of electricity utilities 
in designated Active Management Areas (AMA). First, APS, an electricity utility, 
incorporated groundwater regulations for sustainability into their operational practices 
(Fig. 14). The cooling towers of the Palo Verde nuclear power plant, which is partially 
owned by the state’s largest electric utility, APS, should discharge cooling water after 
over 15 cycles pursuant to “The Third Management Plan” of the 1980 Groundwater 
Management Act. Water regulations impact and adapt the operational cycle frequency of 
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cooling water (Bracken et al., 2015). Secondly, the ACC and its Transmission Line Siting 
Committee (TLSC), regulating 15 energy utilities in Arizona, review and decide whether 
to permit the construction proposals of power plants which supply electricity to the PMA. 
In 2001 and 2010, the ACC rejected two construction proposals (Big Sandy Power Plant 
& Hualapai Valley Solar Project) which planned to consume groundwater (Bracken et al., 
2015, p.56). The ACC maneuvered the nexus configurations to adapt them to an upper-
level goal, the resilience of socio-eco-technical nexus.  
  
6.5.3.3 Constitutional work  
Federal-level interventions by USBR or US Congress transformed energy-water 
nexus in Arizona when uncertainties and tasks became over the jurisdictions of states. 
The CAP canal system (completed in 1993) supported by the Colorado River Basin 
Project Act of 1968 is an example which transformed the energy-water nexus landscape 
responding to increasing water demands by population growth in the PMA. The state of 
Arizona could not have full access to the entitlement of 2.8 MAF of Colorado River 
water since the 1922 Colorado River compact due to lack of access channels. The 
construction of CAP canals required a federal level political mediation due to litigation 
and contestations between Lower Basin states (e.g., California, Arizona, and Nevada). 
The 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act confirmed the amount of Colorado River 
water to deliver, financed the construction cost, and facilitated the construction of 
transmission lines and the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station (NGS) in northern 
Arizona. The NGS was completed in 1976 to provide electricity (2900 GWh annually) to 
the 336 miles-long CAP canal to elevate Colorado River water up to 2,400 feet using 14 
  174 
pumping stations. Currently, the CAP canal delivers approximately 1.6 MAF 
(1MAF=1.2335 KM3) of Colorado River water from Lake Havasu to the Phoenix metro 
area, then to farmers in Pinal County, and ultimately to the city of Tucson (USBR 2010; 
CAP, 2011).  
 
After the creation of transformational nexus of the CAP canal and the NGS in the 
1970s, water systems underwent a sharper transformation in 2007 to overcome unclear 
meaning on burdens of respective states and stakeholders for ‘Colorado River water 
shortage.’ Overcalculation on Colorado River water inflow for the 1922 Compact 
resulted in ‘structural deficit’ of overallocation, and contestation between states around 
the Colorado River water shortage had been amplified (Hirt et al., 2017). After nearly 80 
years of contestation, in 2007, Lower Basin states adopted a transformational plan, the 
2007 Interim Guidelines (Kates et al., 2012), to overcome the supply/demand deficit by 
sharing shortages of Colorado River water in case of long-term droughts. However, this 
transformational change on sharing of future water shortage—the water reduction will be 
320,000 AF on Arizona and 13,000 AF on Nevada when the Lake Mead level reaches the 
threshold elevation of 1,075 feet (AWBA, 2014). This challenged the operational 
practices of electricity utility, APS. Due to the junior status of water rights of Arizona, 
electricity utilities were under pressure to adapt and find alternative sources of water. For 
instance, APS contracted with the Gila River Indian community to purchase stored water 
for their thermoelectric power plant in preparation for the curtailment of ‘excess water’ in 
case of ‘shortage declaration’ by the US Bureau of Reclamation.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
As observed in the case study in this chapter, operational, regulatory, and 
constitutional institutions have distinctively contributed to the stability, adaptability, and 
transformability of energy-water nexus in the PMA with different frameworks such as 
engineering resilience, resilience engineering, and general resilience. Operational 
institutions manage and assess daily water inflow/outflow for operational goals. The SRP 
manages their reservoirs with PROP systems for their six months or one-year planning. 
The state of Arizona identified the depletion of aquifers (sensing and anticipating), 
adapted their groundwater management institutions in 1980s (adapting), and has 
protected the resilience of socio-eco-technical systems of groundwater for decades 
(learning). Also, upper and lower basin states in the Colorado River basin have 
transformed the allocation of Colorado River water in response to droughts and 
‘structural deficit’ in 2007 and in 2019 since the 1920 Colorado River Compact for the 
resilience of the West. Case studies in this chapter prove that infrastructures capable of 
sustaining, adapting, and transforming to complex biophysical or societal disturbances 
have accomplished sophisticated and anticipatory institutionalizations. 
 
Next, Chapter 7 examines the interdependencies of infrastructures. For instance, 
water institutions have affected the resilience of energy systems in Arizona.  Droughts, 
electricity generation turbines, cooling towers, and water governance are all intertwined 
in interdependent water and energy systems in Arizona. This chapter investigates the 
impact of Colorado River water shortage on the management of power plants of APS and 
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the impact of changes in water regulations (e.g., water conservation and air quality) on 
the circulation and vaporization practices of cooling water in Palo Verde plant’s stacks.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE INTERDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS OF WATER AND ENERGY SYSTEMS IN 
ARIZONA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 focuses on the institutional interconnection of the resilience work done 
by institutions across two different infrastructure systems: water and electricity systems. 
Water and energy systems are intertwined in Arizona. In traditional engineering 
approaches, interdependent infrastructures are typically analyzed in terms of their 
physical interconnections. Chapter 7 demonstrates that institutional interdependencies 
can also create resilience challenges. Compromises to one system (the energy system) 
can derive from the other system’s domain (water governance) via institutions. The 
resilience work of one system affects the other’s resilience. Chapter 7 sketches out how 
the water and energy systems of Arizona are laterally and vertically interlinked together 
via institutions in Arizona. For instance, a ‘shortage declaration’ on the Colorado River, 
which is a key element in the resilience work of water institutions in Arizona, can impact 
not only the management of water supply infrastructures but also the management of 
power plants, such as thermoelectric power plants that use diverse sources of water for 
cooling.  
 
In detail, Chapter 7 investigates the adaptation and resilience work of water and 
electricity organizations and their impacts. For instance, after nearly 80 years of 
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contestation, in 2007, Lower Basin states adopted a transformational plan, the 2007 
Interim Guideline (Kates et al., 2012), to confirm the sharing shortages of Colorado River 
water in case of long-term droughts. These constitutional adjustments in water 
governance affect the operation and regulation of energy systems in Arizona. In 2014, 
due to the junior status of water rights of Arizona, electricity utilities were under pressure 
to adapt their practices. One electricity utility had to find an alternative water source, Gila 
River Indian community’s stored water, for their thermoelectric power plant in 
preparation for the curtailment of ‘excess water’ from the CAP system in preparation for 
a ‘shortage declaration’ by the US Bureau of Reclamation. Analysis of these kinds of 
institutional interdependencies offers an important strategy for improving the electricity 
system’s resilience work. 
 
The second contribution of the case studies in Chapter 7 is to show the low 
visibility of institutional interdependencies. Institutional interdependencies of 
infrastructures are hard to identify without in depth institutional analyses. For instance, 
the relation between nuclear regulatory institutions in Japan and the productivity of US 
factories was not evident until the impact of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on Japanese 
automotive companies disrupted the supply chain of automotive industries in the US. Soft 
infrastructures (Eakin et al., 2017), which encompass institutional interdependence, are a 
common thread of infrastructure networks, which “become[s] visible upon breakdown” 
(Star, 1999, p. 382). Conducting institutional analyses as a part of infrastructural 
management can better equip infrastructure institutions to anticipate complex challenges 
which run through social and institutional networks. 
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7.2 Sociotechnical Interdependencies 
The following sections use the sociotechnical approach to analyze the case of 
water and energy systems in Arizona in order to illustrate the implications of institutional 
interdependencies for infrastructure resilience. The case study shows that climate 
extremes not only degrade the physical capacity of infrastructure but also disrupt 
embedded institutional arrangements in society which are critical to infrastructural 
functionality, which is a focal point in this research. Just as in the example of the 2011 
Japanese tsunami impacting the US economy via supply chains mentioned above (Nanto, 
Cooper, & Donnelli, 2011), climate stressors flow through the complex 
interdependencies of social and institutional networks to impact different facets of water 
and energy systems.  
 
Section 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 then explores the effect of groundwater regulations and 
water governance changes on the operation of power plants which supplies electricity to 
the Phoenix Metropolitan Area (PMA). In particular, a couple of examples of utility 
companies’ organizational adaptation in Arizona elucidate how sociotechnical 
disturbances in the water system globally influence the local operational performance of 
energy organizations from the systems theory perspective. Section 7.3 anticipates future 
institutional challenges, which are likely to be water shortage (i.e., ‘Shortage Declaration’ 
by Bureau of Reclamation) and its cascading effects, to the power system based on the 
institutional analysis of current water resources for power plants in the PMA. The effects 
of climatic changes on water availability will necessitate shifts in water-related 
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institutional arrangements wherein power systems are fabricated with grids. These 
institutional shifts, which are vulnerabilities, will impact energy systems in Arizona and 
in turn the price of water and agriculture products in Arizona.  
 
7.2.1 The institutional interdependence of water and energy systems in Arizona 
The rest of the chapter will explore the challenges of institutional interdependence 
and infrastructural resilience through a sociotechnical systems analysis of the coupled 
water and energy systems that operate in the State of Arizona. Infrastructures including 
water and energy systems, nested in institutional arrangements, are vertically, laterally, 
and longitudinally connected via institutions, but how these threads formalize 
infrastructural interdependencies has been rarely discussed in previous studies. The 
following sections will reify the conception of institutional interdependence. In particular, 
this section illustrates how institutional threads are interwoven into interdependencies of 
infrastructures and how interdependencies put trade-offs in complex sociotechnical 
networks. 
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Figure 27. Institutional network trees of water and energy systems in the PMA  
(source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
* Water and energy systems in Arizona are composed of multiple organizations at 
vertical levels and lateral scales. Lines points to interactive threads which diverse 
institutional arrangements govern these interactions. Blue color means water-related 
organizations, and orange color stands for the organizations of the energy system. Gray 
organizations are mutual agents in water and energy systems. 
 
7.2.2 Direct institutional interdependence and trade-offs 
This section will investigate how water system directly governs energy sources in 
Arizona. Direct governance means direct interventive actions on the operation and 
management of energy systems. For instance, in some cases, concerns on groundwater 
depletion and privileging water over energy compromised the construction of 
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thermoelectric power plants in Arizona via regulatory interdependence. In particular, the 
Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) and ADWR emphasize water conservation 
while shaping and balancing the relationship between water and energy systems (Fig. 
28). Groundwater regulations of ADWR have significantly and directly affected the 
operation of power plants through interdependence grids. In terms of trade-offs, decision 
making between valuing water and securing electricity has long played a significant role 
as sociotechnical co-construction in designing water and energy systems in Arizona. 
These trade-offs for resilience have been negotiated and compromised through 
institutional interdependence.  
 
 
Figure 28. Direct intervention in AZ (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
7.2.2.1 Groundwater regulations and construction permission for power plants in 
Arizona 
Institution 1: Article 6.2, 40-360.13.  Certificate of environmental compatibility; 
availability of groundwater and impact on groundwater management plan 
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For facilities subject to the requirements of this article within the service area of a city 
or town in an active management area, as such terms are used and defined in title 45, 
chapter 2, the power plant and transmission line siting committee shall consider, as a 
criterion for issuing a certificate of environmental compatibility, the availability of 
groundwater and the impact of the proposed use of groundwater on the management 
plan established under title 45, chapter 2, article 9 for the active management area 
(emphasis added). 
 
Article 6.2 guides the certificate of environmental compatibility, which illustrates 
institutional interdependence with respect to the construction permission of power plants 
in Arizona. Article 6.2 directly regulate the operation and management of energy systems 
in Arizona (e.g., the construction of power plants). Water governance vertically directs 
the future planning and adaptation of energy systems through institutional 
interdependence.  
 
In 2001, the proposal of a natural gas-fired 750 MW Big Sandy Power Plant by a 
New York based energy firm, Caithness LLC was rejected by the Transmission Line 
Siting Committee of the ACC (Title 40, Chapter 2, Article 6.2 of the Arizona Revised 
Statutes) indicating the groundwater consumption—from 2,400 to 2,500 gallons per 
minute—to cool generators in their operation plan (ADEQ, 2006; Natural Gas 
Intelligence, Dec. 3, 2001). In 2010, another case was also denied: the Hualapai Valley 
Solar Project, which presented a proposal aiming to construct a solar power plant. ACC 
required the utility to take into consideration for dry cooling generation turbines and the 
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use of effluent water from the City of Kingman instead of groundwater pumping 
(Bracken et al., 2015, p.56). ACC reviewed the option of water “moratorium” for wet-
cooling power plant projects in deciding the approval of the project (Bracken et al., 
2015).  
 
Two cases above show energy systems are directly regulated by water-related 
regulations in Arizona. ACC institutionally shaped water and energy systems with 
regulatory standards on groundwater consumption, which highlighted water conservation 
over energy system expansion. The containment of water demand (water security) and 
the growth of energy supply (energy security) come in need of resilient balancing trade-
offs while shaping sociotechnical infrastructure in Arizona.  
 
7.2.2.2 Water circulation regulations and the operation of cooling power plants 
Institution 2: The Third Management Plan for Phoenix Active Management Area 6.5.4 
Larger Scale Power Plant Program 
 
“The Third Management plan requires that power plants in operation as of the end of 
1984 achieve an annual average of 7 cycles of concentration in cooling towers, while 
facilities that went into operation after 1984 are required to achieve an annual average 
of 15 cycles of concentration in their cooling towers. (…) Facilities may apply to the 
director to use alternative conservation technologies in place of achieving 7 (or 15) 
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cycles of concentration if the use of the proposed alternative technologies will result in 
equal or greater water savings. (…)” 
 
A governance change, the Groundwater Management Act, which was established 
in 1980 to protect groundwater, has directly intervened and regulated the operation of 
energy systems. Since the 1980 Groundwater Management Act was set up, power plants 
in the Phoenix Active Management should circulate cooling water over 15 times in their 
cooling towers in pursuant to the Third Management Plan. Therefore, the cooling towers 
of the Palo Verde plant are also subject to the regulations of the Third Management Plan 
of ADWR, which regulates the circulation frequency of cooling water in pursuit of water 
conservation. The Palo Verde plant should discharge the cooling water after 15 cycles of 
water according to “The Third Management Plan” by ADWR (GAO, 2009, p. 59; 
Bracken et al., 2015, p. 33; ADEQ 2010, p. 14). The articles—6.5.4—of the Third 
Management Plan for Phoenix Active Management Area (2000-2010) regulate the 
“cycles of concentration” of water in the cooling tower (ADWR 1999, 6-57). According 
to the regulation, a large-scale power plant (over 25 MW electricity generation) using 
cooling water source should circulate the cooling water at least 15 times—7 times in the 
case of a power plant built before 1985—prior to blowing out vaporized water from 
cooling towers.  
 
Currently, the Palo Verde plant circulates the cooling water over 20 times 
(Maulbetsch & Difilippo 2010, p.40; Henderson, P. et al. 2013, p.17). The problem with 
the circulation and vaporizing cooling is that as an electricity generation utility, the Palo 
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Verde power plant should abide by both water efficiency standards by ADWR and air 
quality regulation set by Maricopa County when circulating cooling water and 
discharging vaporized water through cooling towers (personal communication, August 
17, 2015). If the EPA or Maricopa County sets out more stringent guidelines for the air 
quality, the cost for eliminating polluted components from vaporized water would be 
shifted to the private sector (private electricity utilities) (Middel et al. 2013, p. 17).     
 
7.2.3 Indirect institutional interdependence and trade-offs 
Unlike direct interdependence, the changes in water systems (e.g., water shortage 
and long-term drought) can indirectly affect energy systems in Arizona. Complex water 
governance and multiple resources, which is a characteristic of complex interdependence 
(Ostrom, 2010; Dui et al., 2010), has indirectly supported energy systems nested in water 
institutional arrangements. Higher lever water organization’s decision changes the 
practices of low-level water organizations and in turn, cause the energy system’s 
adaptations (Fig. 29). The two following cases of the Sundance Generating Station—a 
natural gas plant; located in Cooliage, AZ (Pinal AMA)—and the Yucca Power Plant of 
APS prove the detailed indirect linkages between water and energy systems and illustrate 
successful examples of the operational adaptations of power plants. Arizona Public 
Service (APS) altered their regular operation and management of water resources after 
considerable shifts in institutional governance, such as changes in allocation and water 
rights for the Colorado River water, stemming from considerations on water instability by 
the Bureau of Reclamation. 
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Figure 29. Indirect intervention in Arizona (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
7.2.3.1 Anticipatory adaptation of Sundance Generating Station (APS) to USBR’s 
decision 
The priority of the cooling water resource, which is an excess water supply for the 
Sundance Generating Station of APS, is relatively lower than the priorities of M&I 
subcontractors and Indian subcontractors in the Central Arizona Project system (CAP) 
(personal communication, August 17, 2015). In detail, the CAP system has its own 
unique priority system. The priority system is made up of four levels. The first level is the 
highest level, priority 3 level. Third priority means the water entitlement contract 
between the United States and water users was already executed on or before 1968 
(USBR, n.d.) (68,400 AF). Indian consumptive water and Non-Indian Municipal & 
Industrial (M&I) are included in the second level (981,902 AF). Non-Indian Agricultural 
(NIA) consumptive water is situated on the third level (364,698 AF) (AWBA 2014, p. 
29). As of 2014, there is no Non-Indian Agricultural subcontractor (CAP, 2014b). The 
fourth level is water for Agriculture (Ag) priority. The non-Indian Municipal & Industrial 
(M&I) water, Indian water, and Non-Indian Agricultural water are categorized as long-
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term contract water. The fourth and the other excess water usages are regarded as ‘excess 
water’ (Fig. 30) which has the lowest priority.   
 
 
Figure 30. The Colorado River and CAP water priorities (source: AWBA, 2015) 
 
Accordingly, in the declaration of ‘shortage of Colorado River Reservoirs’ by the 
Secretary of the Interior, the excess water should be reduced first, not the long-term 
subcontractors (about 1,415 MAF as of 2014)18 (AWBA, 2014). Before 2012, there was a 
notice from the CAP board that the contract for excess water supply would not be 
renewed at some point due to the low elevation in Colorado River reservoirs. The most 
plausible option was finding an alternative water resource, otherwise there would not be 
sufficient water supply for the Sundance Generating Station within two or three years. 
Responding to this, the Sundance Generating Station of APS made an agreement with the 
Gila River Indian Community (“GRIC”) which has higher priority in CAP water 
allocation structure and gave its Long-Term Storage Credits (LTSC) instead of the 
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entitlement to get the CAP water directly. LTSC can be accrued from AWBA by storing 
unconsumed water in underground water storage facilities (AWBA, 2014). GRIC will use 
the transferred LTSC in pumping up the stored water at the recovery wells permitted by 
ADWR when they need to use that water (institutional exchange, Fig. 31). The average 
cost for recovery of LTSC was less than 60 dollars per acre-foot, as seen in the case of 
recovery by the California Metropolitan Water District (MWD) (AWBA, 2014, p.25; 
p.50).  
 
 
Figure 31. The organizational structure on water rights exchange (source: Changdeok 
Gim, author) 
 
7.2.3.2 Governance of ‘Subflow Zone’ and Yucca Power Plant’s (APS) adaptation  
In the case of the Yucca Power Plant of APS, the significant problem was that 
APS had 5th or 6th priority, which is lower than CAP water, on the Colorado River water 
as cooling water resources. In 2012, APS was notified that their groundwater for cooling 
would not be available in a few years. APS believed that the Yucca Power plant, which 
had 1,500 AF of 5th/6th priority entitlement, had been using groundwater, not Colorado 
River water until the notice from the Bureau of Reclamation in 2012. However, in 2012, 
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the Bureau of Reclamation identified and noticed that this groundwater used by APS 
from a subflow zone was not groundwater, but Colorado River water. Facing this 
institutional challenge, APS designated alternative groundwater resources (personal 
communication, August 17, 2015).  
 
The major issue with groundwater consumption was that there was no priority 
rule in terms of groundwater pumping and, moreover, surface water and groundwater 
were hydrologically connected (Marder, 2009). With this respect, the Arizona Supreme 
Court developed a unique conception of “subflow” water defining it as “those waters 
which slowly find their way through the sand and gravel constituting the bed of the 
stream, or the lands under or immediately adjacent to the stream, and are themselves a 
part of the surface stream” in Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation District 
No. One v. Southwest Cotton in 1931(Marder, 2009, p.191). More specifically, in 
September 2000, the Arizona Supreme Court confirmed the trial court’s decision which 
further articulated the “subflow” zone.  “All wells inside the saturated floodplain 
Holocene alluvium (subflow zone)” are presumed to be pumping subflow, not 
groundwater (Marder, 2009, p.192).  Thus, water resources within subflow zones are not 
groundwater, but surface water. 
 
In accordance with this constitutional governance, the Bureau of Reclamation 
pointed out that the location of wells, which supply cooling water, were inside the 
subflow zone in 2012. After the official notice by the Bureau of Reclamation, APS 
seeked for and designated alternative locations for drilling four new wells as cooling 
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water sources. After this occurrence, APS has attempted to arrange a contingency plan 
for water resources of all the power plants. These narratives demonstrate the impacts of 
institutional shifts from water side on power plants, and system trade-offs and adaptation 
for the resilience of energy systems in Arizona. APS has begun to advance dynamic 
water efficiency assessments and standards for power plants. The Integrated Resource 
Plan reports of APS submitted to ACC clearly shows that APS makes efforts to lessen the 
consumption of water with their various types of turbines (e.g., coal-fire, natural gas, and 
nuclear turbines) (APS, 2016). Generation from natural gas turbines is the most efficient 
thermoelectric generator in terms of water consumption (Lamberton et al., 2010). 
However, the retrofit of contemporary coal-fire generators to natural gas power plants 
(e.g., the Ocotillo power plant of APS in Tempe, AZ) typically needs huge investments 
and is vulnerable to the fluctuations of natural gas prices. Moreover, natural gas fracking 
also shows lateral trade-off repercussions on the environment between geospatial areas in 
the U.S.   
 
7.3 Anticipating the Institutional Impacts of ‘Shortage Declaration’ on Power Plants 
In terms of long-term droughts, there was no specific operational guideline for 
operating Lake Powell and Lake Mead until the establishment of the 2007 Interim 
Guidelines. The Lower Division States did not have an agreement on the frequency or 
magnitude of any potential reductions in water supply. From 2000 to 2007, there had 
been the worst drought conditions ever, which led to reducing the Colorado River system 
storage. From October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2007, storage in Colorado River 
reservoirs decreased from 55.8 MAF (approximately 94 percent of capacity) to 32.1 MAF 
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(approximately 54 percent of capacity). In 2004, the storage was 29.7 MAF 
(approximately 52 percent of capacity). These consecutive droughts led to a socially 
agreed upon standard, the 2007 Interim Guidelines for the low reservoir elevation of Lake 
Mead (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2007a; 2007b; 2010).  
 
7.3.1 Shortage declaration: sociotechnical co-production of water governance 
Declared droughts are a co-production of ‘Law of the River’ and the scientific 
anticipation of Lake Mead elevation for the next year. The Secretary of the Department 
of the Interior manages and operates Colorado River pursuant to the legal framework, 
‘Law of the River’. The legal framework governing Colorado river water comprises the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944, the 1963 
Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, the Colorado River Basin 
Project Act of 1968 (CRBPA), the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of 
Colorado River Reservoirs of 1970, the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Lower 
Basin Water Banking Regulations of 1999,  the 2006 Consolidated Decree of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, and other applicable federal laws (USBR, 
2007b; 2010; Robison, 2012; USBR website).  
 
Contrary to natural phenomena, the confirmation of ‘a drought’ is a socially 
constructed knowledge imbued with complex and political interactions between Arizona, 
Nevada, and California, and scientific modelling verification. Particularly, once the 
shortage of water supply is officially declared, the 2007 Interim Guideline comes into 
effect in Arizona. A confirmation about the elevation of Lake Mead is a result from the 
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embedded knowledge order (Miller, 2008; Miller et al., 2011) with respect to the 
operation of Lake Mead. The number of elevation is the very indication for the 
Secretary’s administrative declaration of a ‘Drought.’ The knowledge criteria for the 
declaration of droughts evidently reveal the interminglement of society and technoscience 
(Miller et al., 2011; Miller, 2017). “Such standards are never solely the product of pure 
science (whatever that might be) but always involve compromises among the industrial, 
the political, and the economic worlds” (Busch, 2013, pp.277-278). The definition and 
criteria of drought are socially constructed. “Co-production is an inevitable and 
ubiquitous feature of modern societies” (Miller & Wyborn, 2018). More importantly, 
‘Shortage Declaration’ can beget ripple effects on further social arrangements and 
behaviors, such as the reduction of CAP excess water, the decrease of groundwater 
replenishment, and groundwater pumping in the Central Arizona area.  
 
The deviations of institutional settings matter, not the amount of water consumed 
by power plants. In the case of the Secretary of Interior’s shortage declaration, the state 
of Arizona should share the curtailments of the Colorado River water allocation as per the 
2007 Interim Guidelines (CAP, 2014; the 2007 Interim Guidelines; Minute 31919; 
Arizona State Senate Issue Brief, 2015) (Table 6). A ‘Shortage Declaration’ will disturb 
basic institutional schemes governing water and affect the design of sociotechnical water 
and energy systems in Arizona. In terms of sectoral portions, the Agricultural sector uses 
74% of Arizona water, Industrial 5%, and Municipal 21%. In terms of industrial 
consumption, the total amount of water consumed by thermoelectric power plants in 
Arizona was 170,250 AF (0.17 MAF) in 2008, which is a small fraction, approximately 
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2.5% (Bartos & Chester, 2015)—according to APS, 2010, this is 0.18 MAF. However, 
the institutional governance for 2.5% is not plain.  
 
Table 6. The curtailment in ‘Shortage Declaration’ (source: CAP, 2014; the 2007 Interim 
Guidelines; Minute 319; Arizona State Senate Issue Brief, 2015) 
Lake Mead elevation 
projection for the 
elevation on 
January 1st in August 
Arizona  Nevada California Mexico 
Below 1,075 feet 
(Tier1) 
320,000 AF 
 
13,000 AF 0 50,000 AF 
Below 1,050 feet 
(Tier 2) 
400,000 AF 17,000 AF 0 70,000 AF 
Below 1,025 feet 
(Tier 3) 
480,000 AF 20,000 AF 0 125,000 AF 
Below 1,000 feet Further measures will be taken. The Secretary of State will 
consult with the basin states.  Consultations will begin if the 
elevation is below 1,000 feet. 
 
7.3.2 Cascading effects of a confirmed ‘water shortage’ on energy systems in the 
PMA 
Institutional analysis on water and energy systems in the PMA emphasizes a 
distinctive aspect from the typical water and energy systems of the other states in the 
U.S., which are normally affected by the temperature of surface water (US DOE, 2014). 
In Arizona, the water-energy nexus has evolved into unique systems which are 
completely dependent on a cooler and consistent resource, groundwater. The uncertainty 
of surface water supplies and high temperature issues of water resources in Arizona, 
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which is located in the Colorado River basin areas, make a unique system evolvement 
favorable for the static water resource, groundwater (USBR, 2016, p. 1-20). 
 
Specifically, 16 of 20 total power plants of APS and SRP use effluent water or 
groundwater as cooling water sources (Diehl and Harris, 2014, Appendix 1; an ACC 
eDocket document # E-00000J-10-0053) for electricity supply in the PMA as of 2016. 
The surface water temperature of Yampa River, San Juan River and Lake Powell can be 
significantly related to the electricity generation efficiency in extreme heat. However, 
other power plants’ water resources are not concerned with heat waves. APS wholly or 
partially owns 10 thermoelectric power plants and SRP owns 13 as of 2016. The Palo 
Verde plant, Navajo Generating Station, and Four Corners Power Plant are common 
power plants that both SRP and APS participate in. The following water resources are 
consumed as cooling sources by these power plants: surface water, effluent water, and 
groundwater. APS, which supplies electricity for water systems with SRP in the PMA, 
cool generators with multiple water resources—effluent (61%), surface water (21%), and 
groundwater (18%) as of 2010 (Arizona Public Service, 2010). In particular, surface 
water is used only for four power plants: the Hayden Generating Station (Yampa River), 
Four Corners Power Plant (San Juan River/ Morgan Lake), Craig Generating Station 
(Yampa River), and Navajo Generating Station (Colorado River, Lake Powell). Effluent 
water is used for the Palo Verde plant, Redhawk and Desert Basin Generating Stations 
for cooling. The Santan Generating Station and Kyrene Generating Station use CAP 
water. This CAP water means water is stored in the ground, not the surface CAP canal. 
The rest of the power plants are pumping groundwater from the aquifer. Thus, the 
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temperature of surface water can affect only these four power plants (out of 20). In this 
regard, groundwater depletion draws attention with respect to climate change. The state 
of Arizona is one of the states in the U.S. which has experienced the severe depletion of 
groundwater according to USGS (2012) data. The amount of depleted groundwater for 
the last 100 years is approximately 102.0 km3 as of 2008 (USGS, 2013, p.25). 
 
Arizona is assumed to consume 2.8 MAF of groundwater annually in an 
unsustainable manner that dwindles natural water storages, aquifers in Arizona (Ferris et 
al., 2015, p.38). The Assured Water Supply program and the 1980 Groundwater 
Management Act have structurally endorsed the unstainable development of lands as well 
as the insufficient replenishment for aquifers at the expense of groundwater exploitation 
(Hirt et al., 2008; Megdal et al., 2014). Groundwater depletion is beyond the scope of the 
water-energy nexus, given the universality of water as a limited and non-fungible 
resource for industries (Fig. 29). Groundwater depletion has grown to be a complex 
socio-ecological-technical issue in Arizona. Historically, the state of Arizona has 
addressed the issue of water consumption by the agricultural sector, which consumes 4.4 
MAF—approximately 70% of water available in Arizona—in multiple ways (ADWR 
website, n.d.). Yet this issue has been contentious in terms of water and Arizona’s 
sustainability. Particularly, agriculture areas in central Arizona have been encouraged to 
use CAP water in lieu of groundwater since the official completion of CAP canals in 
1992. CAP and municipalities agreed upon the subsidy policy program, the Agricultural 
Settlement Pool, for CAP water users in the central Arizona area. The price of water 
consumed by agriculture is lower than the official price of CAP water to encourage the 
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consumption of Colorado River water (Table 7). CAP and municipalities were concerned 
that California could raise an issue on the incomplete use of Colorado River water, which 
was delivered through CAP canals (Bausch, 2015, p.748).  
 
Table 7. Central Arizona Project Final 2015-2016 rate schedule 
Various water users 2014 ($/ acre-foot) 
Municipal and Industrial Long Term Subcontract  146                           
 Non-Subcontract 166 
 Recharge 166 
 AWBA Interstate Recharge 189 
Federal  146 
Agricultural  Settlement Pool 67 
(source: CAP webpage retrieved from  
http://www.mwdh2o.com/PDF%202016%20Background%20Materials/Central%20Arizo
na%20Project%202014-15%20and%202015-16.pdf) 
 
7.3.3 Water-Energy-Agriculture interdependence and trade-offs  
The following paragraphs will investigate complex interdependence and challenges to 
water-energy-agriculture. 
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Figure 32. The cascades of a confirmed ‘drought’ impact on the Phoenix water-energy-
agriculture (WEA) (source: Changdeok Gim, author) 
 
Fig. 32 illustrates how confirmed institutional robustness such as a ‘Shortage 
(drought) Declaration’ based on the Elevation of Lake Mead (<1,075 feet) generates 
cascading effects via physical and institutional interdependencies over water-energy-
agriculture systems in the PMA. ‘Declared droughts’ enhancing water robustness will 
affect physical water availability for thermoelectric power plants in Arizona. According 
to the 2007 Interim Guidelines, in the case of a Tier 1 shortage declaration (under 1,075 
feet), the non-Indian agriculture water pool should be reduced by 143,000 AF (‘CAP 
Excess Water Reduction’). This curtailment (‘Reduction in Arizona Allocation’) can 
prompt the agriculture sector to return back to pumping groundwater (‘The Increase of 
Groundwater Pumping by Agriculture’) (CAP website, n.d.; Ferris et al., 2015). Using 
wells accelerates ‘Groundwater Depletion’, and in turn stimulates ‘Institutional Shifts 
on Groundwater Management’ towards a tighter regulatory consensus (‘Institutional 
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Adaptations’) to protect an irreplaceable natural resource, groundwater. Arguably, for 
desirable adaptation of whole water, energy, and agriculture systems, as seen in past 
cases of APS, these shifts demand anticipatory analysis while engaging diverse 
stakeholders as to socio-eco-agricultural trade-offs around the allocation and 
consumption of groundwater.  
 
For instance, SRP’s adaptation strategies have successfully managed drought risks 
and contributed to sustainable electricity and water delivery to the PMA for a century. 
However, with respect to climate extremes, SRP’s several power plants will be in need of 
an innovative adaptation. Specifically, the Coronado, Springerville, and Coolidge 
Generating Stations of SRP are withdrawing groundwater outside AMA. There is no 
regulation of water rights on pumping groundwater outside AMA. However, tighter 
regulations on groundwater management in the area outside AMA could affect securing 
groundwater for these power plants. In other words, a newly amended 1980 Groundwater 
Management Act of ADWR can require water rights for the groundwater outside AMA 
(Ferris et al., 2015, p.23). In that case, these power plants need to secure ‘Alternative 
Water Resources’ (or rights) or resources. Moreover, ADWR may not permit power 
plants to drill new wells which compromise sustainable groundwater management or 
other user’s consumption in designating the sites of power plants as AMA due to 
draconian droughts (Ferris et al., 2015, p.47). Also, the updated groundwater regulations 
can require the withdrawers of groundwater to pay a withdrawal fee within AMA despite 
Grandfathered Groundwater Rights (Type I) affirmed by ADWR. In addition, other 
stakeholders such as local communities and the National Park Service are concerned 
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about the long-term downsides of water pumping out on the C Aquifer, where the Cholla 
Generating Station is located (Whealan et al., 2003, p.14). These changes for the 
robustness of water resources will cause ‘the Increase Electricity Price’ (Ferris et al., 
2015), ‘the Increase of Water Price’ and in turn ‘the Increase of the Price of 
Agricultural Products’. In Arizona, the price of water is a determinant factor to the 
economic growth and the sustainability of agriculture industries (personal 
communication on Oct. 20th, 2017).  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
On the theoretical basis of Chapter 2 to 4, Chapter 5 illustrated the history of 
sociotechnical fabrication of an infrastructure, Hoover Dam using the case study of water 
and electricity allocation. Chapter 4 showed that how the allocation of Colorado River 
water based on the Colorado River compact in 1922, Arizona’s ratification of the 
Compact in 1944, the Supreme Court decision in Arizona vs. California in 1963, the 
negotiation between Arizona and California on the construction of the CAP canal in 
1968—all these constitutional arrangements have been contributing to and adapted for 
the sociotechnical fabrication of Hoover Dam in Arizona. To broaden and deepen the 
research implications of sociotechnical perspectives and the redefinition of sociotechnical 
resilience in Chapter 2, 3, and 4, Chapter 6 empirically mapped out the institutional 
landscape of water and energy systems, unbundled institutional threads (e.g., the federal 
laws in Chapter 5) wrapping infrastructures, and illustrated the resilience work of 
different institutions dealing with a variety of uncertainties (technical and social 
uncertainties) in response to water disturbances to water-energy nexus. 
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Chapter 7 argues that direct or indirect reciprocal interactions between 
organizations through institutions need to be observed, analyzed, and anticipated with 
respect to infrastructure resilience in Arizona. The transformation of federal institutions 
adapts the state level regulations and design standards of infrastructure. Adapted 
regulations, in turn, change operational level check-up protocols, and manuals for 
management by organizations and technicians (e.g., the upgrades of protocols depending 
on the types of turbines) towards different technical and social practices. APS’s “multi-
layered approach to reduce water intensity,” which includes air-cooled or dry-cooling 
generators, efficient water utilization, and renewable energy sources (APS, 2014), is an 
exemplary case of the resilient organizational knowledge adaptations responding to 
global droughts and water governance changes. The transition of coal-fired turbines to 
natural-gas is not only a technical or operational adaptation but also can be constitutional.  
 
Anticipatory assessments on institutional feedback loops associated with water 
governance are critical to the resilience of power plants responding to climate extremes 
(e.g., 10-year droughts). Moreover, eighty percent of APS and SRP power plants are 
using groundwater for cooling, which fabricates a fundamentally different landscape of 
water and energy systems in the PMA from other states in the US. What is important 
should be the balanced institutionalization of trade-offs between multiple polities, 
stakeholders, and utilities. desirable claims, such as water security and energy stability 
while establishing multiple resilience strategies. Climate challenges to infrastructure pass 
through institutional webs while raising questions for trade-off dilemmas in institutions. 
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Reflexive balancing and trade-offs with engineering formulas are one of essential 
conditions that resilient infrastructure can be nurtured.  
 
Therefore, the next chapter will investigate the complex risk and value landscape 
of water and energy systems, based on the risk innovation perspective by Maynard (2015) 
and the cultural theory of Douglas (1972). Nuanced resilience politics over entangled 
sociotechnical infrastructure is critically important to infrastructure resilience given the 
complexity of institutional work and interdependencies. The consideration of diverse 
perspectives and values is the focal point of the next chapter. As such, this grave question 
for society is the research question of the next chapter: for whom, in what processes, and 
to what ends, infrastructure should be resilient?   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
RISK INNOVATION AND RESILIENCE POLITICS IN ARIZONA:  
THE COMPLEX LANDSCAPE OF WATER-ENERGY-AGRICULTURE  
 
8.1 Introduction  
Based on the theoretical and empirical contributions of previous chapters, Chapter 
8 focuses on how the ‘risk innovation’ framework can be used to unpack the complexity 
of threats and values in water-energy-agricultural interdependencies. Chapter 8 argues 
that a critical element in long-term resilience work is risk innovation work: understanding 
and managing risk landscapes, politics, and values within which the complex realities of 
resilience work (Chapter 6) and interdependencies (Chapter 7) are designed, fashioned, 
and negotiated by myriad infrastructural institutions. The ‘risk innovation’ framework 
scrutinizes resilience politics and values to understand the complexity of infrastructure 
interdependencies. Given the complex interdependencies of institutions and 
infrastructures, resilience questions often escalate to social and political conundrums. The 
pathways to addressing the ‘wicked problems’ of infrastructure resilience include not 
only deterministic quantifications but also participatory governance (Rittel & Webber, 
1973; Kreuter et al., 2004; Maynard, 2015). A key contribution to the participatory 
governance of resilience politics should be an in-depth investigation of the diverse values 
and political tensions involved in interdependent infrastructure systems, which can be 
facilitated by the ‘risk innovation’ framework.  
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In particular, using risk innovation, this chapter illustrates how different values 
and resilience politics around water and energy systems in Arizona will be impacted by a 
'shortage declaration' according to the 2007 Interim Guidelines and long-term droughts in 
the near future. This chapter critically examines the complex landscape of threats and 
values embedded in socio-technical water and energy systems through the ‘risk 
innovation’ lens (Maynard, 2015), coupled with ‘cultural theory’ (Douglas, 1973). The 
chapter describes the diverse, complex threats to different constituencies, such as utilities, 
farmers, governmental organizations, and non-profit environmental groups, which will 
flow through institutional interdependencies, and shows how these threats will require an 
extensive resilience work in interdependent water-energy-agriculture networks. A 
‘shortage declaration’ will curtail the allocation of Colorado River water to Arizona 
which has junior water rights, and in turn prompt groundwater pumping in the 
agricultural sector. The grand transition in the water supply portfolio in Arizona will 
change local groundwater regulations and water contracts of power plants for using 
water. Different values (e.g., political leadership, lucrative business models, family 
economic security, and groundwater sustainability) should be somehow reconciled for the 
smooth adaptation and transformation of each different system. The take away from 
Chapter 8 is that risk innovation analyses have the potential to guide and facilitate the 
implementation of these long-term adaptations and transformations of infrastructures to 
changing contexts and new societal values.    
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8.2 The ‘Risk Innovation’ Perspective  
The ‘risk innovation’ framework (Maynard, 2015), which defines risk as “a threat 
to existing or future value,” is convincing given both quantitative and qualitative features 
of risk and the limitation of scientific risk assessments. According to Maynard (2015), 
value can be variously defined depending on “personal, societal and organizational 
contexts” (Maynard, 2015, p.731). As Selznick stated (1996), “the most significant aspect 
of institutionalization is infusion with value beyond the technical requirements” 
(Selznick, 1996, p.271). Given that a prominent feature of an organization is ‘infused 
value’ in the organizational structure, values of constituencies provide preliminary 
standards to judge whether events or human actions should be confirmed as risks.  
 
Moreover, given the limitations of scientific methods, risk is not just a quantified 
number, but also a value-laden judgment. At the most basic level, science has been 
regarded as an appropriate tool for legitimizing and implementing public policies to 
resolve social problems. For instance, scientific modeling has played out in preventing 
catastrophic natural disasters (e.g., floods prevention and hurricane predictions) (Pielke, 
1999). However, scientific models, which pursue crisp numeric results, have proven to be 
insufficient in solving complex problems in that they include logical fallacies with errors 
propagating through their designed models (Oreskes, 1994). In brief, if a scientific 
modeling produces a predicted outcome, which is congruent with observed (empirical) 
data, the hypotheses of this scientific modeling could be verified and confirmed (Oreskes 
et al., 1994, p.643). However, this reductionist view on scientific predictions and 
verification logic for generalization include innate logical fallacies (Oreskes et al., 1994, 
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p.642-643). Affirmed valid results cannot transition into the evidence of the physical 
generality. Even though A (a hypothesis is true) Þ B (the results will be consistent with 
empirical data) is true, logically, the existence of B cannot be interpreted as the evidence 
of A. As Popper (1968) maintained, we cannot induce ‘a reality’ from finite observed 
data (Oreskes et al., 1994; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2000).  
 
Innate uncertainties and complexity in risks as well as logical fallacies in modern 
reductionism modelling justify a new paradigm of risk thinking, the risk innovation 
framework by Maynard (2015). However, what values should be chosen to render society 
vigilant to particular events or human actions is not clear in the discussion of risk 
innovation. Also, the way to summarize and reduce the wide spectrum of judgments by 
individuals and constituencies on the appraisal between threats (cost) and values (benefit) 
into an interim and singular social memorandum needs to be deliberated.  
 
8.3 The Complex Risk Landscape of Water-Energy-Agriculture Systems in Arizona 
In Arizona, the landscape of risks around water, energy, and agriculture systems 
are complex. Complex networks are comprised of particular organizations for each 
domain (water, energy, and agriculture). Besides utilities, governmental organizations 
and advocacy groups also abound while making claims for their own organizational 
goals. Mapping the complex landscape of infrastructure and institutions illustrates 
diversified imaginaries, myriad values, complicated regulations, and distinct protocols for 
institutional and physical infrastructure. Particularly, each constituency has different 
values, cultures, and cognition for risks (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson & 
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Schwartz, 1990; Kahan et al. 2008). This mapping work helps to understand the risk 
landscape of water-energy-agriculture nexus.  
 
 
Figure 33. Water-Energy-Agriculture interdependence (source: Changdeok Gim, author; 
based on Senge and Sterman’s (1992) system analysis)  
 
Figure 33 and Table 7 describes potential interdependent threats to the complex 
landscape of water and energy systems in Arizona, which include CO2 regulations at the 
federal level, extreme hot weather events, population growth, and water 
quality/efficiency regulations, and the curtailment of the Colorado River water allocation 
(‘-’ water availability) due to the low level of the reservoir in Lake Mead according to 
the 2007 Interim Guideline. These threats can put a wide array of diverse influences and 
challenges to the values of different constituents. According to the 2007 Interim 
Guideline, in the case of water shortage, the state of Arizona should take the curtailment 
of 320,000 AF to their allocation, 7.5 MAF (million acre feet) (Table 6). How this 
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shortage (‘-’ in water availability) and other threats (e.g., CO2 regulations, population 
growth, extreme hot weather etc.) can affect diverse constituencies such as 
governmental organizations (the Environmental Protection Agency and ACC), farmers in 
the central Arizona area, environmentalists, and utilities (APS and SRP) will be a focal 
point in analyzing the complex landscape of water and energy systems in Arizona. 
Currently, approximately 4.4 MAF is consumed by the agriculture sector, which is 
equivalent to 70% of total water consumption in Arizona (ADWR website). 
 
For instance, at the constitutional level, the demography change accompanied 
with population growth will affect the political landscape of Arizona. Typically, the 
population growth leads to the increase of water and energy demand, which in turn 
needs the expansion of water and energy supply systems (‘+’ in water and energy 
supply) and creates more (‘+’) demand in energy and water. Also, accordingly, the 
resurgence of CO2 regulations at the federal level such as Clean Power Plan (Kirsten, E, 
2015) and renewable source regulations (e.g., proposition 127) at the state level on power 
plants—e.g., Clean Power Plan, which was repealed by the EPA in October 2017—come 
to be an overwhelming institutional challenge such as the shutdown to the coal-fired 
power plants (‘+’ in energy price) in Arizona. For instance, the Navajo Generating 
Station (NGS), which is the third largest carbon emitting facility in the US (EPA, 2014), 
employs approximately 500 people from the Navajo Nation and from the Kayenta Mine 
where the NGS mines coal (azcentral, Sep. 29th, 2016). The shutdown of the NGS, which 
supplies electricity to the CAP canals, was not a simple decision (azcentral, Jan. 5th, 
2017). The total electricity consumption for the 1.6 million AF (acre feet) CAP water 
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delivery was approximately 2,800 GWh as of 2014 (Kleiman, 2016). That means the 
increase of electricity price necessarily cause the increase of water price.  
 
Moreover, 86.2% of farms, which are largely dependent on CAP water in 
Arizona, are owned by families and approximately 80% of them are less than 50 acres. 
Most farmers in Arizona are struggling with their relatively low income, which means 
85% of farms earn less than $25,000 dollars according to sale receipts data (Kerna, A. 
and Frisvold, G., 2014). These economic and cultural conditions generate repercussions 
the increase of agricultural product price and the less consumption of agricultural 
products which put negative impact on the income of agricultural households. Given the 
socio-eco-technical convolution of people’s job, technology, regulations, and 
reverberating claims on clean energy, anticipatory governance on trade-offs is a social 
and political task, rather than quantification, in facilitating energy systems’ transition in 
Arizona in Arizona.  
 
8.4 Culture Theory 
This chapter employs the culture theory to better analyze the values and cultures 
that defined the conception of risks in different communities. Given that organizational 
values are infused via institutionalization (Selznick, 1996), culture as a constitutional 
institution is a great locus to begin with an investigation on how risks are structured and 
what threats are harmful to what values of social constituents of water and energy 
systems in Arizona. Different cultural perspectives strongly affect the conceptualization 
and perception of risks (Slovic, 1987; Douglas & Mary, 1982). ‘What is and what is not a 
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risk’ is a socially structured question (Beck, 1992). Kahan et al. (2008) analyzed different 
cultural cognitions (e.g., individualistic, hierarchical, egalitarian, and communitarian) of 
groups and found that cultural perspectives, not the extent of knowledge familiarity, are 
highly tied to different attitudes on risks and benefits of nanotechnology. 
 
Organizations incorporate and react to threats via institutional structures: 
operational, regulatory, and constitutional (e.g., culture) threads. For instance, the 
drought risk (threat to value) in Arizona can be diversified into operational, regulatory, 
and constitutional threats (Table 7). Different constituents rely on the reservoir water of 
Lake Mead for different organizational values. Cultural cognition as a constitutional 
institution run through institutional grids and affect the formation of regulatory and 
technical risks. In other words, cultures contribute to the social construction of risks—
i.e., via cultural cognition, particular threats are confirmed as risks with particular 
institutional arrangements—and other institutional sub-threats (regulatory and technical 
threats). Thus, to understand what infrastructure resilience means in Arizona, it is 
valuable to describe what diverse organizations’ cultures look like and how these cultures 
contribute to the dynamic conformation of risks derived from climate threats (e.g., 
droughts to water and energy systems) with their particular institutional threads 
(Thompson & Schwartz, 1990).  
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Figure 34. Four different perspectives on risks of the environment 
(source: Thompson & Schwartz, 1990) 
 
In particular, Thompson and Schwartz (1990) divided organizations into four 
different types depending on their organizational structures’ responses to different 
threats. The organizational structure of bonding and stratification affects the cultural 
perspectives of organizations, which in turn leads to different attitudes towards social, 
technical, and environmental threats to organizations. The framework by Thompson and 
Schwartz (1990) can be interpreted as a tool to understand different perspectives on 
constituencies’ cultures and threats to these groups (Table 7).   
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Table 8. Threats derived from droughts and other threatened values 
 
 
Constituents Organizations incorporate threats and react to climate 
threats via institutional threads.  
Threatened 
values 
 Constitutional 
threats 
Regulatory threats Operational 
threats 
Government 
organizations 
(hierarchist) 
- Negotiation 
of water 
allocation  
- The increase 
of social 
contestations/ 
litigation 
- Climate 
change 
- Population 
Growth 
- Administrative 
pressure for the 
establishment of 
new regulations 
 
 
- Wildfire 
suppression 
costs 
- Infrastructure 
upgrades 
subsidy 
- Political 
leadership 
- Political 
stability 
Agriculture  
- farmers 
(fatalist) 
- Social 
concerns on 
groundwater 
depletion 
- The 
transition of 
land use 
- Water rights 
change 
 (e.g., well 
permission)  
- Water price 
increase 
- Electricity price 
increase 
- Water quantity 
- Water quality 
- Electricity 
outage (due to 
heat waves) 
 
- The 
sustainabilit
y of 
agriculture 
Industry 
- water/ 
electricity 
utilities 
(individualist) 
- Social 
preference on 
water efficient 
energy 
sources 
(renewable 
energy)  
- Water price 
increase 
- Water efficiency 
regulation 
- GHG Emissions 
regulation (climate 
change regulations) 
- Groundwater 
regulations 
- Water quantity 
(cooling water, 
water 
availability) 
- Water quality 
- Components 
failure 
- 
Maximizati
on of profit 
- The 
reliability of 
water/ 
electricity 
service 
 
Environmenta
lists 
(egalitarian) 
- Social 
conflicts 
- 
Unsustainable 
groundwater 
- Extreme 
weather 
events   
- Social pressure for 
the establishment of 
new regulations  
- The increase 
of unsustainable 
social practices 
- The 
proliferation 
of social 
movement 
- 
Sustainabilit
y of society  
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8.4.1 Governmental organizations; hierarchist  
From the perspective of governmental organizations, tolerant nature should be 
reinterpreted, reorganized, and managed by regulations (Thompson & Schwartz, 1990). 
Climate extremes prompt the introduction of new regulations (e.g., groundwater 
protection and CO2 emission regulations). Federal level organizations (e.g., EPA) play an 
important role in establishing new regulations to respond to environmental threats to 
sustain their political leadership. The EPA is a federal government organization that has 
tended to address sociotechnical pollution threats with hierarchical regulatory frames 
since 1970 (e.g., the clean power plan program).  
 
Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) is a state-level governmental 
organization. Nature is under control of the ACC. The ACC is a key player in regulating 
water and energy dynamics in Arizona and focuses on adjusting water consumption by 
power plants. ACC regulates and reacts to water quantity threats with their regulatory 
permission on the construction of power plants. For instance, in 2001, the proposal to 
construct a natural gas-fired 750 MW Big Sandy Power Plant by a New York based 
energy firm, Caithness LLC, was denied by the Transmission Line Siting Committee of 
the ACC (Title 40, Chapter 2, Article 6.2 of the Arizona Revised Statutes), due to the 
groundwater consumption (2,400 to 2,500 gallons per minute) to cool generators in their 
operation plan. A caveat with this regulation is that the extent and contents of regulations 
for threats thoroughly rest in ACC’s control. In this sense, nature is controllable. 
 
8.4.2 Farmers in the central Arizona area: fatalist 
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Farmers typically stay outside of the discussion of water and energy systems in 
Arizona. The contestation around the water-energy-agriculture nexus in Arizona reveals 
this propensity. To farmers, nature is capricious.  
 
I looked at the front page of the Arizona Republic and there was another article 
about water issues, and after you read that so many times... I think Jesus, maybe 
it’s time to get out... (Baushch et al., 2015, p.750)  
 
The stability of water price plays a critical role in guarding the stable income of most 
farmers in Arizona. In Arizona, 86.2% of farms are owned by families and the average 
acreage of farms is smaller than that of the national average. Most farmers in Arizona are 
struggling with their relatively low income, which means the annual income of 79.7% 
farmers is under 10,000 dollars (Kerna, A. and Frisvold, G., 2014). The increase of water 
price due to droughts will significantly impinge on the sustainability of farms.  
 
In fact, farmers do not use groundwater, not due to water rights but due to the 
pumping costs, which means CAP water is cheaper than groundwater (Bausch, 2015). 
The agriculture area in central Arizona has been using CAP water in lieu of groundwater 
since the official completion of CAP canals in 1992. CAP and municipalities agreed upon 
the subsidy policy program, the Agricultural Settlement Pool, for CAP water users in the 
central Arizona area (Bausch, 2015, p.748). The price of water consumed by agriculture 
is much lower than the official price of CAP water (Table 7). If there is a curtailment on 
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CAP excess water to agricultural sectors, there will be a regulatory threat to utilities in 
terms of groundwater regulations.  
 
8.4.3 Utility companies: individualist  
Nature is benign and resilient so are individualists’ organizations. According to 
the water department, SRP has water rights for the 20 to 30 years of water supply 
contract for the water sources (personal communication, September 4, 2015). Climate 
change is not a new normal for SRP. Droughts have been the norm in Arizona (personal 
communication, September 4, 2015). Water resources for power plants are managed by 
the ‘water rights management’ department at SRP. Most power plants owned by the SRP 
use groundwater for cooling generators. The data about the exact amount of water 
consumption by power plants is not open to the public, though it could be approximately 
calculated from the types of turbines in use. SRP is exempted from the ACC’s ruling by 
Arizona laws. For instance, SRP has no legal duty to submit the IRP report to the ACC.  
In this vein, when droughts disrupt the pre-existing governance on groundwater, this 
institutional disruption on water rights can threaten the current operation and 
management of water resources for power plants by SRP, which is different from SRP’s 
individualistic conception of long-term droughts. Also, this disruption can give rise to 
social conflicts between stakeholders such as farmers, municipalities, local residents, and 
environmentalists.   
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8.4.4 Environmentalist: egalitarian  
To environmentalists, nature is fragile. Threats such as air pollution and climate 
change are critical to the sustainability of nature from the egalitarian perspective. 
Sociotechnical systems embedded in environments should be careful about the 
harmfulness of their operation and management of nature. For instance, if climate 
extremes such as droughts cause the establishment of CO2 regulations fueled by 
environmental movements who thinks ‘nature is fragile’, utilities (individualists) and 
governmental organizations (hierarchists) have to adjust their structures and practices to 
adapt to this new normality. The outcome of one entity’s efforts can be a threat to the 
other entities’ routines. For instance, the litigation between the EPA and the plaintiffs, 
such as the Sierra Club and the National Parks Conservation Association, demonstrates 
this dynamic complexity of risks landscape in Arizona. Environmentalists pushed 
governmental organizations and utilities to close the Navajo Generating Station (NGS), 
which supplies electricity to CAP canals. However, NGS employs about 1,000 people 
from the Navajo Nation and from Kayenta Mine, where NGS mines coal. Given the 
economic impact, the rescheduling of environmental regulations on NGS is not an easy 
risk assessment.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The theoretical contribution of Chapter 2, 3, and 4 is that these chapters pointed 
out and redefined a key aspect of infrastructure resilience as institutional capacities to 
sustain, adapt, and transform infrastructures to uncertainties and disruptions. Chapter 5, 6, 
and 7 respectively provided the supportive evidence of case studies illustrating three 
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points: i) Hoover Dam as a sociotechnical infrastructure in Chapter 5, ii) the institutional 
landscape and threads of water and energy systems in Arizona as well as the resilience 
work of these operational, regulatory, and constitutional institutions in Chapter 6, iii) the 
resilience interdependencies of water and energy infrastructures via institutions in 
Chapter 7.  
 
The focal point of this chapter is not about how to precisely measure risks, but 
how to make an orchestration of diverse constituencies’ (e.g., hierarchist, individualist, 
egalitarian, and fatalist) cultural values with the risk innovation framework. Risk 
innovation as a risk politics methodology cares about human and social dimensions of 
risks. Risk innovation has the potential to open up hidden complexity of resilience 
landscapes and valuable opportunities for stakeholders. When muddling through and 
minute failures are encouraged, serendipity can be found at the destination. Wicked 
(complex) problems are not to be resolved, but to be agreed-upon. This is why plural 
paradigms still exist and will exist. Therefore, resilience is not just about risk 
assessments, but about risk innovation and politics.  
 
Politics is never a panacea, but always a consequential determinant to social 
problems which are less linear or technical. Risk innovation to rigorous processes, 
reminiscent of Charles Lindblom’s shrewd incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959), resonate 
with the queries in the introduction: ‘To what extent, the repair, retrofit, and upgrades of 
physical structure can improve resilience?’ ‘Why is it worthwhile analyzing and 
anticipating institutional interdependence of infrastructures?’  
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Finally, Chapter 9 expands and apply the interdependence and politics of 
resilience to a much broader context, socio-eco-technical infrastructure systems which 
means the water-energy-forest nexus in Arizona. In Arizona, the socio-eco-technical 
resilience of water, energy, and forests are tightly interdependent together. Wildfire 
incidents and the devastation of forests have detrimental impacts on both water-energy 
nexus in Arizona. Chapter 9 describes the forest policy transition as a resilience 
knowledge transition, knowledge processes, and socio-eco-technical boundaries work.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
FOREST MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Adding to the contributions of previous chapters, Chapter 9 suggests that 
resilience work is as much knowledge work as organizational work. The chapter 
identifies key knowledge capacities for organizations pursuing resilience: their abilities to 
monitor and observe, anticipate changes in, develop adaptive strategies for, and learn 
from experiences regarding socio-eco-technical systems, i.e., complex infrastructure 
assemblages and their networked relationships to ecological contexts in which social 
systems and services are managed. Arguably, as illustrated in the case study of forest 
management and its relations to water and electricity systems in Arizona, institutional 
transitions (resilience processes) are critical to the resilience of infrastructures. Regarding 
infrastructure and urban resilience in Arizona, the management of forests and wildfires is 
a crucial domain in which the inextricable nexus of water-energy-forest plays out. In this 
chapter, the process of urban resilience and anticipation will be understood and vetted 
through the procedures of long-term institutional transformation within which the 
dynamics of knowledge elements (e.g., contents, uncertainties, values, and 
epistemologies) formalize and take place.  
 
In particular, decades ago, based on traditional engineering approaches to 
resilience, wildfires in forests were deemed as disturbances to be excluded. However, 
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after observing severe wildfires, ecological failures, and disastrous devastation of forests, 
the old paradigm of ‘fire control’ was replaced by a new paradigm of ‘fire management.’ 
Fire management is not a laissez-faire policy, nor is it a purely engineered approach; 
rather it is a mixture of stability-oriented and flexibility-oriented approaches. Small and 
big wildfires occasionally caused turbid water resources and communication/electricity 
outages coupled with monsoon seasons. Recognizing this has helped legitimize an 
institutional transition from prioritizing dense forests to encouraging healthy (or thin) 
forests. This anticipatory recognition took decades and had to be supported by long-term 
preparatory planning, efforts to engage multi-stakeholders, the integration of a wide array 
of epistemologies, and the mediation of diverse organizational values.  
 
9.2 Engineering Resilience, Water-Energy-Food Nexus, and Forest Management in 
Arizona 
Until the 1990s, forest management was dominated mainly by the engineering 
resilience perspective: sustaining the minimization of wildfires and maximization of 
timber density. Scientific quantification and measurement emphasize one original steady 
state: dense forests. Engineering resilience perspective ignored local Native American 
knowledge which foregrounds the natural cycle of a frequent fire burning and a resilient 
density of ecosystems. Dense forests were deemed as a desirable state of forests, and the 
management was focused on planting more trees and sustaining the density (Arno, 1996a; 
1996b).  
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More broadly, scientific forestation has proved to be perilous. The neglection of 
the complexity and openness of component interactions of ecosystems by scientific 
forestation has typically resulted in disastrous ecological failures and the death of forests 
in Europe and the United States in the early 1900s (Scott, 1998). Along with these 
fallacies in Europe and the US, engineered forestation and wildfire control prevailed in 
Arizona until the establishment of the Forest Health Advisory Council in 2003 
(Governor’s Forest Health Advisory and Oversight Councils, 2007). Wildfires, regardless 
of their intensity and scales, were conceived of as useless and harmful to the health of 
forests. However, ecologists have argued for the benefits of small natural wildfires to the 
ecology for decades.  
 
Urban infrastructure interdependencies become complex when coupled with an 
ecological consideration of forest management. Since myriad technical and social 
components contribute to the creation of complex sociotechnical systems in urban areas, 
urban space is not a linear and quantifiable materialization, nor a closed system. Forests 
as an ecological infrastructure (Grabowski et al., 2017; Silva & Wheeler, 2017) are 
tightly interdependent with water and energy infrastructure in Arizona. Forests invisibly 
fill up reservoirs, while water resources and the outflow of reservoir water generate 
hydroelectricity. The management of forests affects ecological linkages and the physical 
resilience of water and energy systems in Arizona.    
 
Urban infrastructures such as water, energy, and forest systems are interdependent 
and complex in Arizona. Thermoelectric power plants need water to cool, and water 
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resources come from deep forests. In terms of Phoenix’s water supply portfolio, the city 
of Phoenix prior to 1980 got about half its water from SRP and half from non-renewable 
groundwater pumping. Most of SRP’s water supply comes from the snowpack of the 8.3 
million acre watershed in northern Arizona. Healthy forests are linked to not only the 
quantity but also the quality of water sources in Arizona. SRP, a water and energy utility, 
has made efforts towards reforestation since 2010 in a partnership with the National 
Forest Foundation (NFF). Along with SRP’s efforts, a Water-Business nexus is 
recognizable in Arizona. SanTan Brewing company has collaborated with the NFF 
initiating the reforestation campaign, “From Tap to the Top.” According to the Water 
Research Foundation (2013), wildfires have detrimental impacts on water supply 
infrastructure and the provision of drinking water (p.56).  
 
Energy and forests are also tightly intertwined in Arizona. The resilience of 
forests affects the security of energy systems. Aside from water as a cooling resource for 
thermoelectric power plants, wildfires in forests occasionally devastate electricity grids 
and other energy facilities such as substations, while causing power outages in 
communities (LaMaster, 2018). In this context, the Arizona Corporation Commission 
(ACC) proposed the promotion of biomass energy in Arizona’s Energy Modernization 
Plan (Tobin, 2018). In this plan, for “the benefit of Arizona citizens and the health of 
Arizona’s forests,” the ACC proposes to regulate electricity utilities, which supply more 
than 100,000 MWh electricity to consumers, to use 60 MW of nameplate capacity 
biomass made up of “high-risk fuel” by December 31, 2021 while aiming at the 
completion of thinning one million acres of forests in 20 years.  
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Moreover, a complex threat is emerging in the pathological combination of 
chronic droughts and the engineering resilience perspective and its bouncing back to a 
steady state of ‘thickness.’  This pathological combination has jeopardized urban 
resilience intensifies wildfire risks in Arizona and the United States. Small and large 
wildfires have caused turbid water resources and communication/electricity outages 
coupled with monsoon seasons. For instance, the Schultz wildfire, ignited by an 
abandoned campfire on July 20th, 2010, manifested the complicated interdependence of 
water-energy-forests in Arizona. This fire destroyed a total of 15,051 acres in 10 days. 
The U.S. Forest Service Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) team assessed 
potential risks after the wildfire to mitigate the fire impacts. After the BAER team 
assessed eleven basins within the burned area, five basins (4,5,7,9 and 10) were 
designated as basins of concern due to the burn severity, and the steepness of slopes in 
the devastated areas (US Forest Service, 2010; Koestner et al., 2011).  
 
Aside from the destroyed forest areas, the Schultz fire caused a significant water 
quality problem early in the Monsoon season. The precipitation amounts at the ALERT 
rain gauges was around 1.6 inches, and a very high peak 10-minute intensity was 0.98 
inches. That gave rise to a flood in the burned area. In addition, on August 16th, there 
was another high-intensity rainstorm and 10-minute intensity of 0.59 inches rain (US 
Forest Service, 2010). Due to the intense precipitation, a second flood swept the debris 
and ashes into the nearby reservoirs, which are dammed by SRP. Sediments, fire 
retardants, ashes, and burned organic matter all changed the water chemistry, turbidity, 
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and the nitrate and organic carbon concentration. According to Combrink et al. (2013), 
flooding after the 2010 Schultz Fire caused millions of dollars in damages to 
downstream. According to the City of Flagstaff (2010), the cost of flood mitigation is 
approximately 50,000,000 dollars, which is much five times more than 10,000,000 
dollars spent on fire response.  
 
In 2012, the Sierra Nevada Conservancy, the Nature Conservancy, and the U.S. 
Forest Service modeled the factors that affected wildfire damage and found that the 
implementation of fuel reduction (forest treatment) can benefit the infrastructure 
resilience of the Mokelumne watershed. In the modeling, the fuel treatment resulted in 
considerable cost reduction totaling 2,600,000 dollars, including 1,600,000 dollars worth 
of transmission line protection and 1,000,000 dollars in avoiding sediment damage to 
water supply systems (Buckley et al., 2014). 
 
9.3 Institutional Transformation for Forest Management in Arizona 
Section 9.3 will investigate how the awareness and anticipation of risks of 
wildfires are incorporated into the forest management and thinning projects in Arizona. 
In the following sections, resilience processes will be vetted through the knowledge 
systems approach. 
 
9.3.1 Sensing the fallacy of fire control 
Sensing is a process in which the increase of wildfires is taken up to the decision 
makers as the warning signals of boundaries breaching. Sensing abnormalities in the 
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system patterns are particularly significant as an indication of the necessity of new 
“patterned regularities” (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). Resilience work can only be 
possible with sensing boundary breaches.   
 
Despite a long history of fire extinguishment strategies, policymakers recognized 
that the efficacy of engineering assessment and extinguishment control had not been 
successful for fire-fighting (Agee, 1993; US Forest Service, 1996). One of the designated 
culprits was the poor management of ecological infrastructures, forests (i.e., the 
simplistic engineering approaches to forests). Until the 1970s, federal land managers, 
except Harold Weaver, who highlighted the use of prescribed fires, were most inclined 
toward the efficient scientific control of fires, and thus the detachment of fire-forest 
interdependencies without anticipating unintended consequences (Pyne, 1982; Arno, 
1996a). Since the USDA Forest Service’s founder, Pinchot left in 1910, and the 
organization has neglected the traditional knowledge of positive effects of wildfires on 
wildland forests preserved by Native Americans and other ecologists including Pinchot 
for decades. Pinchot argued for “the natural role of fire,” but the “creative action of forest 
fires” has never been appreciated by federal-level organizations including the USDA 
Forest Service (Arno, 1996a). Consistent suppressions have typically resulted in more 
intense wildfires.  
 
Meanwhile, in the 1970s, the increasing numbers of wildfires were evident (US 
Forest Service, 1996). Coupled with this recognition, the surge of wildfire acreage in 
western states (Arno, 1996a), a Report by Starker Leopold and others (1963) proposed 
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the management transition to the federal agencies from a “fire control” scheme into “fire 
management” in 1970s (Lotan, 1979; Parsons & Botti, 1996; Arno, 1996a). Based on this 
advising, the National Park Service implemented the first prescribed burning in 1968 
(Parsons & Wagtendonk, 1996). Then, forest managers began to understand the 
importance of prescribed fires in forest restoration processes and the negative results of 
engineered fire suppressions (Parsons & Botti, 1996). The Fire in Multiple-Use 
Management Research, Development and Applications (RD & A) Program (the USDA 
Forest Service) advised forest managers to understand the role of fire in the health of 
ecosystems, institutionalize this new fire scheme into management practices, and 
recognize the risks of linear suppressions (Loutan, 1979; Teensma, 1996).  
 
Finally, in 1995, the US National Forest Service held a conference session, “The 
Use of Fires in Forest Restoration” on the direction of forest restoration at the Society for 
Ecological Restoration at the University of Washington. In Arizona, the ecological 
resource of the Ponderosa Pine forests was burned by severe wildfires in the 1990s. In 
1997, the Greater Flagstaff Forest Partnership (GFFP), with the Coconino National Forest 
of the US Forest Service, Northern Arizona University, and the Wildland Fire 
Management division of the city of Flagstaff, were established to manage fires in 
Ponderosa Pine forests (O’Grady, Camey, & Vogel, 2016). William Covington, Director 
of Ecology Restoration Institute at Northern Arizona University (NAU), has focused on 
healthy forest management and the role of fires in forest resilience since the 1970s. The 
Ecology Restoration Institute at NAU has significantly contributed to the Four Forest 
Restoration Initiative (4FRI), which is a project that aims at restoring 2.4 million acres 
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forests in Northern Arizona since 2012. The increasing wildfires became not just an issue 
in Arizona but also in the broader context, the United States.  
 
9.3.2 Anticipating more fires within forest boundaries 
“Anticipatory Governance,” (Barben et al., 2008; Guston, 2014) collectively 
practicing imaginaries and building consensus for future uncertainties, which are 
different from foresight or prediction, is an essential step in resilience knowledge 
processes. Anticipating is a procedure that relates past observed data and monitoring 
warning signals of future systems. In resilience engineering, anticipation means 
developing future strategies in preparation for “possible crisis and disasters.” 
Anticipation does not need to be based on quantified assessments, but rather the 
qualitative enhancement of sensing (Park et al., 2013). The way Hollnagel (2011) and 
Park et al. (2013) term anticipation coordinates with the definition of anticipatory 
governance which means “a broad-based capacity extended through society that can act 
on a variety of inputs to manage emerging knowledge-based technologies while such 
management is still possible” (Guston, 2008; Barben et al., 2008; Guston, 2014). 
Anticipation in Arizona for forest resilience can be characterized by preparatory 
planning, engagement efforts, and the integration of stakeholders’ epistemologies in 
preparation for future disruptions such as increasing wildfires (Barben et al., 2008; 
Guston, 2014).  
 
Increasing wildfires signaled the malfunction of forest systems. Moreover, the 
correlation between high temperatures and wildfires ignited epistemological anticipation. 
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There is a clear correlation between the increase of temperature and wildfires in the 
Western United States. As the mean temperature in March through August in the West 
goes up, the annual frequency of forest wildfires, which burn over 400 ha, increases. For 
instance, in 1970, the mean temperature was approximately 13.5, and the number of 
wildfires was 30. However, in 2003, the number increased to approximately 100 as the 
mean temperature reached 15 (Westerling, 2008). Currently, wildfires (> 10,000 acres) 
on U.S. Forest Service Land are about seven times more than 40 years ago (Climate 
Central, 2012).  
  
 
Figure 35.  The 
average temperature 
and fires  
(source: Climate 
Central, 2012) 
 
 
In particular, in the West, the fire season has increased by 78 days since the mid-
1980s (Westerling et al. 2006). Tinning treatment and prescribed burning would mitigate 
CO2 emissions by burning small diameter trees and shrubs and reducing fuel supporting 
fire (Finkral and Evans 2008; Wiedinmyer and Hurteau 2010). The goal of fuel 
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management is to change wildfire behavior through changes in the fuel complex (Finney, 
2001; Raymond & Peterson, 2005).  
 
Concerns and anticipation about the increase of temperatures as well as wildfires 
forced the involvement of federal departments. At the federal level, severe wildfires—6.7 
million acres were burned—in 2000 pushed the Clinton Administration toward a new 
institution, the National Fire Plan for fire prevention and funding proposed by Interior 
Secretary Bruce Babbitt and Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman. This new plan 
augmented the budget for firefighting and prevention from 1.1 billion dollars to 1.8 
billion dollars for FY 2001. This new plan included fuel treatment (hazardous fuels 
treatment) (thinning and prescribed burning). The western states’ governors supported 
this new plan (Pinchot Institute for Conservation, 2002; Janofsky, 2000). 
 
In Arizona, the Forest Healthy Council and the Forest Health Oversight Council 
was created by Governor Janet Napolitano with the recognition of increasing frequency 
and intensity of unnatural wildfires caused by human land use, fire suppression, and 
climate change (Executive Order, 2003-16). The Forest Healthy Council was focused on 
the development of scientific information and policy recommendations to advise the 
Governor’s administration in addressing forest health, unnaturally severe fires, and 
community protection. This assessment of forest health discovered that the collaboration 
between multiple stakeholders and proactive actions are essential to restoring the 
resilience and health of Arizona’s forests with respect to sustainable water supply in 
Arizona. In May 2006, a workshop was held in Flagstaff, and with input from a wide 
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array of stakeholders, a draft for advising was made. In May 2007, six public meetings 
were held in different locations. Along with these investigative activities, the council 
proposed final advisory points in the document, Statewide Strategy for Restoring 
Arizona’s Forests for the Governor on June 21st, 2007 (Governor’s Forest Health 
Council, 2007).  
 
In a recent report, Wildfire Hazard Quantification and Effects on the 
Infrastructures (U.S. Forest Service, 2015), infrastructures such water and energy 
infrastructures were identified as a social resource that would be damaged by wildfires. 
Based on the simulation and survey results, experts expected infrastructures such as 
transmission lines, communication facilities, mineral operations, Oil and Gas Storage 
Tanks & Pipelines would be significantly affected by 12 feet high wildfires. According to 
“Mokelumne Watershed Avoided Cost Analysis (2014),” forest treatment impacted fire 
suppression and rehabilitation costs, with treatments, avoided costs vary from 35 to 43.3 
million dollars (Buckley et al., 2014). Recent modeling of wildfire risks and electricity 
resilience in California reveals that the transmission lines in the state will be increasingly 
exposed to wildfire risks across the state (Sathaye et al. 2012). 
 
  231 
 Figure 36.  Projected 
wildfires and the increase of 
grid failure probability  
(source: Sathaye et al. 2012) 
 
 
9.3.3 Adapting ‘thick forests’ to climate change: fire control to fire management 
across boundaries 
In the 1990s, an institutionalization of fire management for ecosystems was 
ordered by the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review 
(Teensma, 1996). Since then, Thinning treatment and prescriptive fires were proposed by 
many scientists, land managers, and restoration practitioners. According to Fule et al. 
(2001), potential fire behavior can be reduced by following forest restoration treatments. 
Using “tree thinning, prescribed burning, and/ or other fuel reduction methods,” new 
regime shifts such as new institutional practices for frequent, low-intensity fires, and 
sparse vegetation landscapes to forest management were recommended in the 2000s 
(Fule, McHugh, Heinlein, and Covington, 2001). According to Fule et al. (2001), 
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“thinning treatments substantially reduced fire behavior under the same environmental 
circumstances.” Also, it was revealed that some economic benefits from forest product 
removal could be gained through thinning (Larson and Mirth, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 37.  Treatment 
effects and the damage 
severity  
(source: Fule, McHugh, 
Heinlein, and 
Convington, 2001)  
 
In Fig. 37, the correlation between fire severity and forest density is clear. The 
fire behavior assessment team assessed this correlation after the Antelope Complex 
Wheeler Fire. Wildfires severely burned the treated areas, but the treatment of forest 
reduced fire behavior and lessened soil impacts. It was observed that the severe and 
intense crown fire (high heat) was transitioned and contained into small surface fires in 
the pre-treated areas. Fire suppression practices have changed the dynamics of fire in 
ponderosa pine forests across the southwest (Fites et al., 2007; North et al. 2009). 
 
Restoration treatments mitigate fire behavior and effects while providing multiple 
additional benefits and healthier ecosystems (Covington et al. 2001; Omi and Martinson, 
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2002; Fulé et al. 2001; Fiedler and Keegan 2003; Triepke et al. 2011). Pre-treatments and 
prescribed wildfires changed wildfires behavior in the treated areas. Pre-treated/burned 
areas are more likely to make surface fires producing effects beneficial to the ecosystems. 
Surface fires are easier to manage than crown fires (Westerling et al., 2006, p. 271). 
Thinning treatments and prescribed burning are expected to mitigate CO2 emissions from 
wildfires as well. For instance, the San Juan Fire, 2014 proved the efficacy of treatments. 
The San Juan Fire harmed the untreated forest area on the right side (7,000 acres) of the 
road, but the left side, the treated forest, was not affected by the fire (Thorpe, B. 2015).  
 
 
Figure 38.  Treated 
vs. Untreated  
(source: Thorpe, B. 
2015; Photo: Bob 
Thorpe) 
 
 
In the meantime, the frequency of wildfires has worsened, and fire seasons have 
become longer. Wildfires of larger than 10,000 acres are about seven times more now 
than 40 years ago on U.S. Forest Service Land (Climate Central, 2012). Responding to 
these threats, Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Policy was done in 
2001. Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire 
Management Policy was established in 2003. In 2009, USDA and USDOI stated and 
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integrated the management of ‘fire, as a critical natural process’ into an institution for the 
“plans and activities” of land and resource management, which is Guidance for 
Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. In turn, guidance for fire 
management activities was also incorporated into the Forest Service Manual 5100 for the 
USDA Forest Service.  
 
However, this transition from “thickening” to “thinking” has been struggling with 
and confronted by other administrative ‘uncertainties’ such as “funding for prescribed 
burning and silviculture” and “the smoke emissions produced by prescribed burning” 
which impose legal burdens upon forest managers (Arno, 1996a; 1996b). Legal, 
operational, and financial constraints were the main reason of underprovision of thinning 
practices. Not only legal protection of wilderness, operational limitations due to slope 
steepness, and financial budget limits impeded prescribed burning or “managed 
wildfires”, but also these proactive practices rely on several crucial conditions such as 
moderate weather, smoke controls, and managing fire intensity which is out of human 
control (North et al., 2015). For instance, in 1994, the suppression of “frequent low-
intensity fires” devastated ponderosa pine forest areas in the West (Arno, 1996b). 
 
Also, with respect to ‘value’ discrepancies, there have been consistent debates 
between the U.S. Forest Service and environmental advocacy groups. In Arizona, the 
issue of the endangered Mexican spotted owl was one case. In 1993, the Co-founder of 
the Center for Biological Diversity, Robin Silver (emergency physician) pressed the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service to protect the Mexican spotted owl (MSO) as an endangered 
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species under the Endangered Species Act. In 1994, Silver asked U.S. Fish and Wildfire 
to designate a habitat area for the MSO by litigation. Federal Judge Carl Muecke issued 
an injunction preventing the cutting of certain types of forests in Arizona, New Mexico, 
and the other Southwestern region in August 1995. In December 1996, the order was 
lifted. Through this period, the economy of the timber industry in Arizona collapsed. 
After the injunction was eliminated, the filing of other lawsuits by non-profit 
environment groups halted the thinning projects in Arizona. In 1996, 2000, 2003, and 
2012, the center for biological diversity group sued the U.S. Forest Service and required 
to protect the habitat of MSO. For instance, in the case of Forest Guardians v. Thomas 
(October 1996), the Center for Biological Diversity and the Forest Guardians (New 
Mexico) challenged the new guidelines for the MSO. The two groups asked the Court for 
an injunction against the older forest thinning plans. In December 1997, the 9the U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected these appeals. In the case of Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Bosworth (May 2000), the Center for Biological Diversity filed a lawsuit in 
arguing that the U.S. Forest Service had not abided by the procedural rules to develop the 
Baca Ecosystem Management Area plan, including commercial timber cutting. In the 
case of Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service (January 2003), after the 
Rodeo-Chediski fire, the U.S. Forest Service developed a plan to sell the dead trees 
resulting from the fire. The council sued the U.S. Forest Service while claiming the 
violation of federal laws regulating the procedures (e.g., environmental assessment) 
(Cowan, 2015; Blois, 2017; The Associated Press, 2012)  
 
9.3.4 Learning from 4FRI projects  
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The applications and tests of new knowledge content and structures complete the 
knowledge learning process of resilience. The usefulness of adaptive strategies (e.g., low-
intensity fires and thinning) are finally verified through these learning processes. Verified 
lessons are learned and typically incorporated into knowledge structures such as 
practices, standards, rules, and constitutions for sensing, anticipating future patterns, and 
suggesting alternatives when facing new normals. New knowledge content and 
structures ultimately accomplish knowledge unlearning.  
  
Figure 39. Four Forest Restoration 
Initiative Area 
(source: 4FRI Webpage) 
 
 
In Arizona, as a learning process, 4FRI is a collaborative effort to restore forest 
ecosystems of four national forests—Coconino, Kaibab, Apache-Sitgreaves, and Tonto 
along the Mogollon Rim in northern Arizona. Thinning 50,000 acres of forest annually 
for 20 years across the Tonto, Coconino, Apache-Sitgreaves, and Kaibab national forests 
are the project goal of 4FRI. These four forests are overgrown with young and unhealthy 
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trees that contribute to the threat of unnaturally-severe wildfires. The goal of the 4FRI is 
to restore forests that allow low-intensity surface fires. Specifically, the 4FRI’s purposes 
are four-fold: i) experimenting restoration treatment across 2.4 million acres of ponderosa 
pine forest; ii) for restoration, implementing the increased use of prescribed fire and 
management of natural fires; iii) supporting and promoting new business models for 
timber industries to cover the cost of restoration by selling removed trees and pallets; iv) 
establishing science-based and socially acceptable agreements promoting the 
implementation of long-term, landscape restoration (4FRI Webpage).  
 
The Four Forest Restoration Initiative (4FRI) started in 2011. For five years, they 
used both methods to restore and protect forests from wildfires. For the assessment of 
4FRI, the impact assessment of environmental and social effects (EIS, Environmental 
Impact Statement) of this project was approved on April 17th, 2015 according to National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The first EIS assessed about 750,000 acres of 
ponderosa pine vegetation on the Coconino and Kaibab forests. 4FRI is an experimental 
learning process of resilience knowledge systems to review and evaluate the efficacy of 
institutional transformations in managing forests: both thinning treatments and prescribed 
burning.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
The implications of each chapter from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 are as follows: the 
sociotechnical systems approach to infrastructures (Chapter 2), the new definition of 
infrastructure resilience (Chapter 3), and the respective resilience implementations of 
  238 
different institutions for infrastructures (Chapter 4). The sociotechnical perspective was 
applied to Chapter 5 to explain the adaptive, institutional work for the long-term 
management of Hoover Dam. Chapter 6 analyzed the institutional threads managing 
water and energy infrastructures and the resilience work (operational, regulatory, and 
transformational work) of these threads over time. Further, Chapter 7 investigated the 
interdependencies of resilience work which focuses on how institutional changes in water 
systems institutionally affect the management of electricity supply infrastructures in 
Arizona. Chapter 8 employed and tested the efficacy of the ‘risk innovation’ framework 
as a tool to analyze threats from water shortage issues on different value constituencies 
for long-term adaptations and transformations in a vast landscape of infrastructures.  
 
Chapter 9 argues that the resilience of water and energy infrastructures are 
inexplicably coupled with the resilience of forest management in Arizona. 
Transformation processeses in forest management in Arizona illustrate how an 
institutional transition from fire control to fire management affects urban resilience. This 
resilience transition can be better understood from the perspective of knowledge systems 
approach and knowledge components. The resilience processes of sensing, anticipating, 
adapting, and learning in Chapter 9 elaborate the processes of resilience transition in 
forest management. The descriptive work on the changes of forest management in 
Arizona accentuates the indispensable work of institutions to the transformational 
changes of socio-eco-technical infrastructures for resilience.  
 
 
  239 
CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 Summary of Findings  
• Infrastructure is not just technology. It also includes social arrangements (e.g., the 
organizations and workforces that manage technology and the use of technology 
by users to create valuable services) and various forms of labor and work to 
imagine, design, build, operate, repair, adapt, and transform technologies over 
time. This view should be a critical point in managing for infrastructure resilience, 
which requires maintaining and/or recovering both the physical 
performance/capabilities of technologies and the social arrangements and forms 
of work necessary to support those. 
 
• The resilience of infrastructures is, therefore, not simply a static feature of the 
technical or engineering design of a physical (or cyberphysical system) but rather 
a dynamic accomplishment or an outcome of institutional resilience work. This 
feature of infrastructure dynamics necessitates a transition from conventional 
engineering approaches toward alternative ideas and actions that emphasize 
whether or not institutions are doing the work necessary to create stability (in the 
short-term), in order to maintain infrastructure services); adaptability (in the 
medium-term), in order to respond to incremental changes in infrastructure 
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contexts and environments; and transformability (in the long-term), in order to 
respond to changing societal and economic needs and values.  
 
• In terms of new resilience ideas, understanding and improving infrastructure 
resilience requires consideration and analyses of the social and institutional work 
required. This requires, in turn, improved understanding of the institutional 
governance of interdependent infrastructures across multiple scales, the 
uncertainties institutions confront, and the differences in organizational objectives 
and resilience frameworks associated with operational, regulatory, and 
constitutional institutions.  
 
• With respect to resilience actions, infrastructure institutions need to better 
understand and execute their resilience work, so that infrastructure can be made, 
as appropriate, stable, adaptable, and transformable over time. In other words, 
enhancing the resilience work of institutions and the knowledge and operational 
capacities of institutions to carry it out should be a focal point of resilience policy 
and investments in improved resilience. 
 
• This research provides theoretical insights and empirical analyses of institutional 
approaches for enhancing infrastructure resilience. While resilience analyses often 
highlight the role of institutions in managing post-disaster responses, this analysis 
focuses on the role of institutions prior to disasters in creating the conditions for 
resilience by properly operating, regulating, and constituting infrastructures 
  241 
through complex, institutional work and the management of interdependencies in 
social systems. Mapping, cataloging, and implementing the resilience work of 
institutions has the potential to help avoid chronic infrastructure inefficiencies or 
acute failures and thus to improving the resilience of infrastructures over time.  
 
10.2 Research Implications 
The case studies in this research attest to the fact that improving infrastructure 
resilience requires explicit understanding of institutional arrangements in response to 
social changes and biophysical challenges such as climate change. The maladaptation of 
institutions and misinformation can lead to resilience failures of infrastructures. The 
current institutional mismatches will manifest in infrastructure failures in the future. 
Furthermore, recurrent institutions and resilience failures give rise to low level trust in 
public politics which in turn diminishes political leadership in the long term (Vinck et al. 
2019).  
 
The optimal alignment of institutional threads (e.g., vertical, lateral, and 
longitudinal threads) for infrastructures can be achieved via rigorous analyses on 
infrastructures with diverse institutional matrices such as risk assessment, life-cycle 
assessments, cost-benefit analyses, environmental impact assessments, social impact 
assessments, customer satisfaction indices, inclusive civic participation, risk innovation, 
and resilience politics. This research can help to design more resilient infrastructures 
wherein well-aligned metrices and approaches play out to construct, operate, maintain, 
reconfigure, and redesign infrastructures (McDaniel et al., 2013).  
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Infrastructure is a dynamic sociotechnical system. Infrastructure is not a static nor 
a physically independent system. Infrastructure by definition a mediation—a “quasi-
object” (Latour 1991)—between society and technoscience. The management of 
infrastructures for resilience requires the optimal alignment of both the engineering and 
institutional aspects of water and energy systems (Finger et al., 2005). Thus, to improve 
the resilience of our infrastructures to climate change, we will first have to improve the 
institutional ‘landscape, regimes, and niches (Geels, 2005).’ How do institutions improve 
resilience? How do institutions detract from resilience? These questions are critical to 
infrastructure resilience. This sociotechnical awareness helps to understand how to 
prepare institutions for future internal or external disruptions to infrastructure. 
 
Most importantly, the institutional matrix should take into consideration the 
dynamics of balancing of institutional management to render infrastructures stable yet 
flexible in a nuanced way. Different functions of institutions such as operational, 
regulatory, and constitutional institutions stabilize, regulate, and transform institutional 
arrangements for infrastructures with different organizational structures, for different 
goals, and at different temporal and geospatial scales. Different (e.g., operational, 
regulatory, and constitutional) institutions fit distinctive resilience frameworks such as 
engineering resilience, resilience engineering, and general resilience.  
 
Moreover, infrastructural interdependence is comprised of not only physical but 
also institutional linkages. Vulnerabilities run through direct or indirect interdependence 
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networks of infrastructures (Eakin et al., 2018), and thus interdependence grids transport 
vulnerabilities and trade-offs through institutional conduits. Thus, climate stressors and 
other infrastructure risks run through these settings of institutional matrix of 
infrastructures while disrupting past, present, and future institutional arrangements. 
Institutional changes in one part (e.g., water systems) give rise to impacts on the 
operation and management of counterparts (e.g., energy systems). For instance, 
infrastructure resilience management should incorporate water governance changes to 
power plants of APS and conflicting regulations (e.g., water conservation and air quality) 
on circulation and vaporization practices of cooling water in Palo Verde plant’s stacks. 
Given institutional interdependence, a linear resilience concept from engineering 
reductionism does not fit in dealing with infrastructural management. Rather, 
infrastructure resilience challenges typically accompany political and value questions for 
our sociotechnical society (see Maynard (2015) on risk innovation).  
 
The significance of institutions for infrastructures is also evident in socio-eco-
technical networks of water-energy-forest systems in Arizona. These lessons learned 
from the liaison studies between institutions and infrastructure resilience in this research 
provide a couple of suggestions in making public policies in the section 10.3.  
 
10.3 Policy Suggestions 
Policymakers should be wary of three institutional aspects in making policies 
regarding infrastructure resilience: outdated data, social complexity such as institutional 
interdependencies, and trade-offs. In particular, modeling amalgamated with static data 
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(Katz, 2010), unclear hierarchies and overlapping jurisdictions of regulatory policies, and 
trade-offs convoluted with organizational proliferation (Tyler et al., 2016; Eakin et al., 
2016) in transformative processes can result in worsening infrastructure vulnerabilities 
rather than enhancing resilience.  
 
In particular, the first and most significant challenge to sociotechnical adaptation 
is incorporating climate change awareness to upgrade modeling and institutions that 
manage infrastructures (Sampson, Quay, & White, 2016; Doherty, M., Klima, K. & 
Hellmann, J., 2016). Otherwise, the outdated institutions rather detract from 
infrastructure resilience. Outdated data conditions, such as precipitation patterns, 
considered “normal” in the 20th century no longer work for infrastructures in the next 
decades (Milly et al., 2008; Katz, 2010) Weather extremes and unanticipated variability 
from climate change are challenging existing institutional systems for infrastructure. The 
climate resilience of infrastructure depends on whether institutions successfully update 
the best available information on climate change trends and coherently improve their 
protocols, regulations, and constitutions for modeling, upgrading, replacing, and 
transforming infrastructure.  
 
The second institutional point for infrastructure resilience is institutional 
interdependencies of sociotechnical contexts. For instance, new community norms, such 
as a commitment to reduce carbon emissions, can force rapid and unanticipated changes 
to the energy infrastructure. Due to the tight water-energy nexus, new CO2 emission 
regulations on electric utilities can significantly affect water systems and water prices. 
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Likewise, changes in the availability or temperature of surface water due to climate 
change ramify onto the electric system (e.g., gas-fired turbine transition). Preparing for 
climatic challenges requires an integrated perspective on the interdependence of these 
two systems.  
 
Lastly, trade-offs challenge comes from the intersection of the first 
(institutionalization) and the second (interdependence) stated above. The physical and 
institutional complexity of infrastructure can exacerbate vulnerabilities when coupled 
with long-term or short-term climate stressors. The landscape of coupled water and 
energy systems in Arizona consists of a complex network of myriad organizations–15 
energy utilities and 54 water utilities registered at the AZ Corporation Commission as of 
2017. If we include private providers not registered with the ACC, the number of water 
providers would be over 100 (Larson et al. 2013, p.64). The collective action of a system 
cannot be reduced to “aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ attributes or 
motives” (March and Olsen, 1984). Thus, this institutional complexity requires 
coordination and cooperative negotiation on diverse trade-offs for updating institutions 
(Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Leichenko, 2011; Tyler et al., 2016; Eakin et al., 2016).  
 
10.4 Future Research  
For possible future work, broader and more diverse political and regulatory 
contexts can be explored in line with the sociotechnical systems approach to urban 
resilience and interdependent systems. These contexts can include the variations of 
sociotechnical concepts, the sociotechnical contexts of urban resilience conflicts at local 
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and global scales, climate extremes to urban resilience and trade-offs, resilience and 
equity issues, and regulatory failures in energy disasters in relation to urban resilience.  
 
First, one of future research can be focused on how climate change draws upon 
multiple variations of resilience concepts, represented in laws and regulations associated 
with the climate adaptation of infrastructures in global contexts. The concept of resilience 
has been interpreted by diverse global communities and applied to governmental policies 
in various forms of climate strategies (e.g., redundancy, adaptiveness, and flexibility). 
Second, another possible project can be examining how the epistemological strategies of 
urban resilience at the global scale can disrupt pre-existing trade-off settings at a regional 
scale. This research will be focused on innate trade-off challenges (e.g., gentrification 
versus green infrastructure for safe-to-fail strategies, food industry versus water-efficient 
products, and so forth) to infrastructures concerned with regional adaptations in global 
communities in response to climate change. Third, one possibility may include relating a 
new theoretical interpretation of resilience for a balanced, empirical approach to the 
political geography issues of resilience equity while elaborating utilities and 
shortcomings of resilience concepts in regional planning.  
 
This research points to possible spaces for improving resilience assessments and 
politics. By denying either linear engineering or process-centric resilience approach, the 
congruence and optimization of establishing and implementing resilience policies can be 
pursued with the resilience framework of this research. On a small scale, operational 
institutions fit in engineering resilience, but general resilience is more appropriate in the 
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long-term and on a large scale. Yet, the boundaries of the respective small, medium, and 
large scales are not clear. In some cases, individual transformation on a small scale is also 
possible. Furthermore, decision making to scale up or scale down is a more complex task. 
In a timely manner, how to categorize and work each resilience case into either stability 
or flexibility or even transformability-centric order is a more challenging question to 
policymakers. Who participates, in what ways, and to what effect in resilience boundary 
work? (Miller, 2017) To put boundaries, we first need to make clear boundaries to all 
constituencies. In this vein, resilience work and consideration of this research interrogate 
our democracy. 
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1 According to US National Science and Technology Council, resilience is a capacity of a 
system, community, or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, 
by resisting or changing, in order to reach and maintain an acceptable 
level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to 
which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase its 
capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk 
reduction measures (US National Science and Technology Council).  
 
2 Southern California Edison had opposed to any government dam on the Colorado River. 
It wanted hydroelectric dams to be built by the private sector. However, Congress 
rejected that position, so Southern California Edison tried to ensure that government 
dams remained small. It did not want inexpensive publicly owned power to compete with 
its own power generation in the electricity market. In the late 1920s, after the US 
government confirmed again its intention to build a large hydropower dam on the 
Colorado River in the 1928 “Report of the Colorado River Board on the Boulder Dam 
Project,” the company requested permission to be involved in power generation in the 
Colorado River Basin. After Congress also rejected this, it asked for the right to distribute 
the hydroelectricity from the dam. The company then lobbied Congress to allocate the 
states of Arizona and Nevada a larger share of the power from Boulder Dam, believing it 
would be able to buy that cheap power and distribute it at a profit in rapidly growing 
southern California. Donald Pisani, Water and American Government: The Reclamation 
Bureau, National Water Policy, and the West, 1902-1935 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2002), 233-234; Paul L. Kleinsorge, The Boulder Canyon Project 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1941), 79.      
 
3 “… Applications should state the quantity of power desired and should contain a 
general statement concerning the purposes and place of use of the power covered by the 
application, with such other information as may be considered necessary. The early 
submission of applications is desirable in order that a decision may be reached 
concerning the allotment of the power to be made available by this development.” 
 
4 Applicants applying for hydroelectricity from Hoover Dam 
Applicant Date of 
application 
Horsepower Load 
factor 
( % ) 
Millions of 
kWh 
Remarks 
State of 
Nevada 
Sep. 8, 1929   1,200  
State of Utah Oct.  1, 1929 50,000    
Metropolitan 
Water District 
July 5, 1929 280,000 98 1,789  
Mohave 
County, 
Arizona 
Sep. 28, 1929  100,000    
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City of Los 
Angeles, 
California 
July 5, 1929 11,000,000 155 3,600  
City of 
Burbank, 
California  
Sep. 24, 1929 16,800 145 20  
City of San 
Bernardino, 
California 
Oct. 21, 1929 10,000 145 129  
City of 
Pasadena, 
California 
Sep. 24, 1929 24,500 45 72  
City of 
Glendale, 
California 
Sep. 21, 1929 117,000 145 50  
City of 
Riverside, 
California 
Oct. 24, 1929    Amounts 
not stated 
City of Santa 
Ana, 
California 
Sep. 30, 1929 10,000 145 129  
City of 
Newport 
Beach, 
California 
Do. 10,000 145 129  
City of 
Beverly Hills, 
California 
Oct. 30, 1929    Do. 
Southern 
California 
Edison Co. 
July 5, 1929 1850,000 165 3,600  
Central 
Arizona Light 
& Power Co. 
Oct 5, 1929    Do. 
Los Angeles 
Gas & 
Electric 
Corporation 
Sep. 24, 1929 73,000 137 1177 Or 7.3% of 
California 
allocation  
The Arizona 
Power Co. 
Sep. 30, 1929 30,000 150 198  
Yuma Utilities 
Co. 
Sep. 27, 1929 26,800 145 179  
Southern 
Sierras Power 
Co. 
Do. 172,600 160 286 7.94% of all 
generated 
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Public 
Utilities 
Consolidated 
Corporation 
Sep. 28, 1929 134,000 150 1394  
San Diego 
Consolidated 
Gas & 
Electric 
Corporation 
Sep. 27, 1929    3.9% of 
California 
allocation 
Katherine 
Midway 
Mining Co. 
Sep. 12, 1929 5,000 150 116  
Consolidated 
Feldspar 
Corporation 
Sep. 25, 1929 325 150 11  
J. T. Dobbins, 
Fredonia, 
Arizona 
Sep. 10, 1929    Amounts 
not stated 
United Verde 
Copper Co. 
Sep. 23, 1929    Do. 
Palo Verde 
Mesa & 
Chucawalla 
Valley 
Development 
Association 
July 3, 1929 30,000 150 198  
City of  
Colton 
Oct 21, 1929 3,000 45 9  
1 Quantities assumed from best data available. 
 
5 General regulations for lease of power VI (1) (a) One and sixty-three hundreds mills 
($0.00163) per kilowatt-hour, for firm energy (The United States Department of the 
Interior. The Hoover Dam power and water contracts, 109.) 
 
6 There were 10 meetings of the Colorado River Commission for the Colorado River 
Compact. The first 7 meetings were held in Washington between January 26th and 30th 
in 1922. The members of commission were Norviel, W. (Arizona), McClure, W. 
(California), Carpenter, D. (Colorado), Serugham, J. (Nevada), Davis, S. jr. (New 
Mexico), Caldwell, R. (Utah), and Emerson, F. (Wyoming). (U.S. Department of the 
Interior, The Hoover Dam Power and Water Contracts, 5)     
7 This is according to the article II (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of Colorado River Compact. 
See the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Updating The Hoover Dam Documents, 4. 
 
8 For the total allocation for the state of California, there was final agreement among the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the Board of Water and Power 
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Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, and the Southern California Edison Co. on 
March 20th, 1930. The agreement is about the division of 64% hydroelectricity for the 
state of California. As a result of agreement, 36% was allocated to the Metropolitan 
Water District, 19% to the City of Los Angeles and other municipalities that have filed 
application, and 9% to the Southern California Edison Co. (U.S. Department of the 
Interior, The Hoover Dam Power and Water Contracts, 526) 
 
9 “H.R. 4349. Hoover Power Allocation Act” The House Republican Conference, 
accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.gop.gov/bill/h-r-4349-hoover-power-
allocation-act/; “Introduction of the Arizona Power Authority” APA, accessed November 
10, 2014, http://www.powerauthority.org/about-us/; “The Hoover Allocation Act – Fact 
Sheet.” Colorado River Commission of Nevada accessed November 10, 2014, 
http://www.crchooverallocation.com/files/Hoover%20factsheet%20-%2020130801.pdf  
 
10 “Hoover Power Allocation Act” Senate Report 112-58 accessed November 10, 2014, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112srpt58/html/CRPT-112srpt58.htm 
 
11 “Conformed General Consolidated Power Marketing Criteria or Regulations for 
Boulder City Area Projects (49 FR 50582).” Western Area Power Administration, 
Department of 
Energy accessed November 10, 2014, 
http://www.wapa.gov/DSW/pwrmkt/PDProj/RefMaterial/Cgcpmc.pdf  
 
12 “President Signs Hoover Dam Power Allocation Act.” Lisa Lien-Mager, accessed 
November 10, 2014.    
 http://www.acwa.com/news/federal-relations/president-signs-hoover-dam-power-
allocation-act  
 
13 “Comments upon proposed post-2017 Boulder Canyon Project Marketing Criteria To 
Desert Southwest Regional Manager Western Area Power Administration,” Arizona 
Power Authority accessed November 10, 2014, http://2017.powerauthority.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/POST-2017-BCP-Comments.pdf  
 
14 “Comments upon proposed post-2017 Boulder Canyon Project Marketing Criteria To 
Desert Southwest Regional Manager Western Area Power Administration,” Arizona 
Power Authority accessed November 10, 2014, http://2017.powerauthority.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/POST-2017-BCP-Comments.pdf  
 
15 “Notice of Proposed Allocation. (Federal Register Vol. 79, No. 153).” WAPA, 
Department of Energy accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2014-08-08/pdf/2014-18797.pdf  
 
16 “Notice of Proposed Allocation. (Federal Register Vol. 79, No. 153).” WAPA, 
Department of Energy accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2014-08-08/pdf/2014-18797.pdf  
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17 Service standard includes standards for voltage, frequency, and other technical 
requirements, distribution service 
 
18 The initial allocation for CAP delivery was 1.49 MAF. However, 75,000 AF was 
calculated as system loss. (Arizona water settlement agreement between the United States 
of America and the State of Arizona (2007)) 
 
19 Minute No. 319: “Interim international cooperative measures in the Colorado river 
basin through 2017 and extension of minute 318 cooperative measures to address the 
continued effects of the April 2010 earthquake in the Mexicali valley, Baja California” 
